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Abstract
While rarely studied, primary elections have a tremendous affect on the general election.
This effect can be magnified by institutional differences in the way primary and general
elections operate in the states. In the case of judicial elections, the effects of the primary are
further confounded by the differences in judicial selection systems across the states. My goal
is to understand the role of the primary election as a stepping stone on the way to office.
This dissertation endeavors to answer three questions: 1. What are the relevant differences
between judicial primary election systems? 2. What influences challengers to emerge in
judicial primary elections? 3. How do women move through judicial primary elections to the
general election? Using a new, original dataset of judicial primary elections from 1990–2016,
I isolated the relevant differences and identified five different types of primary elections held
in judicial contests. Challengers are more likely to appear in races where the incumbent had
faced challengers in prior primary elections. In the aggregate, women do not face systematic
disadvantages in primary elections and win primary contests at high rates. These findings
add to the scholarly understanding of judicial elections and prompt further studies on the
role of the primary in state judicial and legislative elections.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most of the research done on elections in the United States focuses on the general, or
final, election. However, the race for office begins many months before the first Tuesday
in November. Primary elections are one stepping stone in a multi-part electoral cycle and
they are important institutions that shape candidate emergence and the general election
outcomes. Despite this, there is a void in the literature on judicial primary races. This is an
unfortunate gap in the scholarship, as our scholarly understanding of how judges are elected
neglects the key role played by primary elections in state judicial races. For incumbents
and potential challengers each phase of the election cycle has a different set of constituents,
goals, and challenges.
In 2016, there were 65 supreme court seats up for election across the United States. Of
these, 28 were retention elections in which no challengers are permitted to stand; of the
remaining 37 elections, 24 were contested, and 13 seats were uncontested. Several were
decided at the primary level, particularly in Texas, where there is no meaningful opposition
during the general election. There, incumbents are more likely to be challenged by members
of their own party. In Idaho, one race was decided completely at the primary level and was
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not even listed on the general election ballot.
State supreme courts have a great influence on the lives of the average citizen. While
each state’s supreme court has a different case load, it is estimated that state supreme courts
decide over ten thousand cases a year (Hanson 2001). A vast majority of the time, unsatisfied
litigants have no other recourse after this decision, as most state supreme court cases do not
deal with questions involving federal laws. Therefore, state supreme courts are the court
of final resort for most citizens, particularly when it comes to answering questions of state
law (Langer 2002). State supreme courts are also powerful in that they determine when
Supreme Court precedent is applicable. In so doing, states have the ability to limit what
might initially be interpreted as a sweeping decision by the Supreme Court (Romans 1974).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court gets the bulk of scholarly and media attention, it is the
justices on America‘s state courts who make decisions with consequences much closer to
home for the average American.
Judicial races are undergoing a renaissance of relevance in that interest is increasing in
the races and the candidates themselves. Although interest in all judicial races is increasing,
the effects are felt differently in each state because of different electoral rules. Judicial
elections were once considered low interest and low information (Schaffner and Streb 2002),
but more recent awareness of the judiciary’s impact on the laws of the land and the lives of
citizens have made these elections more competitive at the state level (Schaffner and Streb
2002; Hall 2001). This is one instance in which the states have no unified standard, thereby
leading to several different methods of judicial selection and retention across the United
States. However, the effects of these divergent systems are felt differently in each state due
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to the number of moving parts, or institutional differences in the ways judges are selected
and retained. Focusing on the judicial primary has the potential to reveal important insights
about which candidates emerge and the strength of the incumbent advantage in determining
the outcome of judicial elections.
There is a steadily growing body of research analyzing the ways electoral institutions
influence the outcome of the election cycle for the executive (e.g. Holbrook and McClurg
2005) and legislative branches (e.g. Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006), and a smaller,
albeit growing, segment of research that looks at the influence of primary elections in execu-
tive and legislative contests (Boatright 2014; Gerber and Morton 1998; Lazarus 2005). This
research provides a foundational theory for the ways primary elections influence candidate
behavior and the outcomes of the general election. While this research was not specifically
written about judicial primary elections, the same concepts may apply across the branches
of government. However, little is known about the ways state judicial primaries influence
the eventual winner of the election.
Before filing as a candidate in the election, potential challengers must take into consider-
ation how many elections they will run in and their chances of winning each election before
obtaining the seat. In some states, particularly those with entrenched partisanship, the only
competitive election occurs at the primary stage, with the winner of the general election be-
ing a virtual certainty (Klumpp 2011). Having the ability to win the general election means
nothing if a potential challenger is unable to move beyond the primary election to the general
election. The different institutional rules surrounding the primary election influence when
challengers emerge in judicial elections. Specifically, evidence suggests potential challengers
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take the incumbent’s prior primary and general election vote shares under consideration
before filing as a candidate (Lazarus 2008a). Additionally, it is possible that differences
in electoral institutions would lead to some states having more competitive elections while
other have less competitive elections.
Different institutional characteristics may also influence progress towards greater diversity
on the state supreme courts. Women lag behind in gaining representation on state courts
and current evidence suggests women may be held back from advancing through the primary
election, or women may face more, or stronger, challengers. The different types of primary
elections and culture surrounding them may lead to some states having more women run for,
and win, election while other states have few women, or women may face a more stringent
vetting process as they move through the election cycle. Thus far, scholars have offered
many hypotheses on the forces at work driving the election of women in the primary (Hayes
and Lawless 2016; Lawless and Pearson 2008; Reid 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006a), but there are
few studies to confirm these hypotheses. This study endeavors to fill some of the gaps in the
literature concerning when women run and win before they reach the general election.
These are but two of the possible consequences of primary elections. While there is an
established subfield of work on judicial general elections in an attempt to understand when
challengers get elected and what factors influence the election prospects of all candidates,
there has been no such attention on judicial primary elections. Not only is the primary
election one step on the way to winning office, but it is also the closest step to the general
election. Scholars cannot understand the general election without understanding the missing
link, or the primary election.
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Dissertation Overview
Winning public office is not the result of a singular event. Rather, there are several
critical junctions on the path to office. The first of these is for all candidates, challengers and
incumbents alike, to decide to run for office. If the incumbent decides to run for reelection,
potential challengers know the strengths and weaknesses of their opponent prior to the filing
date. This allows challengers to be strategic and shape the decision to run for office. However,
this can be a blind process, particularly in open seat elections where potential challengers
make this decision not knowing in advance who else will run for office.
The filing date is one of several critical junctures introducing or removing candidates
from the election. It is possible a strong incumbent can win the election on the filing date
if they are successfully able to deter all potential challengers from filing for election. Even
if the election is competitive, it is still possible for one candidate to win long before the
general election because candidates must first navigate through the primary election. Again,
here it is possible for any candidate to lose. Conversely, it is also possible for a candidate to
defeat all competition in the primary election and either obtain office, or move the general
election with an assured victory. Conceptualizing elections as a series of sprints, rather than
a marathon, reveals the ways in which the general election is not an isolated event.
Much is made of the many different selection systems for judges and the influence those
systems have on how candidates obtain office in the states. There has been limited study
of the ways judicial primary systems differ and what influence that has on which candidates
get to the general election. In Chapter 2 I describe the different judicial election systems
and current knowledge about state supreme courts. Because there is limited research on
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judicial primary elections as one step on the way to gaining office, Chapter 3 describes
current research on primary elections in general and judicial primary elections specifically.
Here, I explain current research on primary elections, how they influence the outcomes of
general elections, and their potential influence on judicial elections.
In order to categorize judicial primary elections, I create a typology of primary elections
which differentiates primary elections on partisanship, ability to win office in the primary
election, and the presence of uncontested primary elections. This leads to five categories in
states with judicial elections: Always Held Partisan Primaries (AHP), Challenger-Based Par-
tisan Primaries (CBP), Election-Runoff (ERO), Always Held Nonpartisan Primaries (AHN),
and Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Elections (CBN). All but two states holding judicial elec-
tions fit into only one of these five categories.1
Differentiating primary elections according to the typology is an efficient way to group
states into like groups when testing hypotheses about primary elections. ANOVA tests
show that these models do no worse than models that are distinguished by state and has
the advantage of accounting for changes in each state’s judicial selection method over time.
Additionally, using the typology has an advantage of grouping states with few primary
elections, but the same system, together. Due to rules about when primaries occur, some
states have very few primary elections during the 26 years covered in this study. Using the
typology links observations together when n-sizes would be otherwise too small for statistical
analysis. Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical framework, data, and the making of the typology
of primary elections.
1The two states that do not fit into one of these categories, Michigan and Mississippi, do not have primary
elections because candidates are either chosen by the party elite (Michigan) or only run in the general election
with a possible runoff election occurring in late November (Mississippi).
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Chapter 5 contains hypotheses and tests relating the challenger emergence in judicial
primary elections. In primary elections, candidates having a higher vote share in the previous
primary election are more likely to deter a challenger in the primary. In a related measure,
candidates who were contested in past primary elections are more likely to be contested
again in the future. However, many other potential explanatory variables such as partisan
entrenchment, term length, and the vote share in the prior general election are not significant
predictors of challenger emergence in the primary election.
Chapter 6 focuses on the role of gender in judicial primary elections. Women have a vote
share advantage when they run as either challengers or incumbents and women overwhelm-
ingly win primary elections. In most nonpartisan primary elections, the top two candidates
go on to the general election, even when the top two vote shares are not close. While this
suggests an advantage for women, incumbent women in nonpartisan systems are more likely
to be challenged. Finally, there are far more women who run as challengers in Challenger-
Based judicial primaries than who run in general elections. This suggests that women may
be blocked at the primary election.
Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and suggestions for further research using the data,
model, and typology. Appendix A contains a formal codebook of the variables used in the
analysis. Appendix A also includes a brief description of how the data were collected and
the steps necessary to compile a dataset of this magnitude along with the tools used to
clean, analyze, and graph the data. Finally, Appendix B contains a summary of methods
explaining the modeling choices for analysis as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
using the models as they are presented. This appendix also contains additional validity tests
7
and alternate versions of the models with different specifications.
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Chapter 2
What We Know about Judicial Elections
In the past decade, news coverage and public knowledge of the courts is on an increasing
trajectory (Vining Jr and Marcin 2014; Vining and Wilhelm 2010). Between a string of
high profile cases such as Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (2012), and Citizens United v. FEC (2010), most citizens of the United
States now recognize the ability of the Supreme Court to change laws or legitimize a practice,
even after voters passed state laws to the contrary. It has long been thought that Americans
associate the role of the judiciary with that of an impartial party on the meaning and role of
law in society, even when the public disagrees with the decision (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence
2003). Despite multiple studies that claim justices on the highest courts act in ways that
are ideologically partisan, Americans once viewed the courts as following and interpreting
the rule of law in an unbiased manner (Segal and Spaeth 2004). In this conceptualization,
the role of the judiciary is as a neutral arbitrator of the law, and the public must accept
decisions, even unpopular ones, on the basis of following fair procedures (Gibson, Caldeira,
and Spence 2003; Tyler and Rasinski 1991). However, recent research suggests that the
legitimacy of the judicial branch might be overstated, with voters recognizing and reacting
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to the partisan nature of the judiciary (Bartels and Johnston 2013; Nicholson and Hansford
2014).
State supreme court justices must work within another set of expectations and a different
conception of their role in the political arena (Hall 2014c; Tarr 2012; Tyler and Rasinski
1991). The state courts are the final word when it comes to interpreting the state constitution
and determining what laws the state legislature can and cannot enact. Additionally, the state
supreme court is the last resort for criminal cases without federal implications (Ginsberg
et al. 2015). In many respects, state supreme courts have more of an impact on the lives of
individual state citizens because they only take cases dealing directly with state laws (Tarr
and Porter 1988). Because of this, states balance competing interests when it comes to the
election and accountability for judges in their highest courts. This is often expressed in state
laws on judicial selection and retention.
Although scholars are giving an increasing amount of attention to judicial races in general,
there is still a gap in the scholarly knowledge concerning the ways the primary election
influences the eventual outcome of the election cycle. In legislative and executive contests,
the context of the primary election influences who chooses to run and when, as well as who
moves on to the general election. Given that judicial selections vary between the states,
I expect the context of the primary election would have an influence on when challengers
emerge. Additionally, as judicial elections can vary between partisan and nonpartisan, I also
expect the effect of the primary system on when challengers emerge and who moves on to
the general election to also vary between the states.
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Judicial Accountability and Independence
At the state court level, there is an ongoing tension between the two poles of judicial in-
dependence and judicial accountability (Goelzhauser and Cann 2014; Lovrich Jr and Sheldon
1983). On the one hand, the ideal judge is supposed to be impartial, objective, and learned
in the law. This allows the judge to evaluate the legal arguments presented strictly on their
merits and the best interpretation of the law (Baum 2003). This works when the judge is
free from popular and professional backlash from decisions on the bench (Baum 2003; Brody
2008; Burbank 1999). However, on the other hand, the ideal judge is also accountable and
can be removed should rulings be enacted that are disagreeable to a substantial proportion
of the population or abuses of power discovered. Legislation concerning the selection and
removal of judges at the state level attempts to strike a balance between these two poles (Gill
2013; Goelzhauser and Cann 2014). Additionally, the balance struck by each state, along
with the political context when changes were enacted, explains many variances in judicial
selection systems. States want balance between independence and accountability, in part,
due to the vastly different conceptualization of a judge as a neutral arbitrator of the law as
compared to the duties of other office holders.
Imposing measures of accountability limits full independence in ways that may cause
judges to fear the ramification of their decisions on their ability to maintain office in the
future. This is most clearly seen in recent research showing judges who do not face reelection
release more death row prisoners than those who will face voters (Hall 2014c). However, any
move towards full independence opens potential avenues of abuse that many in the public
and government would rather not allow. While independence from arbitrary removal due
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to unpopular decisions is important for the judiciary to perform its proper function in the
government, there is a fear that with too much independence also comes corruption and a
willingness to abuse the powers of office at the state level. At the same time, there is a need
for the public to perceive the judiciary as independent to maintain public faith in the rule of
law (Webster 1995). If the judiciary is not independent enough to make unbiased decisions
based on the law, the public may lose faith in the institution (Gibson 2009). These polar
forces, as well as the political context of the time the laws were enacted, have led to many
different systems for the selection and removal of judges in the United States (Gill 2013).
At the federal level, the Supreme Court has life tenure, the ultimate in judicial inde-
pendence. However, the nomination process for Supreme Court involves both the executive
and legislative branches. Therefore, the person who gets the seat is the product of com-
promise between multiple branches of government. Federal court judges are also appointed
by the president and subject to Senate confirmation. therefore, at the federal level, there
is more emphasis on the need for judicial independence from the powerful political actors.
This leads to a system that favors judicial independence over public accountability. Yet,
even with these safeguards in place, there is still a tendency for the Supreme Court to make
decisions consistent with the preferences of power holders or risk those decisions not being
enforced by the executive branch, also known as regime politics theory (Graber 2005; Hall
2014a; Keck 2004; McCloskey 2010). However, as critics of regime politics theory point out,
an abundance of diverse political actors increases the power of the judiciary as both parties
turn to the courts to resolve differences (Chavez 2004; Roux 2016).
In a departure from the federal system, states have enacted a multitude of systems in
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the search for a compromise between independence and accountability, with few adopting
the same methods of judicial selection and retention (Goelzhauser and Cann 2014). These
methods range from gubernatorial selection and legislative confirmation followed by life
tenure, to either partisan or nonpartisan elections in which candidates meeting minimum
requirements need only gain a specified number of signatures to obtain a place on the ballot
in their state. However, to keep their position, these judges must often compete in reelection
campaigns every six to twelve years, as determined by the state constitution. In this instance,
the states act as laboratories of democracy, as the variance in judicial selection systems allows
for a convenient comparison for social scientists on the differing effects of these systems on
the judiciary.
The differences in judicial selection systems did not come about at random, but rather
as a response to initial executive overreach (Tarr 2012). In fact, most states in the early
1800s began with judges completely restrained by the legislatures of their respective states
(Tarr 2012). Judicial selection and tenure was completely controlled by elected legislative
lawmakers. As a consequence of this, most state judges were always under threat of im-
peachment, and often had their rulings overturned by the state legislatures (Tarr 2012). It
was not until the Jacksonian Era that states began passing laws mandating term limits and,
eventually, allowing for the direct election of judges by either partisan or nonpartisan means
(Gill 2013). Mississippi was the first state to enact judicial elections in 1832. Other states
rapidly followed, with 24 of the 34 states implementing judicial elections prior to 1861 (Streb
2007).
This had the immediate impact of increasing judicial independence by reducing the retal-
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iatory ability of lawmakers and gave state supreme court justices greater freedom to exercise
judicial review against the laws passed by state legislatures without fear of removal (Shuger-
man 2010). This move was initially heralded as a success for the judiciary, as it brought
more independence to the bench (Tarr 2012), but it was later criticized for allowing partisan
politics, bargaining, and the influence of powerful political bosses into the judicial arena (Gill
2013; Melton and Ginsburg 2014). While justices were freed from the threat of job loss from
an upset state legislator, lawmakers and scholars were also concerned about the potential
for the corrupting influence of politics and partisan money as elections became more high
profile (Tarr 2012).
In an effort to allay these concerns, the progressive movement of the early 1900s pushed
for nonpartisan elections for judicial contests (Boatright 2014; Gill 2013). At the time, non-
partisan elections were thought to be a compromise reform because it removed the influence
of party bosses while still allowing the people to vote for judicial office. In theory, without
the partisan label or the influence of party leaders or bosses, people would be better able
to choose judges based on experience and qualification (Gill 2013). The first nonpartisan
judicial elections were implemented by Cook County, Illinois in 1873 (Streb 2007). While
the move to nonpartisan elections was supposed to make judges more accountable, judi-
cial reformers do not devote much study to the ability of nonpartisan elections to promote
accountability (Hall 2001). Disappointed in the lack of accountability present in partisan
elections, reformers in many states turned to the merit plan, in which potential justices
are selected by a panel and appointed by the governor before facing uncontested retention
elections after a specified term length (Gill 2013; Hall 2001; Kritzer 2015).
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It is the constant push and pull between judicial independence and accountability that
led to several changes in the ways judges are elected and retained in the states (Keele 2014).
With each transition between judicial systems, lawmakers have sought to achieve a balance
between judicial independence and accountability, with mixed results (Bowers 2003). The
reason for this lies in the ways most lawmakers and laypeople conceptualize the role of the
state court as decidedly different than that of the Supreme Court. State courts rule on cases
dealing with laws that change at a much quicker pace and, subsequently, need to be more in
tune with the desires and opinions of a smaller and more rapidly changing segment of the
population (Bonneau and Hall 2009). The real power of the state supreme courts is to rule on
issues that lead to measurable change and widespread effects throughout the state (Tarr and
Porter 1988), particularly when it comes to clarifying supreme court decisions and tort cases
(Champagne 2005; Kang and Shepherd 2015). While the decisions made by the Supreme
Court must ostensibly be followed by all courts beneath them, there are many instances
where state courts have narrowed a ruling by determining that it was not applicable to a
particular individual or situation (Romans 1974).
For these and other reasons, the interplay between judicial independence and account-
ability is felt more acutely in the states than in the federal courts. Federal courts are given
greater independence to deal with matters of utmost salience in the nation and to protect
the court from the partisan games that occur in the legislative and executive branches as
they make rulings that affect the entire country. State courts are held more accountable
to the voters in their individual states because of a history of greater legislative oversight
(Kang and Shepherd 2015) and exert greater influence on laws that are of particular concern
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to powerful interests within the state (Champagne 2005). Justices at the state level must be
more cognizant of the threats to their independence and also of how their decisions affect a
majority of the people residing within their state borders.
Who is Eligible to be State Supreme Court Judge
There are minimal requirements to run or be appointed to office for most executive and
legislative jobs. For the most part, prospective candidates must only meet signature and
minimal residency requirements before being eligible for public office. Beyond that, there is
only a requirement to pay the filing fee. Therefore, because there are few requirements for
office, the potential candidate pool for most public offices consists of most adult citizens in
the state or district.
While anyone able to pay the filing fee who meets residency and signature requirements
has the potential to run for and hold office in state executive and legislative branches, the
same cannot be said for judicial posts. In addition to paying the filing fee and meeting sig-
nature requirements, prospective judges must also meet a different set of criteria before they
are eligible to hold office. Every state has additional requirements for judicial candidates,
although these vary between states.
All states require supreme court judges to have graduated from law school, but some
states also require any prospective judge to be a member of the state bar association in good
standing for at least 10 years and be under 70 years old. Like other aspects of state courts,
the exact requirements vary from state to state. The different categories of requirements are
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Table 2.1: Requirements for State Supreme Court Office by State
“Learned in
the Law”
Licensed to
practice >5 years
Member of the
State Bar >5 years
Member of the
State Bar >10 years
Connecticut; Alabama; Colorado; Arizona;
Delaware; Alaska; District of Columbia; California;
Illinois; Arkansas; Florida; Hawaii;
Iowa; Georgia; Missouri; Idaho;
Maine; Kentucky; Montana; Indiana;
Massachusetts; Maryland; Nebraska; Kansas;
Minnesota; Michigan; South Carolina; Louisiana;
New Hampshire; Mississippi; Utah New Jersey;
North Carolina; Nevada; Vermont; New York
North Dakota; New Mexico; Virginia;
Oregon; Ohio; Wisconsin
Pennsylvania; Oklahoma;
Rhode Island; Texas;
South Dakota; West Virginia;
Tennessee; Wyoming
Washington
shown in Table 2.1 (National Center for State Courts 2017).
Because of these varying requirements, determining the candidate pool for state supreme
court judge is difficult. At minimum the potential candidate pool encompasses all of the
lawyers in the state; however, due to requirements for years of experience, or years registered
with the state bar, the actual candidate pool is much smaller than the total population
of lawyers. As a result of this, it is possible that state supreme courts may reflect the
demographics of lawyers several years prior to election. To add to this, state supreme court
judges often move up from lower courts (Savchak 2015). Since the late-1990s, around 70% of
all state supreme court judges had prior judicial experience (Savchak 2015).1 There is some
regional variation in this variable with state supreme courts in the North East and South
1These findings are confirmed by Acquaviva and Castiglione (2010).
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having a higher percentage of experienced judges and the West having a lower percentage
of experienced judges (Acquaviva and Castiglione 2010). As most lower courts have the
same or similar standards of experience, it is possible that the actual candidate pool for
state supreme court is much smaller, and much older, than the demographics of lawyers may
suggest.
These statistics also suggest a few things about the pipeline to the state supreme court.
With 70% of state supreme court judges having prior judicial experience (Savchak 2015) and
judges with prior experience having an advantage when running for election (Hall 2014d),
then the most successful candidate pool consists of lawyers who met residency and state
bar membership requirements prior to sitting on the lower court. In other words, the most
successful judges far exceed the minimum requirements in terms of time spent in the state.
Generally speaking, scholars use the number of lawyers or the lawyers per capita in the
state to estimate the candidate pool (Alozie 1990; Bonneau and Hall 2003, 2009; Hall and
Bonneau 2006; Holmes and Emrey 2006; Streb and Frederick 2008).
This proxy measure is generally lagged one year to reflect the number of lawyers in the
state during the filing period (Bonneau and Hall 2009). Prior findings suggest state with
greater numbers of laywers are more likely to have competitive judicial elections (Bonneau
and Hall 2009; Hall and Bonneau 2006; Hall 2014d). Although this is not a perfect rep-
resentation of the number of candidates who are eligible to sit on the state highest court,
states with more lawyers are also more likely to have more lawyers in the state meeting the
requirements to become judge.
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Judicial Selection
There are four main ways state supreme court judges are placed into office and eight
ways for them to maintain office. Due to the numerous possible combinations, few states
have identical systems. The first, and oldest, method of ascent to the state supreme court
is through legislative election. This occurs when the state legislature votes on a candidate
for the state supreme court. Two states still use this method of judicial selection: South
Carolina and Virginia. In these states, the legislature is responsible for picking a candidate
from a list of qualified individuals provided by a committee for this purpose. The legislature
then votes on the results, with the winner being the candidate who receives the majority
vote. In South Carolina, the committee responsible for creating the candidate list is made up
of people independent from the legislature, who first publish a list of recommended judges
and then release it to the public for comment before submitting final recommendations to
the legislature. In Virginia, committee hearings about nominees are also public to solicit
comments and critiques. A vast majority of the states have given up this form of judicial
selection and retention in favor of ones that offer more independence from the legislature,
such as elections or gubernatorial appointment, in an effort give judges freedom to strike
down laws the legislature enacted without fear of repercussions (Tarr 2012).
Currently, 21 states use public election as a means of selecting their state supreme court
judges. Six of these states have elections that are openly partisan, where the political parties
choose the candidate and judges are represented on partisan primary ballots. Thirteen states
have nonpartisan elections. Two states, Ohio and Michigan, have hybrid systems. In Ohio,
primary elections are openly partisan, while the general election is nonpartisan. In Michigan,
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candidates are chosen at party conventions and supported by the parties themselves, but the
final vote is in officially nonpartisan general elections (Nelson, Caufield, and Martin 2013).
These two cases have the outward trappings of nonpartisan elections, while retaining the
dissemination of information that partisan money and labels afford the candidate (Nelson,
Caufield, and Martin 2013).
In an effort to combat the rise of partisan politics in the judicial branch, and in response
to criticism from the American Bar Association, many states passed laws prohibiting judicial
candidates from expressing a partisan preference while also implementing nonpartisan elec-
tions for the initial selection and subsequent retention of judicial office (Hanssen 2004; Keele
2014). In nonpartisan elections, judicial incumbents can be challenged after a specified term,
but rather than be supported by the formal political parties, there are no partisan labels on
the ballot. In the past fifty years, there has been a shift away from the practice of using
elections as a means of selecting state supreme court justices, with 12 states moving towards
gubernatorial appointment (Gill 2013; Keele 2014). The current judicial selection system by
state is in Table 2.2.
Judicial Retention Systems
In elections for state executive and legislative office, the mode of selection and the mode
of retention are identical—partisan competitive elections.2 This is not the case in judicial
elections. Along with utilizing a multitude of selection systems, states also choose from
several types of retention systems. Sometimes the retention systems do not match the initial
2Elections are nonpartisan in many municipal offices and in Nebraska state legislative elections.
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Table 2.2: State Supreme Court Selection Systems by State
Partisan
Elections
Nonpartisan
Elections
Gubernatorial
Appointment
Legislative
Appointment
and/or Confirmation
Alabama Arkansas Alaska** Delaware**
Illinois Georgia Arizona** District of Columbia**
Louisiana Idaho California* Maine
New Mexico Kentucky Colorado** Massachusetts***
Pennsylvania Michigan Connecticut** New Hampshire***
Texas Minnesota Florida** New Jersey
West Virginia Mississippi Hawaii** New York**
Montana Indiana** Rhode Island**
Nevada Iowa** South Carolina
North Dakota Kansas** Tennessee
Ohio Maryland** Vermont**
Oregon Missouri** Virginia
Washington Nebraska**
Wisconsin Oklahoma**
South Dakota**
Utah**
Wyoming**
*California uses gubernatorial nomination with commission confirmation.
**Judges in these states come through a nominating commission.
***Judges are nominated by a commission, appointed by the governor, and approved
by the executive council.
selection system. A majority of judges who stand in partisan elections must face competitive
reelection after a specified term limit; however, in a few cases, states have instituted retention
elections. In New Mexico and Illinois, the initial selection for an open seat position is done
in contested elections, but afterwards judges run in uncontested retention elections. Save for
New Mexico and Illinois, judges who are elected in partisan elections are open to challengers
in competitive races after a specified term.
The merit plan is a compromise between gubernatorial selection and competitive elections
as part of an attempt to keep partisan politics and bias out of the judicial realm, while still
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holding judges accountable to the citizens for their actions on the bench. This method gives
the governor the ability to appoint a judge to the highest court, but, after a term, the
judge must face a retention election (Hanssen 2004). These elections are nonpartisan and
unchallenged, but the judge must obtain at least 50 percent retain votes in order to maintain
their seat. Otherwise, the judge loses the seat, and the governor chooses a new justice (Gill
2013; Hanssen 2004).3 This system has been criticized for protecting judges. As retention
elections are uncontested, it is virtually impossible for a judge to lose election, making it
little more than a formality (Bopp 2013).
Appointment systems use diverse types of retention strategies. These range from un-
contested retention elections to life appointment or the age of 70. Most of the variation
in appointment systems revolves around who makes the decision of retention. A majority
of states use uncompetitive elections and allow citizens in the state to vote on reelection.
However, five states allow the governor to reappoint a judge, three states use legislative elec-
tions, two states use life appointment, and one state relies on the members of the judicial
commission to reappoint the judge. Table 2.3 shows the retention system used by each state.
The biggest difference between appointed and elected judges concerns retention pressures
and expectations. Judicial selection and retention pressures cause potential candidates to
self-select either into or out of the system, resulting in disparate decisions and variation in
the number of filings for each type of case (Besley and Payne 2003). This could be due to
self-selection within the pool of potential judicial applicants, as judges in each state know
they will be subject to reelection pressures. They may not aspire to be in the supreme court
3A majority of states use the system as described, but Vermont has legislative reelection after gubernato-
rial appointment while New Hampshire and Rhode Island both have life tenure until a mandatory retirement
age.
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Table 2.3: State Supreme Court Retention Systems by State
Competitive
Election
Retention
Election
Gubernatorial
Reappointment
Legislative
Election/
Appointment
Life
Appointment
Nominating
Commission
Reappointment
Alabama Alaska Delaware* Connecticut Massachusetts Hawaii
Arkansas Arizona DC* South Carolina Rhode Island New Hampshire**
Georgia California Maine* Vermont
Idaho California New Jersey* Virginia
Kentucky Colorado New York*
Louisiana Florida
Michigan Illinois
Minnesota Indiana
Mississippi Iowa
Montana Kansas
Nevada Maryland
North Carolina Missouri
North Dakota Nebraska
Ohio New Mexico
Oregon Oklahoma
Texas Pennsylvania
Washington South Dakota
West Virginia Tennessee
Wisconsin Utah
Wyoming
*These states use gubernatorial reappointment with legislative consent.
**New Hampshire uses reappointment by an executive counsel.
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if they do not want to constantly run for popular election. Therefore, the constraint of
reelection may account for some differences between the types of judges in each state (Sobel
and Hall 2007).
The Divide Between Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections
Within judicial selection and retention systems, there is a distinct difference between partisan
and nonpartisan elections. These differences affect all stages of the electoral cycle. The simple
removal of partisan identifiers impacts more than just the information voters have when
they go to the ballot box, but also affects the procedural function of elections. Candidates
in partisan states run against different people, for different audiences, between the primary
election and the general election. In contrast, nonpartisan election put the same candidates
against each other multiple times. In this way, nonpartisan systems function more like the
system of election and runoff that are more commonly held in Louisiana, Latin America, and
Europe. This critical difference shapes much of the current scholarship on judicial elections.
There are also questions about the type of candidates produced by partisan or nonpartisan
elections (Barber 1971; Bonneau and Cann 2015b; Canes-Wrone and Clark 2009; Hall 2007;
Hawley 1973; Klein and Baum 2001; Lovrich Jr and Sheldon 1983). The past thirty years
have seen a shift in that judicial elections are becoming higher profile, with candidates
garnering more media attention and greater amounts of campaign donations (Kritzer 2015;
Schotland 1985). There is currently a large body of scholarly debate on which type of
election simultaneously allows for judicial accountability while also preventing money and
politics from having an inordinate amount of influence in the judiciary (Lovrich Jr and
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Sheldon 1983; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001; Squire and Smith 1988). Several states
have switched from partisan to nonpartisan elections in an effort to reduce the amount
of partisan money and influence in the system. However, this has also had the effect of
removing one of the only cues voters have to help them in casting their vote (Streb and
Frederick 2007). Due to this, states with nonpartisan judicial elections have higher roll-off
rates, meaning fewer people vote for the judicial races, even though they voted for the other
more high profile races (Bonneau and Hall 2009).
While there has been a push to change the judicial selection systems in the states to
types that take partisanship and politics out of the process, the results have been mixed.
Over the past 10 years, campaign donations for judicial candidates have increased in all
states that have elections, including those states that have uncontested retention elections,
as the ramifications of the Citizens United (2010) decision continue to be felt by the courts.
According to some, this, in conjunction with the White (2002) decision, allowing judges to
reveal their positions on high profile issues, has started to make judicial elections look more
like the elections held for the more overtly political offices in the nation (Hasen 2007).
The Best Way to Select a Judge
While there is no way of conclusively determining which system produces the best judges,
outcomes can be described in other, more empirical, ways (Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2008;
Flango and Ducat 1979; Glick and Emmert 1986; Reddick 2001; Webster 1995). While there
is no universal definition for what makes a quality judge, scholars have attempted many
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different metrics in order to quantify this elusive concept to compare the outcomes of the
different selection methods (Glick and Emmert 1986; Hurwitz and Lanier 2003; Owens et al.
2015). As there is no empirical way to determine which judicial system produces the best
judges, most current scholarship focuses on the outcomes of selection such as the demographic
characteristics of the judge, the types of cases that are successful in the different systems,
and who has the ability to influence the judge. These outcomes, particularly those linked
to judicial demographics, are important because they shed light on the types of candidates
who run for office and when they are able to successfully gain office as either incumbents or
challengers.
Measuring Differences in Outcomes
Looking at the difference between appointed and elected judges, early research shows judges
who obtained office via election were more likely to be born in the state in which they held
office, while appointed judges are slightly more likely to be born out of the state (Glick
and Emmert 1986). However, the authors did not attribute any significant meaning to that
particular finding (Glick and Emmert 1986). Scholars have also studied the educational
attainment of those elected and appointed to the bench. Years ago, studies found that
judges who were appointed had attained a greater level of education (Flango and Ducat
1979; Jacob 1964). However, several of the appointed judges in the study completed their
education in night classes at lesser ranked institutions. This forced the authors to conclude
that judges who are elected have a higher quality of education while the appointed judges
with greater educational attainment might have a lower quality (Jacob 1964).
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The study of judge characteristics, such as education and temperament, to determine
quality has largely been abandoned. As all state supreme court judges are equally likely
to have their decisions overturned by the Supreme Court (Owens et al. 2015), another way
scholars ascertain the differences in selection systems is to study the length, quality, and
number of opinions or the differences in case outcomes for similar cases in states with different
selection and retention systems (Ash and MacLeod 2016; Hall 2014c; Leonard and Ross 2015;
Shepard 2009). For instance, elected judges are most likely to rule in favor of the state, but
prioritize the individual over business (Pinello 1995). This is because the judge is directly
responsible to the voters for reelection (Pinello 1995). Further studies show judges act in
equally strategic ways prior to appointment hearings. Appointed judges rule in favor of the
government as appointment hearings approach so as not to alienate those who vote on their
job continuance (Shepherd 2009). However, when appointed judges either announce their
retirement or approach mandatory retirement age, these government appeasement effects
disappear, since judges no longer fear ruling against those who determine the judge’s job
security (Shepherd 2009). Similar strategic decisions are seen when judges commute a death
penalty sentence, more often during their last term, (Hall 2014c) and when they invalidate
laws, more often if they are elected (Lindquist 2017).
Judges who are elected in partisan elections have an incentive to vote in favor of their
constituents over out of state defendants, particularly when the case involves a transfer
of money from out of state to an individual or group of individuals within (Helland and
Tabarrok 2002). By redistributing wealth from nonvoters to voters within the state, these
judges may be revealing their mindfulness of the constraints of election and the need to
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maintain a favorable public opinion (Helland and Tabarrok 2002). Differences in electoral
systems may explain when judges are more willing to vote in favor of the individual over
interests of either the state or business. More recent research suggests that these findings on
who wins, or when judicial review is used the most, may be timebound, as current judges
show no difference in when they rule for one group or another or when they utilize judicial
review (Leonard 2014).
Some scholars have warned that to attract the highest quality people to the bench, salaries
must be commensurate with that a prospective judge could make working for a top law firm
(Posner 1996). However, there are other benefits of being a judge, and many choose the
profession for altruistic reasons (Posner 1996). Updated research on judicial salaries reveals
the disparities in pay between judges and other public sector employees (Schotland 2007).
While state employee salaries are determined by the free market, judicial salaries are set
by the legislature, leading to drastic disparities within some states.4 Although there are
many in the judicial branch who still push for an increase in judicial salaries to make them
more competitive with the earnings of those in the top law firms, the most recent empirical
research comparing salary rates does not support those claims (Choi, Gulati, and Posner
2009). Taking into account other factors such as tenure and working conditions, recent
studies conclude increasing the salary may not increase the quality of the person seeking the
position (Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2009).
While most studies point to the ways public opinion influences the judges selected and
retained in partisan elections (Kritzer 2016), research also investigates the pressures of non-
4In Arizona, the chief justice earns less than the police chiefs of Phoenix and Tucson, Tuscon’s fire chief,
and the municipal judges in Phoenix, Glendale, and Tempe (Schotland 2007, 1276).
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partisan elections on judicial independence (Schaffner and Streb 2002). It is now possible
for an interest group to take a single decision during the career of a judge and politicize
it in the minds of the voters, particularly on landmark topics such as abortion, gay rights,
and the death penalty. (Canes-Wrone and Clark 2009). This is possible, in part, due to a
lack of other voting cues. In partisan elections, voters already have working assumptions
about where each judge stands on these issues, whereas nonpartisan judges must fight an
uphill battle to first increase their name recognition in positive ways while also combating
the smear campaigns put on by opponents (Hall 2014b). Although this is a relatively new
phenomenon, research suggests public opinion has a greater influence on the actions of judges
who face nonpartisan elections than those who run in either partisan or retention elections
for high-profile issues (Canes-Wrone and Clark 2009).
Elected Judges and Judicial Legitimacy
For judges at all levels of the court system, it is important that they behave in such a way as
to maintain judicial legitimacy. As the judicial branch by itself has no power to enforce any
decision, they must rely on the willingness of the executive and legislative branches to com-
ply and enforce those rulings. It is possible that, by allowing judicial candidates to express
opinions on legal and political beliefs, voters would be given many informational cues on
which they could base their vote (Caufield 2007). However, the White (2002) decision allow-
ing judges to express overt political opinions did not make judicial elections more political in
any of the standard measurements of competitiveness like more challengers, decreased sup-
port for the incumbent, higher campaign costs, and declines in voter participation (Bonneau,
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Hall, and Streb 2011). Studying the practical results compared to the predicted outcome
of the White (2002) decision, and finding nothing that shows a fundamental change in the
way the judiciary operates, the authors conclude much of the fear surrounding the potential
increase in judicial politicization is unfounded (Bonneau, Hall, and Streb 2011).
Although some in the public and news media point to the rising costs of judicial elections
as evidence of wrongdoing or proof of corruption in the judiciary (Miller 2017), studies have
shown judicial campaign activities have mixed effects on judicial candidates (Gibson 2009).
While all races, both partisan and nonpartisan, have become more expensive over the past
20 years, the causal relationship falls apart once other factors are introduced into the model
(Bonneau and Hall 2009). This suggests there are other variables aside from partisanship
that make those elections more expensive. Kritzer (2015) identifies a trend of increasingly
expensive partisan elections only in certain regions of the county, particularly in the South.
Therefore, the simple fact of being partisan does not necessarily lead to an influx of money
in the election.
There are likely other factors in southern partisan states causing an increase in judicial
spending focused on this region (Kritzer 2015). Additionally, while it is clear incumbents
outspend challengers and win most of the time, it does not necessarily follow that the seat
is awarded to the person who can successfully raise and spend the most money. This is
another criticism of election systems (Bonneau 2007). This is because campaign money
has decreasing marginal returns—the more that is spent, the less impact is has per dollar.
Likewise, challengers get more out of each dollar spent in terms of name recognition and the
ability to whittle away at the incumbents lead, while the incumbent can only spend in an
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attempt to maintain the position (Bonneau 2007).
Rise of Media Attention and Attack Advertising
One consequence of the rise in publicity and competition in judicial elections is the uptick
in attack advertising in what was once a relatively obscure election sector. The rise in
attack advertising is one reason why laypeople (Miller 2017), scholars (Schotland 1985), and
judges alike (Schwartz 2009) may decry the increased amount of attention given to judicial
elections. Particularly in the wake of the White (2002) decision, there is an increased focus
on what attack advertising means for campaigns and if there are any negative effects from
the increase. It is also important to understand the role of the media in judicial elections
(Tarr 2007). As media attention increases, it is possible that potential challengers will more
carefully evaluate when they stand the best chance to win elections. Additionally, as the
use of attack advertising grows, potential challengers, particularly women, may be deterred
from running for election.
In one of the first studies on attack advertising as it relates to the state supreme courts,
Hall and Bonneau (2012) find increasing attack advertising has the effect of mobilizing the
electorate and spurring voter engagement and participation in the process (Hall 2014b; Hall
and Bonneau 2012). However, it is possible that nonpartisan judges are affected more by
attack advertising, because there is no partisan cue on the ballot (Hall 2014d). Voters use
advertising as a way of gleaning information about the candidate in the absence of other
cues. Nonnpartisan judges are particularly vulnerable to media coverage of cases, particularly
insofar as unpopular decisions can be used against them in the election (Lim, Snyder, and
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Strömberg 2015). For example, newspaper coverage of a case can increase the sentence length
for violent crimes (Lim, Snyder, and Strömberg 2015).5 Because of this, attack advertising
can weaken the incumbent advantage in nonpartisan elections (Hall 2014d).
Voters respond well to what has been termed the new-style campaigning, including more
high-profile advertisements, and that the direct link between judges and political preferences
has not caused a crisis in the legitimacy of the courts (McKenzie, Rugeley, and Unger 2015).
While the use of traditional attack ads does decrease the legitimacy of the state courts (Hall
and Bonneau 2012; Hall 2014d,b), making speeches in which candidates state policy positions,
or even promises, does not have that same effect (Gibson 2009, 2008). This suggests that
these new-style campaigns where judicial elections look similar to legislative and executive
elections may be here to stay (Tarr 2007).
Although scholars have studied many aspects concerning selection and retention systems
for state supreme court, there is still much left to learn. Judicial scholars have looked at
the history of selection systems, challenger emergence, outcomes of judicial elections, and
the role of the media and attack advertising. However, despite all of this there is still a
gap where it concerns the all of the steps on the path to office. While scholars have studied
challenger emergence (Bonneau 2004; Bonneau and Hall 2009; Hall and Bonneau 2006) and
outcomes of judicial elections (Owens et al. 2015; Streb and Frederick 2008), there is a gap
in that scholars do not know how the primary election, or lack thereof, also influences the
path to judicial office. This is because up until now judicial primary elections have largely
been ignored in the literature despite being an important juncture for judicial candidates
5This effect is not replicated in partisan and appointed systems.
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seeking office.
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Chapter 3
Primary Elections as Critical Junctures
Elections are not just a single event, and judicial candidates in states with either partisan
or nonpartisan elections must first gain enough votes to pass a primary election before they
are contenders in the final election. In partisan systems, the primary election is a way
for the party to narrow down the field of candidates to the one with the most support
to face off against the opposing party in the general election. In executive and legislative
races, elections generally pit people of very similar ideologies against each other. The voters
registered to that particular party select the candidate that best matches their own, or their
community’s, ideal point in the spectrum of politics. In nonpartisan primaries, the primary
serves a slightly different function, in that it is designed to whittle down the entire pool of
candidates to just the top two who will then continue on to the general election. Because
judicial candidates must run in the primary election before they are able to move on to the
final vote, the primary serves as a juncture on the road to office. Candidates who lose the
primary election are unable to compete later in the election cycle. This makes the primary
election an important stop in the judicial electoral processes.
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History of Primary Elections
While primary elections are a staple of politics in the United States today, voters did not
always choose candidates in primary elections. Rather, primary elections grew out of the
Progressive Movement’s appeal to citizens directly and attempt to take power away from
powerful political bosses (Boatright 2014). Prior to the early 1900s, candidates for all offices
were selected in conventions or smaller town hall meetings or caucuses. These caucuses
functioned like community meetings where all voters deliberated and choose a candidate to
support (Boatright 2014). However, as urbanization took hold and more voters concentrated
in larger metropolitan areas, the caucus system became inefficient, bulky, and prone to
corruption and carelessness (Boatright 2014).
While there was a push to take power away from powerful party bosses who controlled
elections in large cities, ultimately, the introduction of secret ballots and the rejection of the
party convention system contributed to the evolution of a caucus/town hall style meeting
into the primary as we commonly think of it (ACE: The Electoral Knowledge Network 2017).
In response to the control of party machines and the advent of secret ballots, Minnesota was
the first state to institute a primary election in 1899 and the first state to put primary
elections into law in 1901 (ACE: The Electoral Knowledge Network 2017). By 1970, every
state instituted mandatory primary elections (Boatright 2014).
Because at the time, as now, many states were either ‘red’ or ‘blue’ where party domi-
nance meant the partisan outcome of the election was decided prior to the race, the advent of
primary elections had the effect of giving voters a greater role in selecting the individual can-
didates who ended up on the ballot (ACE: The Electoral Knowledge Network 2017; Boatright
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2014). Because primary elections gave more power to voters and were easy to understand,
the mandatory primary laws were popular and spread quickly through the states. Manda-
tory primary elections also had the consequence of shifting campaigns from party-centered
to candidate-centered and encouraging independent candidates to join a party (Boatright
2014). Since the Progressive Era at the turn of the 19th century, primary competition
has steadily decreased due to changes in partisan politics and American political culture
(Boatright 2014).
There have been other changes in the function of primary elections since their inception.
While most of the early primary elections started out as closed, meaning only those who
were publicly affiliated with the party were allowed to participate. Reforms in the early
1960s changed those laws for many of the states, particularly in the South, and allowed any
voter to vote in the primary election (Boatright 2014). More recently, research that primary
elections provide incentives for more ideologically extreme candidates, has led to greater
interest in the the jungle, blanket, and top-two primary elections. This is a marriage of
partisan and nonpartisan elections where all candidates go on the same ballot (either with
or without partisan identification) and voters vote in an open primary. Either a winner is
declared outright or the top-two vote getters move on to the subsequent election (Boatright
2014). Louisiana has used the jungle primary since 1978 while California and Washington
adopted the top-two primary in the past 10 years.
These continued reforms suggest that primaries did not function as intended by the
progressive reformers at the beginning of the twentieth century. While the states adopted
primary elections relatively quickly, they did not do it uniformly—leading to each state
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having a slightly different set of rules around the election. These rules and differences
are documented, but they have been largely left unstudied by scholars. This leaves a gap
in understanding the strategic dilemmas that candidates, voters, and parties face in the
primary election (Boatright 2014).
Legislative and Executive Primaries
Although there have not been any studies that measure the effects of primary elections on
judicial outcomes, or that control for the primary election when measuring other outcomes
from judicial selection systems, we know a lot about the effects of the primary election when
looking at executive and legislative elections at the national, state, and municipal levels.
There are very distinct ways in which primary elections differ from general elections. The
effects of the primary are obviously felt in the general elections in that the outcome of the
primary is what determines who is on the ballot in the general election. In addition to this,
there is research suggesting the primary election is substantively different from the general
election in the types of people who vote (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007; Norrander 1986), the
number of people voting (Boatright 2014; Ranney 1972), and their level of education and
interest in politics (e.g. Galderisi, Ezra, and Lyons 2001; Gerber et al. 2017; Mcghee et al.
2013; Lazarus 2005).
Who Votes in the Primary Election
In the aggregate, voters who come out to cast their ballot in the primary elections, partic-
ularly in states with closed primaries, are those who are more ideologically extreme. These
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voters either hold more entrenched positions, or they fall further to the ends of the ideological
spectrum when compared with the median voter in their respective districts (Brady, Han,
and Pope 2007; Gerber and Morton 1998; Gerber et al. 2017).1 This poses a problem for
candidates for legislative and executive positions, as they must first be elected by these more
ideologically entrenched voters before appealing to the often more moderate general elec-
torate. To combat this, many candidates to adopt positions that are more extreme in order
to first gain acceptance by the ideological voters (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). This leads
to a system in which more ideologically extreme candidates tend to win primary elections
(Hall 2015). Moderates in the general election are then forced to choose between the member
of their party who happens to be more extreme than they are and the candidate from the
opposing party. As this ideological push to the extremes works in both parties, the oppos-
ing candidate is likely extreme also. Previous studies of legislators show this contributes to
party polarization by moving politicians away from the political center (Brady, Han, and
Pope 2007). However, findings also suggest that the ideologically extreme candidates who
win primary elections suffer an electoral penalty in the general election (Hall 2015).
Primary voters not only are more likely to be strong partisans, but also have other signif-
icant differences from general election voters. As early as 1972, studies revealed disparities
in the proportion of minorities, women, and under-30s who vote in primary elections (Niel-
son and Visalvanich 2015; Ranney 1972). As a whole, the voter in the primary election, on
top of being more partisan, is also more likely to be older and have a more prestigious job
than the voting demographic present in the general election, who, in the aggregate, are often
1This is likely because of the effects of people who do not vote due to the high costs and perceived low
stakes.
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older and has more prestigious employment than the population as a whole (Ranney 1972).
Additionally, Blacks and other minorities are known to be underrepresented as primary vot-
ers (Norrander 1986). These layers of self-selection, in which the population that votes in
the general election is largely older, whiter, wealthier, and more politically knowledgeable
than the population as a whole, and those who vote in primary elections are even older,
whiter, wealthier, and the most partisan of the voting population means primary voters end
up appearing markedly different when compared to the general population.
Some of these effects are a result of how primaries have historically been conducted.
While the general election is designed to appeal to most of the voting population in order
to maximize individual participation in the democratic process, primaries have been the
arena in which party members reveal their preferences as distinct from the opposing party
(Bullock and Clinton 2011; Gerber and Morton 1998). Known as party elite theory, this
argument holds that candidates view the primary as a chance to appeal to the preferences of
the median party member rather than the preferences of the voting population as a whole.
Recent studies show that Republican primary candidates tend to be more extreme overall,
while Democrat candidates appeal more to their individual primary constituencies (Nielson
and Visalvanich 2015). For the candidate, this facilitates greater access to party resources,
such as people, data on voters, or access to important donors (Gerber and Morton 1998).
By discounting the restraining effects of those voters who are moderate or largely apolitical,
candidates use the primaries to focus on voters who already display some level of interest
and knowledge about the political process.
These institutional differences between the states lead to crucial differences in turnout.
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Primary elections also suffer from low turnout. Currently, primary election turnout rates
hover in the 15 to 30 percent range per state, while general election turnout rates are much
higher, at between 50 and 70 percent per state (McDonald 2015; Boatright 2014). However,
despite the fact these elections have low turnout when compared to the general election,
studies show the most partisan individuals are most likely to vote in the primaries and that
strong partisan affiliation is an indicator for likelihood to vote in the primary elections,
particularly in closed primaries (Norrander 1986; Ranney 1972).
Some of these disparities are inevitable in a system requiring voters to vote several times
to elect a single office. The primary election is often viewed as a way for the party apparatus
to gauge the desires and priorities of the members of the party. As such, most messaging is
directly aimed at those with a high interest in politics or who already carry strong partisan
opinions. A lack of mobilization also contributes to disparities in voter turnout due to a
lack of advertising or other methods to encourage high amounts of voting (Norrander 1986;
Wanat 1974), particularly among certain demographics such as the youth (Enos, Fowler, and
Vavreck 2014). As candidates spend more money on advertising prior to a primary election,
their vote share increases as they not only capture a larger proportion of the vote, but also
mobilize people to vote (Wanat 1974). Although a majority of primary elections have very
low voter turnout, there is generally an increase in turnout when the two candidates have
very different visions for the future. When multiple candidates have similar stances on most
issues, voter turnout is often much lower (Norrander 1986). Increase in voter turnout is also
associated with directed campaigns to mobilize the voters using modern technology such as
the internet and social media (Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck 2014; Jones et al. 2017).
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The focus of primaries is on the needs of the party members. There are specific laws in
many states that restrict or exclude independent or cross-party voting during the primary
election. Open primaries allow any registered voter to vote in the primary or caucus for the
party of their choice, while closed primaries restrict access to only those who are registered
members of the party. These determinations are decided by the party leadership at the state
level. Currently, there is not an overwhelming preponderance of any one particular system
across the United States. Nineteen states use open primaries, 17 use closed primaries, and
14 have a hybrid or other system for state office (FairVote 2016). Judicial elections are split
among the different primaries, with half occurring in states with open primaries and half in
states with different restrictions on primary voters and attendance (see Table 3.1).
Although the differences between the primary and general election electorate are inter-
esting and can have profound consequences on the election outcomes, the study of primary
elections has largely gone out of vogue. There was a flurry of activity on the topic in the
1970s, but that was largely dropped in the 1990s, despite the increased public awareness of
primary elections in framing the general election contest. In an attempt to revive the study,
Boatright (2014) shows evidence suggesting that Republicans lost key congressional races
because the candidate who won the primary was too radical to win the general election.
However, he does not establish a causal link between polarization of the parties, increased
television advertising, and biased news leading to a voter that is ideologically more com-
mitted than those seen in the past. Similar research comes to the same conclusions: the
presence of primary elections, primary competition, or higher levels of voter turnout does
not lead to greater ideological polarization in Congress (Hirano et al. 2010; Layman, Carsey,
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and Horowitz 2006).
Open and Closed Primaries
These are not the only differences possible in the lead up to the general elections. There is
also the issue of the openness of primary elections. Some states restrict the people who are
eligible to vote in the primary. Some primary elections are closed, meaning only members of
the party are allowed to vote. This allows only those who publicly identify as party members
make decisions about who is going to represent the party in the general election. In contrast,
some states have open primaries, where the voter is not required to join the party in order to
vote in that primary, so long as they only select one party. Additionally, there are systems
in which unaffiliated voters can pick which party to vote with, or choosing a party to vote
for in the primary constitutes a declaration of affiliation to that party. Some states use the
top-two system in which all candidates, regardless of partisanship, are on the same ballot
and everyone can vote for anyone.2 Table 3.1 shows primary openness in state elections.3
The openness of the primary system is very resilient to change over time, with most states
rarely engaging in state level reforms. Until recent times, this transition has only gone in one
direction as states have been on a trajectory of opening their primary elections (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2016). As a consequence, most of the literature on the
subject is dated or deals with the consequences of opening the primary election. Table 3.1
shows the states with supreme court elections listed by openness of primary.
Party elite theory assumes that members of each party have identifiable preferences dis-
2This is also known as the Jungle Primary.
3Note: This is the openness of the primary detached from the judicial selection system.
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Table 3.1: Primary Systems in the States
Open Primary Closed Primary Hybrid Primary Top-Two Primary
Alabama Idaho Mississippi Louisiana
Arkansas Illinois North Carolina Washington
Georgia Kentucky West Virginia
Michigan New Mexico
Minnesota Nevada
Montana Ohio
North Dakota Oregon
Texas Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
tinct from the other party and distinct from those who do not identify as members of any
particular party (Carey 2007; Gerber and Morton 1998). As such, candidates from each
party take stances during the primary that do not align with the median voter in the dis-
trict.4 Tests on time series data suggest states with closed primaries have candidates that
take more extreme policy positions compared to the median district voter and in relation
to states with open primary systems (Gerber and Morton 1998). Additionally, that same
study suggests hybrid systems, or those that allow newly registered voters or independents
to choose a ballot, so long as they only vote in one party’s primary, have a moderating effect
on the candidates (Gerber and Morton 1998). Calcagno and Westley (2008) find that the
closer the candidates are to the median voter, the larger the voter turnout. Consequently,
voter turnout in open primaries, where the candidates align more with the median voter, is
greater than in closed primaries, where preferences do not align as closely and fewer voters
are eligible to vote.
4In a state or district with an equal number of Republicans and Democrats, the median voter will be
relatively moderate. However, this also leads to a situation in which the Democrat candidate will be fairly
to the left of center and the Republican candidate will be fairly to the right of center. No matter which
candidate wins, a majority of the needs of the district will not be served.
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Scholars have attempted to discover if different levels of primary openness leads to in-
creased voter turnout of if there is different voter turnout depending on the type of primary
in place. According to Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman (2003), there are distinct differences
in the ideological, age, and income representation of voters in the primaries when compar-
ing states with open and closed systems. Calcagno and Westley (2008) verifies the overall
conclusion that open primaries have higher turnout in gubernatorial elections. Specifically,
Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman (2003) claim open primaries have a moderating effect on
the liberalism of Democrats and cause more moderates to participate in Republican primary
elections. However, a lot of the difference is swallowed up in regional variations and in the
timing of the election. Democrats are better able to mobilize voters in early elections. Ad-
ditionally, open primaries draw a younger set of voters than closed primaries (Kaufmann,
Gimpel, and Hoffman 2003).5 Perhaps surprisingly, this study suggests open Democratic
primaries lead to an increase in wealthy voters in that election–suggesting either low in-
come voters have been replaced by high income voters or strategic, crossover Republicans
are more likely to be wealthy (Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman 2003). Yet, the study
as a whole echoes the findings of Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport (1981)6 in that
crossover voting is actually very rare and assumes too much sophistication on the part of
the voters. Overall, Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman (2003) suggests open primaries lead
to a younger electorate across the board and a wealthier electorate voting in Democratic pri-
maries. Rogowski and Langella (2015), testing elections for Congress and state legislatures,
5There are exceptions in the southern states where the electorate skews older in the primaries than the
general election.
6In their study, only 10% of respondents indicated they voted strategically (Abramowitz, McGlennon,
and Rapoport 1981, 902).
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find no support for these findings–reflecting, perhaps, an increase in polarization since the
original studies.
Brady, Han, and Pope (2007) note that even if the primary electorate is different between
closed and open primaries, as a whole, it is still more ideologically extreme than the general
electorate. While open primaries have a moderating effect, these voters are still more ideo-
logically extreme than the median voter. This leads to a dilemma for those being elected,
because they have to cater to both the primary electorate and the general electorate in order
to get elected. These effects may be moderated in the case of low information elections. As
the public does not know a lot about where the candidate aligns on the ideological spectrum,
it may be possible that votes are more random, or that candidates will have to work harder
to increase name recognition by revealing policy positions.
When California moved from a closed primary to the top-two primary system, critics
feared the Republican party would no longer be competitive in state offices (Mcghee 2014).
The state was largely Democratic at the time and changing systems could make it possible
for two Democrat candidates to advance to the runoff election–effectively shutting out Re-
publican candidates (Kazee 1983). In actuality, the move to the top-two system did not lead
to any dramatic changes in the party make-up of the state. For years following the change,
registration in the Democrat party decreased while registration as Republican and Indepen-
dent increased (Mcghee 2014). This finding is likely linked to growing disillusionment with
Democrat policies and a concerted effort among Republicans to appeal to rural voters (Kazee
1983). However, in Louisiana, where similar laws were passed, voter turnout remained the
same in the decade following the passage of the law. This suggests that opening the primary
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did not increase voter turnout by removing barriers to access in Louisiana and provides an
exception to the overall findings of Calcagno and Westley (2008) who find no increase in
voter turnout associated with opening the primary process.
Nonpartisan Primaries
The primary election has two specific functions: to make decisions within the party apparatus
and to serve as a means of communication between rank and file members of the party and
the leadership. This explanation ties the existence of primaries to the strength of the political
party. However, there is a large plurality of states that use open primaries, which allow any
registered voter to participate in the primary election of either party. The broadening of
the eligible voter pool has the effect of decreasing the power of the party elite to rally the
troops and speak to a unified audience (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007; Mcghee et al. 2013). In
contrast, nonpartisan primaries serve a singular purpose: to narrow down the candidate field
to the top two candidates who will later face off in the general elections. In many respects,
a nonpartisan primary functions more like the systems of election and runoff that are seen
in European and Latin American countries, and Louisiana. Here the electorate is presented
with a group of individual candidates and must choose between them with few, if any, cues
to educate their voting preference.
As a whole, nonpartisan elections have higher rates of voter roll-off as voters cannot find
many voting cues. Instead, they tend to just leave those sections of the ballot blank (Hall
2007; Klein and Baum 2001; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). Studies of nonpartisan
elections at the state and local level find that votes are more random because there is a
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strong correlation between the partisan breakdown of the community and the winner in a
partisan election, but no correlation between the partisan makeup of a community and the
eventual winner of a nonpartisan election (Dubois 1979). This suggests that even when the
electorate turns out to vote, they do not know which individual has party preferences closes
to their own and end up voting blindly. This idea is supported by studies showing ballot
order is strongly correlated with vote share in nonpartisan elections (Chen et al. 2014).
As there are few cues to suggest which candidate would be best to vote for, nonpartisan
primaries are largely a game of who has the ability to mobilize the most voters. In the past,
this has given the Republican Party an advantage, as churches and other interest groups
are better able to link their candidates to the party and get voters to the booths for the
primary and the general election (Hawley 1973). Known as the Republican Benefit Thesis,
Hawley suggests nonpartisanship enhances the electability of Republicans (Hawley 1973, 31)
but the magnitude is not very substantial. Historically, Ohio has been an example of this
principle in action. Officially, Ohio has nonpartisan judicial elections, but partisan primary
elections. This mixed system has led to outcomes that look partisan, as Republican candi-
dates and voters vote at a much higher rate than their Democrat counterparts in primaries.
The combination of low turnout in nonpartisan elections and increased mobilization of the
Republican Party at the primary stage has led to a dominance of Republicans on the state
supreme court bench in Ohio (Barber 1971).
In an update to this study, scholars have studied the effects of the Republican Benefit
Thesis and found that nonpartisan elections favor the minority party as people are unable
to vote straight ticket for the majority. This gives the minority party the opportunity to
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gain more votes (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2007). Additionally, there are many ways
in which voters can glean partisan information in nonpartisan elections. They can make
quick assumptions about the candidate’s positions based on their name, gender, and race
(Banducci et al. 2008; Matson and Fine 2006). Even without partisan labels, voters assume
women and minorities are more liberal than white men (Banducci et al. 2008) and make
partisan decisions based on these assumptions (Matson and Fine 2006).
In addition to being a contest of who can mobilize the most people to vote when ballot
cues are missing, nonpartisan elections are also easily twisted into partisan elections in the
minds of voters (Bonneau and Cann 2015a; Squire and Smith 1988). This is potentially due
to the socialization of voters which leads them to view elections in largely dichotomous ways.
For instance, a candidate can either be a Republican, a Democrat, or neither, but a candidate
cannot be both Republican and Democrat. Years of viewing elections as a choice between two
dichotomous parties has primed the electorate to hold these beliefs when it comes to electing
nonpartisan officials. The presence of a partisan cue is enough to generate or change an
opinion about a sitting justice, even when the respondent previously had no opinion (Squire
and Smith 1988). Therefore, even in elections that are listed as nonpartisan, voters will latch
on to any cues that shed light on the partisan identification of the judge and use them to vote
(Bonneau and Cann 2015a). However, in the event of a truly nonpartisan primary election
in those states that are able to obscure the partisan leanings of the candidates, it is possible
that voters will be swayed by cues revealing gender or ethnicity (Banducci et al. 2008; Matson
and Fine 2006). These ethnic and gender cues may take the place of party identification,
as people vote based on personal identification and existing stereotypes (Matson and Fine
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2006; Shah 2014) This has been shown to be the case in municipal elections (Banducci et al.
2008; Pomper 1966).
Judicial Primaries
Although much is known about the primary election in executive and legislative election
cycles, there is a critical gap in the literature on judicial primary elections. Given that judicial
elections occur in both partisan and nonpartisan contests, it is possible that the presence of
a primary election, or a system in which candidates can be elected in the primary election
without running in the general election will lead to different outcomes when compared to
the traditional partisan primary election. Aside from the partisan-nonpartisan divide, states
with judicial elections are also split between those that have open, closed, or hybrid systems.
This is seen in Table 3.2.
The lack of formal research on judicial primary elections and the effects of the different
systems means there is a critical gap in knowledge of how judicial primary elections influence
the outcomes of judicial contests and when challengers emerge. Lack of knowledge of the
exact path candidates must take to gain office throws into question the existing findings about
candidate emergence and outcomes in the general elections. We do not know how potential
challengers respond to primary pressures, or when challengers win elections. However, there
is significant evidence that suggests the primary election is very different from the general
elections and that candidates and voters behave differently in both elections (Galderisi, Ezra,
and Lyons 2001; Gerber et al. 2017; Lazarus 2005; Mcghee et al. 2013).
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Table 3.2: Judicial Elections and their Primaries
Open Primary Closed Primary Hybrid Primary1 Top Two Primary
Partisan
Elections
Alabama;
Illinois;2
Michigan; Ohio;
Texas
New Mexico;
Pennsylvania
West Virginia Louisiana
Nonpartisan
Elections
Arkansas;
Minnesota;
Montana;
North Dakota;
Wisconsin
Kentucky;
Nevada
Idaho;
North Carolina;
Oregon
Washington
1 In West Virginia and North Carolina, primaries are technically closed, but unaffiliated
voters can request an official party ballot for the primary election. In Idaho, Republican
primaries are closed and Democrat primaries are open and judicial candidates can register
on both ballots. Oregon primaries are closed for federal offices, but recently the Republican
Party opened its primary to unaffiliated voters for state offices (FairVote 2016).
2 Primaries are open, but voters must declare their party affiliation at the polling place to
a judge, who announces it “in a distinct tone of voice, sufficiently loud to be heard by all
persons in the polling place.” Voter only gets a ballot if no one objects (FairVote 2016).
History of Judicial Primary Reform
As a whole, statewide primary elections are understudied and there is little research on
the evolution and effects of particularly judicial primaries. As mentioned previously, states
implemented primary elections in the early 1900s out of a desire to give voters more say
and decrease the corruption and power associated with political bosses. As reformers in the
Progressive Movement pushed for primary elections for municipal and statewide political
offices, they also began the task of removing partisan labels from judicial elections. By 1912,
five states had instituted nonpartisan elections and nonpartisan primaries for judicial offices
(Adrian 1952). Before 1924, 12 states instituted nonpartisan judicial elections. This largely
coincided with the adoption of primary elections for other statewide offices. In order to mit-
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igate power from strong party bosses, reformers simultaneously pushed for primary elections
and nonpartisan judicial elections. However, as noted by Adrian (1952), the nonpartisan
judicial movement died shortly after it began with Nevada being the last of the initial wave
of states to adopt the measure in 1923. Recently, however, there has been an increased
interest in nonpartisan judicial elections with North Carolina moving to nonpartisan judicial
elections in 2004, Arkansas transitioning in 2012, and West Virginia adopting nonpartisan
judicial elections in 2015.
The first nonpartisan elections developed simultaneously with partisan primary elections
at the turn of the twentieth century. This was a time of great freedom for states as they
developed new election systems with the express purpose of decreasing the power of corrupt
urban bosses. Due to this freedom, and the dual goals of decreasing partisan influence in
judicial and municipal arenas, states developed a multitude of nonpartisan election systems
with varying rules, norms, and procedural processes (Chang 2003). Many of these diverging
quirks are still in existence today as there have been little reform to existing nonpartisan
primary structures.
While nonpartisan judicial primaries are largely unchanged from their original inception
at the turn of the twentieth century, partisan judicial primary elections have evolved in con-
junction with the other statewide primary elections. This is most apparent when looking
the status of open and closed primary elections. A majority of the initial primary elections
were closed, so only members of the party can vote in the election and to encourage voters to
formally join a party. However, in the 1960s there was a push to open primary elections so
that unaffiliated voters could also vote in the primary (Boatright 2014). Judicial primaries,
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particularly in southern states, opened alongside other statewide primary elections (Boa-
tright 2014). Additionally, as states adopt top-two, or jungle primaries, the state judicial
elections adopt the same rules.
Challenger Emergence
The methods of selection, retention, presence of either partisan or nonpartisan primary
elections all have a role in the calculation if an individual is going to run for a judicial office.
While states with the merit system remove this aspect of challenger emergence from the
equation, many states rely on challengers to self-select and take the first steps to run for office
on their own. The types of people who are encouraged to make these decisions are greatly
influenced by the political climate, incumbent, and current institutions (Jacobsen and Kernell
1981). However, most of the research done on candidate emergence is limited to the legislative
and executive arenas; few studies on candidate emergence in state judicial contests exist
(Bonneau and Hall 2009; Bonneau 2007). Challenger emergence is an important aspect of
the electoral process as a potential candidate cannot win if they choose not to run. Challenger
emergence is also critically linked to the process of diversification on the court. In order for
courts to become more diversified, women and minorities must choose to run in elections.
Those willing to run for any type of office have long been thought of as cautious risk takers.
Potential officials are considered cautious because they only run in conditions favorable to
their success, but risk takers in the sense that any foray into public office is uncertain
(Jacobsen and Kernell 1981). In early studies of legislative elections, challengers appear
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to be strategic in that they only run for office when, through partisan tides or scandal,
they have a chance of winning (Carson and Park 2005; Jacobsen and Kernell 1981; Lazarus
2008a). This puts challengers at a natural disadvantage because they need access to large
amounts of money before they can advertise enough to attract the attention of voters and
gain traction when soliciting donations. Evidence for these general hypotheses can also be
seen in city council elections where more candidates run for open seats rather than challenge
an established incumbent (Krebs 1999). Likewise, in municipal elections, those who run for
an open seat are often more qualified than those running against incumbents (Krebs 1999).
Incumbents who won by large margins in the previous election were far less likely to face a
challenger in the future (Krebs 1999). All of this suggests that, even at the municipal level,
challengers closely evaluate the political environment and the strength and standing of the
incumbent before making the decision to run for office.
Research shows there is a distinct electoral advantage to being an incumbent (e.g. Ban,
Llaudet, and Snyder 2016; Eckles et al. 2014; Erikson 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014; Jacob-
sen and Kernell 1981). More recent research conceptualizes elections as a two stage process
in which the first level of factors determines if a challenger is going to emerge. From there
the presence of a challenger and a set number of other factors lead to the eventual vote share
(Bonneau and Hall 2009). Therefore, it is important to first determine if a seat is going to
be challenged. This is done by measuring the the electoral vulnerability of the incumbent,
as determined if he or she achieved more than 60 percent of the vote in the previous election
(Bonneau and Hall 2009). In these low information elections, a vote share of less than 60
percent indicates that the voters may be less likely to support this individual in the future.
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In legislative elections, those likely to run are generally holding a lower office or are
established in the community (Ban, Llaudet, and Snyder 2016; Eckles et al. 2014; Maisel and
Stone 1997). However, in survey research, potential candidates claim personal factors are less
influential in their decision to run than professional and institutional characteristics (Maisel
and Stone 1997). This lends credence to the idea that it is the attractiveness of the seat
and the weakness of the incumbent that plays the largest role in determining if a particular
person was going to run for office (Maisel and Stone 1997). Additionally, judicial elections
may mirror legislative elections in that the number of other highly qualified candidates may
also be a factor (Adams and Squire 1997; Eckles et al. 2014). As there are few seats and long
terms for judicial office, it may not be worth the time to wait until the incumbent is weak.
In this case, we may see challengers run when opportunity presents itself (against the other
party, or when there are not many other challengers), even if that means running against a
strong incumbent (Adams and Squire 1997).
Additionally, the attractiveness of the seat, which includes measures of the salary and
the length of term, as well as the political and institutional context, and the partisan climate
of the state, also motivates candidates to run in elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009). Those
states that pay the best have a longer term, or, where the state supreme court is held in high
esteem, possess more attractive court seats. More people in these states may be willing to
take the risk of losing in order to obtain a more attractive seat. Additionally, the political
context also plays a factor in determining the likelihood of a challenger emerging (Ashworth
and Bueno de Mesquita 2008). The presence of a partisan election, the number of lawyers in
the state, and the presence of unified government all contribute to the attractiveness of the
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seat (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008; Bonneau and Hall 2009). Others hypothesize
an incumbent woman is more likely to be faced with a challenger, as well as those who are
newly appointed, as they will be perceived as a weak incumbent (Streb and Frederick 2007).
Diversification of the Court
The study of challenger emergence is the first step in studying the progression of diver-
sification on the court. In elected positions, one of the only ways to increase diversity on
the court is to first increase the diversity of the people running for election.7 The 1980s
saw the first women appointed/elected to the state high courts. However, despite women
beginning to join state courts more than 25 years ago, state high courts still lack gender
parity. Women comprise less than 40% of the high court in most states. Prior research on
the outcomes of women running for judicial office suggests that, in general elections, chal-
lenger women have a slight electoral advantage (Frederick and Streb 2008; Gill and Eugenis
2017). Some findings also suggest a greater number of women reach the bench in courts
with high appointment rates (Glick and Emmert 1986; Valdini and Shortell 2016). However,
other findings show there are a myriad of factors that facilitate diversity on the courts and
this cannot be attributed to just the selection method (Hurwitz and Lanier 2003).
Ultimately, in states with competitive elections, women must run for election in order
to facilitate greater gender diversity on the court. As a general rule, when women run for
office, they are successful (Burrell 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2006b; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton
7In judicial contexts, it is possible to increase diversity on the court in the event of a midterm vacancy
as the Governor is able to appoint an interim judge to fill the position before they must run in an election.
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1997). Additionally, research shows that, in the aggregate, voters do not use gender against
the candidate and there are many gender stereotypes which are advantageous to women
running for public office (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Hayes and Lawless 2016; Lawless
and Pearson 2008; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Women are seen as being more liberal and attuned
to social issues—giving a particular boost to Democrat women running in progressive regions
(Lawless and Pearson 2008). It is likely that voters care more about partisan affiliation more
than gender (Hayes and Lawless 2016). This means that, in most elections, voters will vote
for whichever candidate shares their partisan preference—regardless of the gender of that
candidate.
While these findings hold in general elections, it is possible that there are different factors
at work when looking at the ways women move through the primary election. Research
suggests women are less likely to run for office, despite being equally qualified and working in
a relevant position (Fox and Lawless 2004). Women also need to be encouraged more directly
to run than men, which leads some to suggest that women are particularly election adverse
(Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2014; Kanthak and Woon 2014). This leads to fewer women
running for office, and, ultimately, fewer women gaining office. Additionally, while voters in
the general election focus solely on partisan affiliation, the primary election is separated by
party, and gender may play a role in determining the vote share when partisan affiliation is
shared. Many have hypothesized that primary institutions create additional barriers (Seltzer,
Newman, and Leighton 1997) or that women face a disadvantage in primary elections that
prevents their participation in the general election (Burrell 1994).
Such findings cast a shadow on the otherwise rosy picture of women running in elections.
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Reid (2010) finds incumbent women are more likely to face a challenger and they must work
harder in order to raise campaign funds. If parties or traditional funding sources do not
support women to the same degree they support men, there may be a substantial difference
in the types of campaigns women have to run and the people they need to appeal to in
order to be elected office, even if eventually they are successful in their run for office (Reid
2010). It is also possible that, due to the nature of state politics, most elections are decided
in the primary election (Klumpp 2011). If this is the case, a systematic disadvantage in the
primary election would be a substantial barrier for the emergence of women.
Women in Judicial Elections
Most research done on the topic of gender diversification on the bench focuses on the differ-
ences among judicial selection systems to explain why there are few women on state court
benches. Prior research shows the first woman on the court is more likely to gain office
via appointment. However, appointment does not produce more than token representation
(Bratton and Spill 2002). Given this, it appears as though the second wave of women are
more likely to gain office through direct election (Brennan 1986; Williams 2006). However,
there may be other explanations for the lack of women on the court. Terms are long in the
state high courts, and sitting justices benefit from high retention rates and a strong incum-
bency advantage (Allen and Wall 1993). It is possible that women are simply blocked from
winning or gaining office because the incumbency advantage protects sitting justices from
losing election.
Even as few challenger women win office, it possible that challenger women may have an
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advantage over challenger men when running against an incumbent judge due to strategic
entry into the race (Frederick and Streb 2008; Gill and Eugenis 2017). Specifically, Gill and
Eugenis (2017) find women have an advantage in general elections when they have the ability
to strategically pinpoint a weaker incumbent. This advantage is confined to challenger women
against incumbents. While not always able to defeat the incumbent, challenger women are
able to decrease the incumbent’s vote share moreso than challenger men. Additionally,
challenger women end the election with higher vote shares than similarly placed challenger
men when running against incumbents (Gill and Eugenis 2017).
This prior research suggests women are electorally strong in judicial general elections, but
it raises questions about what occurs before this point in the election cycle. It is possible
that women are more likely to be challenged in the primary election. If so, this may lead to
more women being defeated at the primary stage, with the winning women being stronger
candidates than incumbent men who did not have strong competition in the primaries.
Differences in the quality of women compared to men may be hidden in general elections,
but come to the forefront of primary elections (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Reid 2010).
Finally, due to the structure of judicial primary elections, it is possible for women to avoid a
competitive primary by strategically choosing when to run and who to run against. Women
may run uncontested by their primary in partisan elections. By doing this they either run
uncontested or skip the primary entirely. Additionally, candidates can skip the primary by
either running as one of two candidates in a state where the top-two move on to the general
election, ensuring everybody wins the first stage, or by running in states where primaries are
only held when there are more than two candidates.
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Gaps in the Literature
Existing literature on legislative and executive elections shows primaries are important
stepping stones on the path to office. Not only do primary elections pave the way for
the winner of the general election, but they are critically different from general elections.
Primary elections generally suffer from low turnout (Boatright 2014); different subsets of the
population vote in them, with the most politically interested and strong partisans voting in
the primary election (Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck 2014; Norrander 1986). Therefore, in order
to win the election, all candidates must appeal to two different segments of the population
in order to either win both elections or deter challengers from emerging. This additional
step in the electoral process has the potential to influence when challengers emerge.
Prior research shows challengers are strategic in that they run when they are most likely
to win (Jacobsen and Kernell 1981). Additionally, research in legislative and executive
elections demonstrates challengers consider the incumbent’s prior primary results as part of
the calculus to decide to run for office (Lazarus 2008a). We know that, in legislative elections,
this has the overall effect of increasing partisan primary challengers in locations where the
party is dominant and when the incumbent has experienced close primary elections in the
past (Carson and Park 2005; Lazarus 2008a). We do not know how this calculation works in
the differing contexts of judicial elections. Here, some elections are partisan and may work in
similar ways as legislative elections. However, many judges are chosen in nonpartisan races.
There is limited research on the role of the primary or first election in nonpartisan systems.
In many respects, the issue of diversification of the court is linked with challenger emer-
gence. In order to create a diversified court, it is necessary for those running for office to
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also be diverse. While research finds that in the aggregate, challenger women do better than
similarly situated men in general elections (Frederick and Streb 2008; Gill and Eugenis 2017).
It is possible that events occurring in the primary election lead to either fewer women run-
ning in the general election (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2014) or only the most overqualified
candidates running in the general election (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Without
knowledge of the role of the primary election for women in judicial primaries, we cannot
understand how and when women proceed to the general election.
There is still a lot that we do not know about the effect of the primary, both partisan
and nonpartisan, on candidate emergence in judicial elections. Although there has been
research on the effects of judicial elections on candidates, the judiciary as a whole, the
effects of primaries on the electoral system, candidate emergence within legislative systems,
and success rates of women, we do not know the effects of primaries on candidate emergence
or the path of women in judicial elections. There is opportunity to merge the ideas and
study the effects of the primary election on the patterns of candidate emergence and the
ways in which women move through judicial election cycles.
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Chapter 4
The Moving Parts
Primary elections are the first hurdle for candidates to cross before the general election,
and, ultimately, winning office. They act as a gatekeeper for candidates. Only candidates
who can emerge from the primary election, or who can deter challengers altogether, have a
chance to win office. Therefore, biases in the primary election are reflected in the general
election. No matter how equitable the general election appears, the end result is can still
be biased because one of the necessary hurdles is compromised. Thus, if there is limited
understanding of the forces at work in the primary election, ultimately there is a limited
understanding of why general elections display certain characteristics.
Consequently, primary elections complicate the study of elections. However, as the pri-
mary has a different function from the general election, studying the electoral gateway is
a necessary complication (Boatright 2014). In partisan elections, primary elections are a
means for party membership to collectively decide which candidate best represents their
conceptualization of the party platform. Partisan primaries thus serve the party by estab-
lishing a platform and candidate. In nonpartisan elections, the primary serves to narrow
down the field of candidates to those who are most liked and most qualified in the eyes of
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the electorate.
The Model
Most current studies of elections imply we can understand any general election as a single
data point in that the election cycle begins, candidates campaign, raise and spend money,
and then people vote in the general election (see Figure 4.1). This conceptualizes elections
as one continuous race where the winner is crowned at the end when one candidate wins over
50% of the vote. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the process begins when candidates declare
their intention to run for office and fill out the necessary paperwork. After that, they embark
on the business of raising money, advertising against any other opponents, and increasing
name recognition in positive ways across the electorate. If all goes in their favor, they will
get the majority of votes in the general election.
Figure 4.1: The General Election Perspective
However, this model does not paint an accurate picture of the judicial, or any other,
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election cycle. It does not take into account the critical junctures that occur during the
election cycle and ultimately affect the outcome of the general election. Rather than being a
marathon where the winner is the candidate who reaches a plurality of votes in the general
election after months of work, as the General Election Perspective suggests, election cycles
are more akin to a series of sprints in which each mini race has its own character, strategy,
and demographic. At any point, a candidate can win by discouraging challengers from
emerging or by beating competitors in the primary election, thereby making the general
election uncompetitive.
Election cycles have three of these critical junctures: the filing date, the primary election,
and the general election. Each of these are points where it is possible for one candidate to
defeat the rest of the competition and enter the general election either uncontested or with
only weak candidates as competition. In order to account the different factors that lead to
a candidate eventually gaining office, I present a new model of elections. It emphasizes the
importance of the primary election in determining which candidates make it to the general
election ballots, or if candidates face the competition with the best chance of winning early
on the in the cycle. This process can decide the outcome of the general election long before
voters go to the polls or look at the general ballots. Figure 4.2 presents one way to visualize
the entire election cycle.
Here, the critical junctures are represented by points on the timeline. The first critical
juncture is the filing date. It is possible that a strong enough incumbent or candidate
can deter challengers from even filing paperwork during that particular election cycle. If
challengers do not feel their chances of winning are sufficiently high to take the risk of
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Figure 4.2: Dynamic Election Phase Model
running for office, then some may be deterred from running and will wait for an open seat
or run against a weaker candidate. The second critical juncture is the primary election.
Candidates then advertise and increase name recognition among the primary electorate. As
the primary electorate is often different from the general election electorate (Brady, Han, and
Pope 2007), this requires the use of different strategies and skills to discredit opponents and
increase name recognition among the most partisan of voters in the election (Boatright 2014;
Gerber et al. 2017). In some nonpartisan primaries, as voters do not have the partisan cue
to inform the vote, candidates must work to increase their name recognition and distinguish
themselves from the competition early to win in the primary and avoid a contested election
in November. If a candidate is able to defeat all competition in the primary election, they
will be able to either win office outright or move to an uncontested general election. Finally,
the general election is the third juncture with the outcome of the general election leading to
the winner of the seat.
Partisan state supreme courts can spend decades completely controlled by one party or
another based on the party platforms and the prevailing ideology within the state. In cases
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where only one party is competitive in statewide elections, the voters effectively choose the
next justice in the primary election (Klumpp 2011). Even if the other party does have a
candidate for the general election, or if third party candidates decide to run, the general
election is already essentially decided in these red and blue states (Klumpp 2011). In the
rest of the states, the purple states, where both Republicans and Democrats are elected to
the supreme court on a consistent basis, the most competitive race may still occur during
the general election.
Candidates in both partisan and nonpartisan elections must distinguish themselves from
their opposition in the minds of voters who may know very little about the race (Hall 2007;
Dubois 1979). A partisan primary asks voters to distinguish between two or more people
who may be very similar in their ideological stances. In order to be competitive in a race like
this, candidates must be able to imprint their name on voters’ minds. While nonpartisan
primaries pit many candidates with many ideologies together in one single race, there is no
party identification on the ballot. These candidates must work before the election to connect
their names and beliefs together, thereby convincing voters who share their ideology to vote
for them in the primary election (Hawley 1973; Schaffner and Diascro 2007).
Communicating with primary voters requires its own strategy. The people who are most
likely to vote in primary elections are not a representative sample of the population. Primary
voters are more likely to be white, have prestigious jobs, and be strong partisans (Ranney
1972; Norrander 1986) than voters in the general election. In order to account for these
different demographics, candidates employ different behaviors and strategies to cater to the
primary electorate.
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Candidates run knowing the institutional context of the state when they run for office.
Therefore, social scientists may see differences in the way they run for office in the different
primary systems as well as a difference in the behaviors exhibited between the primary
race and the general election race as judicial candidates appeal to the different segments
of the population who vote in each race. Knowing the differences between the primary
and general electorate, and knowing the importance of primary elections, potentially leads
candidates to behave differently in the primary election. They may self-select in or out of the
race at different rates depending on the electoral system in their jurisdiction. It is possible
that judges possessing certain characteristics are more competitive in systems where there
is always a primary election while those same judicial characteristics are less successful in
systems where the primary is only held when there is sufficient competition.
The presence and type of primary election plays a role in candidate emergence. The
different systems present across the states create a pool from which to compare the ways
candidates act in primary and general elections. This leads to several different hypotheses on
the behavior of judicial candidates as they move through the entire election cycle. Addition-
ally, the study of primary elections may reveal the differing ways women proceed through
the system and the potential roadblocks to diversity on the court.
In a multi-stage model such as this one, there is a lot to unpack and there are many
different small research projects buried within. Individually, each project would only begin
to paint a picture of the processes at work in an entire election cycle. In this dissertation,
I will not endeavor to explain every aspect of each stage of the judicial primary election.
Instead, I am going to only focus on the two critical junctures—candidate emergence and
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primary elections. While combining the first two stages with the results of the general
election is my eventual goal, for the purposes of this dissertation, I will be looking at smaller
snapshots of the larger model.
Potential Candidate Pool Prior to the Filing Date
The candidates who emerge in state supreme court elections are largely dependent on
the requirements for office and the candidate pool in each state. While anyone meeting
residency and signature requirements are eligible to run for state executive and legislative
office, judicial candidates must meet a more stringent set of requirements. In all states,
judicial candidates must at least hold a law degree and oftentimes must meet additional
state bar requirements, as seen in Table 2.1. To account for this many scholars choose to
use the number of lawyers in the state as a proxy for potential candidate pool (Alozie 1990;
Bonneau and Hall 2003, 2009; Hall and Bonneau 2006; Holmes and Emrey 2006; Streb and
Frederick 2008).
This proxy measure is generally lagged one year to reflect the number of lawyers in the
state during the filing period (Bonneau and Hall 2009). This is not a perfect representation
of the number of candidates who are eligible to sit on the state highest court due to the
varying requirements for years in the state bar. However, states with more total lawyers are
also more likely to have more lawyers who are eligible to run for judge. Figure 4.3 shows the
number of lawyers in each state in the dataset per year. Here we can see that most states
maintain fairly consistent lawyer populations with gradual increases over time (American
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Bar Association 2017a).
Figure 4.3: Number of Lawyers in Each State 1995-2016
For the most part, the number of lawyers stay fairly consistent across this 21-year time
frame, particularly in states with lower populations such as North Dakota, Montana, and
Idaho.1 Most states experienced a slight increase in the number of lawyers, with the exception
being Texas, which experienced a steady increase from 54,606 lawyers in 1995 to 87,957
lawyers in 2016.
1I was unable to obtain the number of lawyers in each state prior to 1995.
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Women as Part of the State Supreme Court Candidate Pool
The restricted candidate pool also affects the rate at which women obtain seats on the state
courts of last resort. In the past 37 years, women have moved into the ranks of practicing
lawyers at a rapid rate. In 1980, approximately 3.4% of all lawyers were women (Michelson
2012) and women made up only 2.9% of all state supreme court justices (Alozie 1996). By
1993, women made up about 24.6% of the lawyer population (Michelson 2012) and 15.8% of
all state supreme court justices (Alozie 1996). Since then, women have continued to steadily,
albeit slowly, increase representation as both lawyers and state supreme court justices with
women making up about 36% of lawyers and 34.6% of state supreme court seats across the
nation (American Bar Association 2017b). Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of lawyers who
are women from 1960 through 2017 (American Bar Association 2017b; Michelson 2012).2
Figure 4.4 shows a steady increase in the percentage of lawyers who are women from 1960
through 2016. Now, approximately 36% of lawyers are women, however this is a national
number. Data are not available to say if this number is being driven by a few states with
large lawyer populations where the gender ratio may be more equal. It could be possible
that states such as Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania may have both high numbers of lawyers
and a high percentage of attorneys who are women while states such as Idaho, Montana,
and North Dakota, where there are few lawyers, may have a lower percentage of lawyers who
are women. In 2005, 36.2% of lawyers in Washington DC were women while only 20.3% of
Utah’s lawyers were women. This suggests that there may be systematic differences in the
percentage of lawyers who are women per state (Carson and Park 2005). These differences
2Data for 1960 through 2000 comes from Michelson (2012). Data on the percentage of lawyer who are
women after 2000 comes from American Bar Association (2017b).
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Figure 4.4: Women as a Percentage of the Lawyer Population 1960-2017
may be reflected in the percentage of women on state courts of last resort. However, the
vast majority of states in 2005 had very similar percentages of lawyers who are women.3
As women have become a larger percentage of the lawyer population, they have also
become a more visible presence on state courts of last resort. As a consequence, women’s
representation on the state high courts has also increased dramatically since the 1970s.
Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of state supreme court seats held by women by decade.
Data are averaged by decade and come from American Bar Association (2017b); Acquaviva
3The mean is 27.9 and the median is 28—indicating that many states had similar representation of women.
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and Castiglione (2010); Alozie (1996).4 This graph shows the 1980s and 1990s fostered a
dramatic increase in the percentage of state supreme court seats held by women. Since
then, women are still increasing their representation on state supreme court seats, albeit at
a slightly slower pace.
Figure 4.5: Percentage of State Supreme Court Justices 1970s-2010s
4I use decade measurements because of incomplete data. I gathered percentages state supreme court
seats held by women in the 1970s and 1980s from Acquaviva and Castiglione (2010) and data from the 1990s
from Acquaviva and Castiglione (2010) and Alozie (1996). Finally, data for the 2000s and 2010s is from
American Bar Association (2017b). In cases where I had more than one measure per decade, I averaged the
percentages together to create a decade average. It is important to note there is an upward trend with the
early years of a decade having a smaller percentage of women on the court of last resort than the later years
of the decade.
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While representation of women on state high court bench is increasing at nearly the same
rate as women’s representation in the law profession, long-standing experience requirements,
such as being a member of the state bar association for 10 or more years, may mean the
pool of women who are eligible for office is smaller than how it appears here. As women
increasingly join the ranks of practicing lawyers, it will take time for them to develop the
experience necessary to be eligible to run for office (Palmer 2001). Because of these additional
qualification requirements, the actual candidate pool of attorneys eligible to run for office is
smaller than just the raw population of lawyers. Particularly, the number of women who are
eligible to run for office may be less than the total population of attorney who are women
because women may be newer to the profession and it will take time for them to move up
the ranks of experience.
Characteristics of Primary Elections
Judicial general elections are a culmination of what is ultimately a multi-stage process.
Each state has different rules on a number of key institutional characteristics. This includes
partisan/nonpartisan elections, who can vote in the primary, when the primary occurs, the
differences between primaries and runoff elections, off-cycle elections, and other differentiat-
ing factors. A typology, or framework, helps to make sense of all the important ways in which
primary election systems differ. While there is research on the different selection systems
and their outcomes, it only concerns the outcomes of the general election. Current research
on judicial elections misses the fact that these candidates arrive at the general election only
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after competing in the primary election. Where there is a general election, candidates must
first compete in a primary election either against their own party members, or against a
wider pool of everyone else running for the same office. All of these factors at the primary
level have a direct effect on which individuals appear on the general election ballot and,
subsequently, which individual wins the general election.
Judicial primary elections only occur in states where voters choose their judges in com-
petitive elections, both partisan and nonpartisan. Even within these two categories there
is a significant amount of variation in the rules and specific barriers that lead to the mo-
ment of election (Gill 2013). Most of this variation comes in the form of primary elections,
off-cycle elections, and runoff elections. When these different rules are taken into considera-
tion, it becomes evident there is no standard judicial election or electoral process across the
states—even when only comparing those states with competitive elections.
Candidates in Each Race
The traditional primary election, or the one most similar to state legislative and gubernatorial
elections, occurs in partisan judicial elections. In these systems, the general election is made
up of one candidate from each of the main parties and any third party candidates who decide
to run for office. Prior to that point, the parties determine who their candidate will be by
holding a primary election. Here, all candidates of the same party who are interested in
office run against each other and the voters or party members have the opportunity to pick
the candidate who best represents their ideology. Theoretically, in partisan states, there
can be two primary elections for each judicial seat, one with Republican candidates and the
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other with Democrat candidates. This is the basic format for partisan elections, as used in
legislative and executive elections. Although not all states with partisan judicial elections
use this format, this is generally how the system works.
While candidates in the general election must appeal to most of the voting population,
primaries have historically been the arena in which party members reveal their preferences
(Gerber and Morton 1998). According to party elite theory, candidates view the primary as a
chance to appeal to the preferences of the median party member rather than the preferences
of the voting population as a whole to get greater access to party resources like campaign
volunteers, data on voters, or access to important donors (Gerber and Morton 1998). In sum,
candidates use the primaries to focus on voters who already display some level of interest
and knowledge about the political process.
Without a partisan marker on the ballot, nonpartisan primary elections take on a different
character. In nonpartisan systems, the general election will still have the final two candidates
for office on the ballot, but the primary election ballot will list all candidates registered in
the race. The two candidates who get the most votes will rematch in the general election.
Because candidates face each other twice, this system operates more like an election followed
by a runoff than a partisan primary. This is because candidates face the same challengers, or
subset of challengers, both times, while candidates in partisan primaries face different sets
of challengers in each election. Candidates in nonpartisan elections must work to connect
their personal policy stances with their name, rather than rely on the partisan cue on the
ballot. It may be possible that challengers running in this system have an advantage as they
must face the incumbent twice. The primary election may serve as a proving ground, with
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challengers being able to refine their message and find the incumbent’s weakness prior to the
final election.
Openness of Primary Elections
The openness of the primary is determined at the state level for all state-wide elections. This
means the primary structure for the state legislative and the state executive elections are the
same. This complicates things when it comes to judicial elections—particularly nonpartisan
judicial elections. If primaries in the state are closed, a nonpartisan judicial primary election
will still occur at the same time as other statewide closed primaries although anyone can
vote in the nonpartisan primary. The openness of the primary is not necessarily correlated
with the status of the election as partisan or not. Table 4.1 shows each state by election
type and primary openness.
The differences between open and closed primaries is more pronounced in state executive
and legislative races. Openness matters more in partisan elections where the party can
control who votes in that primary. However, in nonpartisan systems the distinction does
not directly affect judicial elections. Nonpartisan judicial primary elections are always open,
even when they occur at the same time as closed primaries for other statewide elections,
because they are not linked to the party. There may be indirect effects of a closed primary
system on open nonpartisan elections. If it is widely known that the statewide primary
election is closed, then those not connected to a primary may refrain from going to the polls
only to vote for judicial elections.5
5This would be an indirect effect of the openness on judicial primaries, but currently I do not have the
data to test hypotheses concerning it. From personal experience, as an independent in a state with closed
primary elections but nonpartisan judicial primaries, I have never voted in a judicial primary.
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Table 4.1: Primary Openness by Election Partisanship
Open Primary Closed Primary Hybrid Primary1 Top-Two Primary
Partisan
Elections
Alabama; Illinois2;
Michigan;
Ohio; Texas
New Mexico;
Pennsylvania
West Virginia Louisiana
Nonpartisan
Elections
Arkansas;
Minnesota
Montana;
North Dakota;
Wisconsin
Kentucky;
Nevada
Idaho;
North Carolina;
Oregon
Washington
1 In West Virginia and North Carolina, primaries are technically closed, but un-
affiliated voters can request an official party ballot for the primary election. In
Idaho, Republican primaries are closed and Democrat primaries are open and
judicial candidates can register on both ballots. Oregon primaries are closed for
federal offices, but recently the Republican party opened its primary to unaffili-
ated voters for state offices.
2 In Illinois the primaries are open, but voters must declare their party affiliation
at the polling place to a judge, who announces it “in a distinct tone of voice,
sufficiently loud to be heard by all persons in the polling place” (Illinois General
Assembly 2017). Voter only gets a ballot if no one objects.
Uncontested Primary Elections
States also differ in the frequency and conditions under which they hold primary elections.
One such difference is whether the state holds primaries in the event of an uncontested
race. State supreme court elections are often uncontested the primary or general elections.
In partisan electoral systems, this can take the form of having a completely uncontested
election, uncommon in nonpartisan systems, or, more commonly, an uncontested primary
election in which only one candidate from each party runs for the position. Because these
primary elections are uncontested and the candidate wins by default, some states do not list
the primary candidates on the ballot while other states list uncontested races for vote on
the ballot. This difference is important because listing the candidate’s name and partisan
affiliation on the primary ballot may assist in name recognition. When voters cast their
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ballot for a candidate in an uncontested election, it may become easier for them to vote
again for that same candidate later when the candidate has opposition (Adams and Merrill
2008). Table 4.2 shows which states allow uncontested primaries and which states only hold
primary elections when there are a sufficient number of challengers.
Table 4.2: Uncontested Primaries vs Contested Pri-
maries by State and Presence of Partisan Elections
Uncontested
Primaries
Contested
Primaries
Partisan Elections
Illinois; Ohio;
Texas
Alabama;
Louisiana;
New Mexico;1
Pennsylvania
Nonpartisan Elections
West Virginia;
Arkansas; Montana;2
North Dakota;2
Mississippi
Idaho; Georgia;
Kentucky;
Minnesota;
Mississippi;
North Carolina;
Nevada; Oregon;
Washington;3
Wisconsin
1 Prior to 1998, New Mexico always held a primary elec-
tion.
2 If there are two candidates in the primary, those two
candidates rematch in the general election.
3 Washington held uncontested primary elections until
2014, when they switched to a system in which primaries
are only held when there are three or more challengers.
Additionally, according to Adams and Merrill (2008), parties that hold primaries are
electorally favored over parties that do not, if all things equal, even when the candidate
has to run in two contested elections. Even in the event that the party having the primary
election is the political underdog, it has a greater chance of winning by holding a primary
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election than not (Adams and Merrill 2008). This is due to the ability of the candidates to
position themselves closer to the median voter and increase their name recognition (Adams
and Merrill 2008). Finally, when both parties hold a primary, research suggests primaries
help the weaker party. However, while the weaker party’s candidate receives more votes than
if a primary had not been held, it does not guarantee an election win. This is because the
stronger party needs to take a more extreme position in order to win the primary, while the
candidates from the weaker party do not have the same pressures to select extreme policy
positions and can thereby appeal to the median voter (Adams and Merrill 2008). For these
reasons, it is possible that holding a primary election advantages one candidate over another
in the general election. Additionally, candidates who run in uncontested primary elections
may be better positioned to deter challengers in the future as candidates are deterred from
running against strong incumbents (Lazarus 2008a).
While current research on the advantages and disadvantages of holding a primary cen-
ters on executive or legislative contests, it is still applicable to the study of judicial races.
In roughly one third the states, judicial races are partisan, meaning judges make the same
decisions about where to place their policy positions on the ideological spectrum as candi-
dates in other elections, all while still needing to maintain the veneer of judicial impartiality.
Nonpartisan elections have a similar distinction between contested and uncontested primary
elections. While it is rare that a nonpartisan primary and general election is entirely uncon-
tested, there are different rules across the states when dealing with the varying numbers of
challengers. Some states still list completely uncontested judicial primary elections on the
ballot despite the results being assured. In other states, no primary election is held unless
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there is a minimum of three candidates running. This prevents two candidates from running
in the primary election, both winning and running again in the general election.
Gaining Office after Running in the Primary Elections
There are several states where it is possible for state supreme court candidates to win the
election without ever being listed on the general ballot by winning an absolute majority of
the vote in the primary. As voter turnout in primary elections is much lower than in general
elections (McDonald 2015), it is possible for candidates in these states to gain a seat on
the state supreme court by appealing to a very narrow segment of the population. This
changes the strategy employed by candidates in that they must raise money earlier, utilize
advertising earlier, and activate their troops earlier with the intent of getting voters to the
polls at an earlier election.
There is an important distinction in the states where the state supreme court justice can
be elected during an election that occurs before the standard general election in November.
Voters may know to look for primary elections if they are eligible to vote in them prior to
November. However, most voters may not know the vote in the primary election is the final
vote. For example, Arkansas conducts general elections for the state supreme court at the
same time, and on the same ballot, as the primary elections for all other state offices. If
there is no conclusive winner of the May elections, then there is a judicial runoff election
on the same ballot as the general election in November. While this is officially listed as a
general election, because it is on the same ballot as the primary election for all other state
offices, it is an instance of election during the primary time period. Because the voting
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demographic is different in the primary elections, Electing prior to the general election could
lead to different outcomes compared to states where the final election occurs with the more
moderate voters of the general election. Knowing that it is possible to win in a primary
election may change when challengers emerge. This may be particularly relevant when it
comes to subsets of candidates who are election adverse (Kanthak and Woon 2014).
With that in mind, there are seven states where it is possible for voters to elect in the
primary election. These are Louisiana, Arkansas, Idaho, Georgia, Washington (until 2014),
and Oregon. These states span across open, closed, and top two primaries, and partisan
and nonpartisan electoral systems. Top-two systems, such as Louisiana and Washington, are
more likely to allow early elections if a particular candidate receives an absolute majority
(over 50%) in the primary. Likewise, in Idaho, if one candidate lists himself or herself on
both the Republican and Democrat ballots and gets an absolute majority of all votes, that
candidate is elected without appearing on the general election ballot. Because turnout is
lower in the primary election, a smaller segment of the voting population is necessary to elect
justices in these situations than in states where all elections occur on the standard general
election ballot. Table 4.3 shows the states with judicial elections broken down by primary
openness and ability to be elected in the primary.
Similarly, some states hold off-cycle elections for state supreme court. While those states
that elect during the primary election are holding general elections when voters may be
accustomed to voting, but might not expect the vote to be the final say, off-cycle elections
occur when the public does not necessarily expect there to be any election at all. This
has the effect of dampening voter turnout and decreasing the number of votes it takes to
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Table 4.3: Primary Openness by Ability to Win Office in the Primary
Open Primary Closed Primary Hybrid Primary
Top-Two
Primary
Win During
Primary Election
Georgia, — Idaho; Oregon
Louisiana;
Washington
(until 2014)
Only Win in
General Election
Alabama;
Arkansas
(until 2012);
Illinois;
Michigan;
Minnesota;
Montana;
Ohio;
North Dakota;
Texas; Wisconsin
Kentucky;
New Mexico;
Nevada;
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
(until 2015);
North Carolina
—
win a majority and get elected (McDonald 2015). There are two states that hold off-cycle
elections: Pennsylvania, which holds judicial elections in November of odd numbered years,
and Wisconsin, which holds judicial elections in April of both even and odd numbered years.
Through this cursory list of differentiating features within competitive judicial elections
in the states, it becomes apparent each state does things very differently and there are not a
lot of features that naturally go together. Many of the characteristics, such as if the states
elect in primaries or if there is an off cycle or runoff election element, are not linked to either
partisan or nonpartisan systems. However, this information can assist in creating a basic
typology based on the institutional differences and which set of voters has the most influence
in who wins the election.
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Why this Matters
While there is limited prior research on judicial primary elections, or any nonpartisan
primary elections, the structure of the primary in each state may reveal systematic differences
in the ways candidates in different locations get elected to the same office. The judicial
primary typology also reveals different hurdles candidates must pass through on their way
to winning the election. Additionally, it is possible the different types of institutional rules
for primaries may lead to a greater number of challengers in some systems; alternatively,
these differences may affect the decisiveness of the election.
Prior research on legislative and gubernatorial elections suggests primary challengers, or
in-party challengers, emerge when the incumbent has done poorly in prior primary elections,
while general election challengers (or out-party challengers) emerge when the candidate has
done poorly in prior general elections (Lazarus 2008b). In partisan judicial elections, it is
possible challengers will emerge in much the same way: When incumbents do poorly in
the primary election, their odds of attracting in-party challengers in subsequent primaries
increases, while those challengers who do well in primary elections may be more likely to run
unopposed. The same logic may be true in judicial elections. Those incumbents who have
done exceptionally well in prior general elections may attract fewer out-party challengers
than those who have win in much closer margins.
Ultimately, this pattern of behavior would have the effect of making elections in some
states attract many challengers, while other states may have few challenged elections. As
candidates run unopposed in primary elections, they may be more likely to run unopposed in
the future, regardless of qualification. As this continues, it may cause a divide in the states,
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Table 4.4: Conceptual Hypotheses for Challenger Emergence
1. In partisan primaries, prior primary election results may predict the emergence of
a current challenger more than prior general election results.
2. Nonpartisan elections are more likely to have challengers in the first stage
regardless of other factors.
3. States with more partisan entrenchment may be more likely to have primary
competition.
4. Candidates who run in uncontested primaries may be more likely to deter a
challenger than those who ran contested or those who skipped the prior primary.
with some states having more a more competitive primary or general election. Other states
may have a large number of uncompetitive elections because a history of uncompetitive
elections may deter challengers.
Nonpartisan elections tend to attract more challengers than partisan elections at the
state supreme court level. However, the initial trends identified by Lazarus (2008b) may also
be at work in judicial nonpartisan elections, albeit in a slightly different way. It is possible
that states that only hold primary elections where there are three or more challengers will
be less likely to have challenged elections because candidates will be less likely to challenge
an incumbent who has done well or been unchallenged in the past (Krebs 1999). Conversely,
states with election-runoff systems will be more likely to attract challengers, as there effec-
tively is no primary. In other words, state institutions may create self-perpetuating systems
that either encourage or discourage challengers from emerging in primary elections based,
in part, on the rules concerning when primary elections are held. Prior research on primary
elections (Hamm and Hogan 2008; Eckles et al. 2014; Ban, Llaudet, and Snyder 2016; Maisel
and Stone 1997) suggest several trends to look for in judicial primary elections (Table 4.4).
The different primary systems also have implications on the diversification of state
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supreme courts in general. Prior research on women on the state supreme court suggests
merit plan systems are more likely to add the first woman to the court (Bratton and Spill
2002). Some suggest election systems have greater opportunities for women’s advancement
on state courts (Williams 2006; Brennan 1986). Additionally, some studies indicate women
may have an advantage over men in judicial elections, particularly challenger women over
challenger men in the general elections (Gill and Eugenis 2017; Frederick and Streb 2008).
Outside of judicial contests, fewer women run for office than men, even though much of
the current research suggests that women face no disadvantage when they do run for office
(Fox 2014; Burrell 1992; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Sanbonmatsu 2006b). In the
legislative and executive contexts, this is particularly true when the woman is a Democrat
because Democrat women have the greatest advantage (Dolan 2014). Although few studies
address the role of gender in judicial primary elections,6 legislative research suggests women
may be challenged at the primary level more often (Lawless and Pearson 2008). If true, it is
possible that any advantage women have at the general election, particularly the advantage
held by challenger women, may be a result of having faced a more arduous primary election
than men. If this is the case, the women who have advantage in the general election may be
stronger candidates than the incumbent or men running an an open seat election, making
their win at the general level more a reflection of their qualification rather than a gender
advantage (conceptual hypotheses are in Table 4.5).
While these two subfields of literature, women in judicial elections and women in primary
elections, shed light on possible challenges women face as they move through the electoral
6The only study about judicial primary elections is Klumpp (2011) which is limited to only Cook County,
Illinois. The author finds that being a woman and being Irish are two of the strongest predictors of the
outcome.
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Table 4.5: Conceptual Hypotheses about Women in Judicial Primaries
1. Women may be challenged more often and by stronger challengers in primary
elections—regardless of partisan affiliation.
2. Women may wait until they are stronger candidates before they run in judicial
elections as either an open seat candidate or a challenger.
3. Party leaders and other judicial influencers may steer challenger women towards
running against another woman rather than face an incumbent man.
4. Women may face a systematic disadvantage in vote share at the primary election
level.
cycle, there are more questions than answers. Women may have a blanket advantage, or
they may be systematically disadvantaged at the primary level in ways that are not obvious
when studying only general elections independent of the entire cycle.
Due to the different functions and roles of the primary election in vetting out weaker
candidates and, in the case of partisan elections, establishing a candidate who espouses
the dominant ideology of the state, I expect primary elections to be different from general
elections. Additionally, given that potential candidates must consider their viability in both
the primary and the general election before filing for candidacy, the context of the primary
election must influence the decision to run for office. Studying at challenger emergence and
the ways women move through the election cycle are firm starting points for the study of
the role of the primary election in judicial election cycles.
Data Collection and Formatting
In this analysis of the relationship between primary type, challenger emergence, and the
role of gender, I will be using a mostly quantitative approach. Qualitative analysis can be
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useful in revealing trends in lieu of quantitative data, in situations where data are difficult
to obtain, or where quantitative measures do not accurately reflect real life. However, in
this instance, data on elections are publicly available which can shed light when challengers
emerge or when incumbents run unopposed and connect these trends to systematic differences
in the states. Although officially election data are publicity available, they are not readily
accessible. Difficulty in establishing a comprehensive dataset of judicial primary elections
may explain why scholars have not previously done this research.
The data making up the core of this study consist of election results for primary and
general elections for 22 states from 1990 through 2016. Data is only from states holding
competitive elections for state supreme court judges: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin.7
Data was initially organized at the election level of analysis. Each election seat per year
counted as an individual observation. Each state can have multiple elections per year, as each
individual seat goes through a primary and general election. For example, if there are three
incumbents up for election in the Ohio primary, there will be three separate observations
for that state/year/election type. This follows the election reporting habits in many of the
states, where each race is listed separately.8 This is an example of data in wide format.
7I excluded New York. Although the New York Supreme Court is elected in partisan elections, they are
not the highest court in the state. The highest state court is the New York Court of Appeals and those
judges are appointed.
8There are exceptions to this format in states where multiple seats are elected in a singular race. Mostly,
this occurs on Michigan where as many as two incumbents and six challengers run in one race for two seats.
The top two vote-getters end up winning the election with vote shares hovering around the 20-25% mark.
This causes other problems with the data analysis which I will explain later.
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Some of the analyses require the data to be transformed into a long format. The long format
version of the data centers on the candidate, with each candidate, both incumbent and
challenger(s), becoming a separate observation linked together through state/year/election
type/seat number. The data were transformed from election centered to candidate centered
for some of the later analyses. The long format of the data also consist of an election identifier
to tie all of the candidates together.
The dataset consists of the date of the election, the names of the candidates, indicators
of incumbency, final vote shares, the incumbent’s electoral history, and whether they were
challenged previously. While these data are, in theory, publicly available, it is not all ac-
cessible online. As the internet became more accessible and use increased around the turn
of the millennium, states created websites and began putting current public data online. A
few states retroactively put prior electoral data online, but many did not. Unfortunately,
statewide electoral data are not available in any one national repository, particularly going
back to 1990. For those states that do not have prior electoral results online, electoral data
come from state-published legislative “Blue Books,” state archives, and direct requests to
each state’s Elections Division.9
The electoral data in the dataset forms the backbone of the entire analysis. Electoral
data hold information about the presence of a challenger, the number of challengers, and
the competitiveness of the race measured by the closeness of the final vote. These measures
are important independent variables when testing if some primary types tend toward certain
outcomes that others do not. For example, this information is required to test hypotheses
9There are too many to name individually, but I owe a huge debt of appreciation for all of the hard-
working people in the various state electoral divisions for their help in locating this archival data, emailing
it to me, and/or directing me in the right direction.
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about whether potential challengers use the incumbent’s previous competition and prior
election results as signals for if that incumbent is vulnerable (Lazarus 2008a).
Many of the variables in the dataset describe the election and the state electoral context,
for example if it is a primary or general election, partisan or nonpartisan, if elections were
off-cycle, if primaries are open or closed, filing dates, if candidates are selected at a state
convention, the total number of judicial seats, term length, and if the candidate was elected
in a primary or runoff election. These variables make up both a large portion of the context
surrounding each election and the foundation of the typology of primary elections. Additional
control variables indicate the number of lawyers in the state the year prior to the election,10
the statewide murder rate and violent crime rate for the year prior to the election,11 and the
partisan leaning of the state.12
In addition to the electoral data, the dataset includes demographic variables, such as
sex, race, law school, and law school ranking for all candidates running for judicial office.
This is accessible by searching state bar associations, Martindale-Hubble (2017), state court
websites, and public sources online. In states with partisan elections, partisan affiliation is
indicated for all candidates and incumbents are noted. There are other variables reflecting
whether the winning candidates were appointed or have faced opposition in prior elections.
In addition to law school, I also added a categorical variable describing the law school ranking
according to the US News and World Report 2016 following Gill, Lazos, and Waters (2011).
10Data provided by the American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation.
11Data accessible from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics (U.S.
Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017).
12Partisan leaning is made up of the vote share of each party in the prior presidential election and the par-
tisan affiliation of the current governor. States are coded as Republican Dominated or Democrat Dominated
if the the governor is of the same party as the candidate that got the most votes in the prior presidential
election. States are labeled split otherwise.
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The categorical variable divides the formal ranking into large categories of similarly ranked
schools. Although it is possible rankings changed between 1990 and 2016, schools change
rank slowly, and it is unlikely that schools shifted either up or down even one category in
this time period.
Campaign donation data come from the National Institute of Money in State Politics
(2017) which has compiled the financial disclosure records for all state offices from the present
until around 2000, and, in many cases, further back. I separated the contributions by date to
isolate the money raised in the primary election. To do this, I added all contributions from
the start of the electoral cycle when a candidate begins accepting donations until the date of
the primary. General election donations begin the day after the primary election through the
end of the election year, as candidates are still collecting donations to balance their books
and pay off campaign expenditures even after election day.13 I also included measures of the
total amount of money raised by all candidates in a particular election and money raised
by a particular candidate during the electoral cycle. Finally, the remainder of the dataset is
comprised of dichotomous variables and categorical variables describing the electoral rules
in that state. These include whether primaries can be uncontested, if a candidate can win
election in the primary, and regional location.
While I will endeavor to identify outliers and states that may be driving the results, there
is always the possibility that there are some nuances of the electoral process that would be
better revealed through qualitative case study analysis. In addition to this, my range of
electoral data only encompass 1990-2016 and some variables only go as far back as the early
13Campaign donation data are complete in all states save for Montana. Montana’s campaign donation
data do not include contribution dates—making it impossible to distinguish how much money was donated
prior to the primary election.
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2000s or the mid 1990s, thereby limiting the data in my models. In total, I gathered data
on 975 separate elections, a measure of the total number of seats in each state/year from
1990-2016. Within that dataset, 467 of the elections are primary elections, or first level
elections in the case of systems with an election then runoff. In short there are 467 elections
which occur before the traditional general election in November. There are 507 second-level
elections, or those occurring in November, or the standard election time. There are two states
with regular off-cycle elections and several others that have occasional off-cycle elections. In
these cases, elections are still coded as either a primary or general based on where they fall
in the that state’s standard election cycle.14 For a complete listing of all the variables, data
sources, and coding rules, see Appendix A.
The Typology
Individually, these differentiating features seem confusing, particularly as there is no ob-
vious group of states that share multiple characteristics in clear and defined way. While the
states all seem to have different methods of ushering candidates through the primary and
general elections, at further glance, there are patterns based on which of voters have the
ultimate decision, whether candidates face different candidates at the primary and general
elections, or whether the state uses an election and runoff system that puts the same can-
didates against each other during multiple elections. This leaves five categories of election
types: Always Held Partisan Primary, Challenger-Based Partisan Primary, Election-Runoff,
14There are two states that have regularly scheduled off-cycle elections. Pennsylvania elects in odd num-
bered years and Wisconsin elects in the Spring of odd-numbered years with the primary occurring in February
and the general occurring in April.
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Always Held Nonpartisan Primary Election, Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Primary. All of
the states, save for two, fit in one (and only one) of these electoral categories. What follows
is a description of each of the primary types and what makes it distinct from the others.
Always Held Partisan Primary (AHP)
Always Held Partisan Primaries (AHP) are the most familiar to voters because they most
closely mirror both statewide and federal legislative and executive elections. These elections
are partisan, so every candidate must declare a party and run in that party’s primary election,
even if the candidate is not opposed in the primary. This has the potential to increase name
recognition among partisan voters (Adams and Merrill 2008). The primary election serves
to both narrow down to one representative of the party in the general election and increase
name recognition for that party’s candidate. The key is that once the winners of the party
move on to the general election, they are now running against candidates they have not faced
previously. In short, the candidate pool for the primary election and the general election are
different. This system is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
What differentiates this system from the others is the presence of uncontested primary
elections. While it is designed so voters belonging to each party will have the ability to narrow
down a field of candidates all possessing a similar ideology, in actuality Always Held Primary
Elections allow for large numbers of uncontested races. While the traditional intention of
this system is to allow parties to test their candidate as in Figure 4.6, in practice it allows
for elections with one or more uncontested primary elections prior to a challenged general
election (visualized in Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.6: Always Held Partisan Primary—Scenario 1
Figure 4.7: Always Held Partisan Primary—Scenario 2
States with this system are Texas, Ohio, and West Virginia (until 2015). These states all
have partisan primary elections that all candidates must pass through before they are able
to run in the general election. Much has been made about Ohio’s unique system because
Ohio has partisan primary elections and nonpartisan general elections. While Ohio has
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nonpartisan general elections, its electoral system as a whole more closely resembles Texas
than other nonpartisan systems. Candidates must declare their partisan affiliation and it is
possible that one or more of the primary elections are uncontested due to lack of competition
in the races.
Challenger-Based Partisan Primary (CBP)
Challenger-Based Partisan Primary (CBP) elections are similar to the Always Held Partisan
Primary in that primary elections are partisan and there are different sets of candidates
for each election. They differ in that the primaries are only held when the candidate is
challenged by a member of their own party. If two candidates from the same party run for
election, voters in the primary will choose one candidate to represent the party in general
election. Therefore, that candidate will face the candidate from the opposing party who
they have not faced previously in an election. This situation can happen with either party,
depending on the party strength in that particular state. There are four states that use this
method: Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. For a visual representation of
this system see Figure 4.8.
The presence of uncontested primary elections is an important difference between this and
the Always Held Partisan Primary and it has the potential to lead to different outcomes. In
challenger-based partisan systems should only one party hold a primary election, that party’s
candidate may face different advantages in the general elections. For one, the candidate
who ran in the primary may have the advantage of increased name recognition from their
party, and may have a better apparatus for creating advertisements and running a functional
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Figure 4.8: Challenger Based Partisan Elections
campaign. However, they also need to raise enough money to win a primary, and then go
immediately from that election into another competitive race against a candidate who, by
virtue of being unchallenged, has full resources at hand.
Election-Runoff (ERO)
The previous two categories feature candidates running in separate primary elections based
on party affiliation before meeting in the general election. In those categories, each election
is different in that it requires appealing to separate voting blocks, the partisan primary and
the general electorate. In contrast, the remaining three systems have subsets of the same
candidate pool running in both elections. The first, Election-Runoff (ERO), does not have
a primary in the normal sense of the word. In these elections, all candidates for office run
in the first election that occurs in conjunction with the statewide primary; however, if one
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of the candidates gets more than 50% of the vote in the primary election, that candidate is
elected without running in the general election (as seen in Figure 4.9). When there are three
or more candidates for office and none receives an absolute majority, the top two move on
to a runoff election (shown in Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.9: Election-Runoff Scenario 1
However, most of the time, the election is decided during the statewide primary in a
system similar to Figure 4.9. If no single candidate gets an absolute majority of the votes,
the top two candidates move on to a runoff election (Figure 4.10). This changes which group
of voters are the most influential in the election. Here, those voters who are most motivated
to vote in the primary election are also the most likely decide the election–particularly in
states with less interest in judicial elections and where the courts have few candidates running
for office, like Idaho. All races with two or fewer candidates for office are decided during the
election that takes place during the statewide primary. Only those that have more than two
candidates are decided by the general electorate.
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Figure 4.10: Election-Runoff Scenario 2
There are six states that use this system: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Oregon,
and Washington (until 2014). Five of them are nonpartisan systems where candidates can
win the race in the first election. The final state, Louisiana, holds partisan primaries in a
top-two format where all candidates run against each other. The two with the most votes
move on to the runoff occurring in the general election. However, Louisiana is more similar
to these nonpartisan election-runoff than to partisan elections because a candidate can win
office in the first election, and, if there is no winner, the top two face off again in the runoff
election. This is a different mechanism than what is seen in partisan elections where different
candidates run in the primary and the general and where is not possible to obtain office from
just the primary election. Although partisan labels are on the ballot, the top two candidates
move on to the general election irrespective of their party. This makes it fundamentally
different from the other partisan states where the primary election forces partisan voters
to choose one candidate from each party. In Louisiana, two Republicans or two Democrats
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could move on to the general election.
Always Held Nonpartisan Primary (AHN)
Distinct from the Election-Runoff system is the Always Held Nonpartisan Primary (AHN).
This election is different because all candidates are required to run in the primary, even if
there are no challengers or if there are only two candidates running for election. However,
while all are required to run in the primary, there is no opportunity for outright election in
the primary. Candidates, even if they receive over 50% of the vote, move on to the general
election where they face same challengers. Only in elections with three or more candidates
does the primary election serve to narrow down the candidate pool to the top two. This
system is intended as a way to narrow down the candidates and allow the general electorate
to make the final decision on who gets elected. However, often the same two candidates run
in the primary and general elections, as seen in Figure 4.11.
This system is used in Montana and North Dakota, states where there is little competition
in state supreme court elections. Most elections have fewer than three candidates running for
office who, regardless of the results, move on to the general election. This allows candidates
to track their performance because they can use the primary election as a dry run to see
which voters they are reaching and which they need to target more advertising towards. If
two candidates run in the primary and one wins by a landslide, the other candidate has a
few months to change their strategy to improve in the general election. Additionally, should
a candidate for office be unchallenged at the primary level, they are assured victory at the
general election as well, as there is no mechanism for an additional candidate to emerge after
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Figure 4.11: Always Held Nonpartisan Primary
the primary election.
Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Primary (CBN)
Finally, the last category of elections is the Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Primary (CBN).
This is similar to the Always Held Nonpartisan Primary in that the final decision for who
holds office is in the hands of the general election voters. In these states, there is only a
primary election if there are more than two challengers in an election. If there are three or
more challengers in a race, then all candidates run against each other in the primary and
the top two vote getters move on to the general election, much like Nonpartisan Election
Runoff (see Figure 4.10). On the other hand, if there are two or fewer candidates, then they
only run in the general election. The winner is the one who gets more than 50% of the vote
during the statewide general election, as seen in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Primary
Because this only takes place in states with nonpartisan judicial elections, where all can-
didates run in the same primary, there is neither an advantage nor disadvantage between
candidates in regards to candidate spending, organization, or name recognition. All can-
didates must begin campaigning at the same time, and both have the same potential gain
from name recognition. In this system, there is no scenario where one candidate must run
in the primary while the other can save all of their resources for the general election.
There are six states currently using this system: Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Carolina (since 2004), Washington (since 2014), and, finally, Wisconsin. All candidates for a
particular office run against each other in the primary without respect for partisan affiliation.
The distinguishing feature between these states and the state with an Election Runoff system
is the ability to be elected in the primary election, by the smaller primary electorate. In
Challenger-Based Nonpartisan states, if there are fewer than three candidates, there is no
primary election. Even if there are three candidates and one wins an absolute majority of
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votes in the primary, that candidate must still run in the general election with the second
runner up.
Two Leftover States
There are two states that do not fit into any of these classifications, Mississippi and Michigan.
Mississippi does not have primary elections and instead has a true system of election and
runoff. First elections are nonpartisan, but do not occur until the statewide general election
in November–regardless of the number of candidates running for office. In races where there
are one or two candidates, the candidate who gets an absolute majority of votes wins outright.
However, where there are three or more candidates, the top two have a runoff election two
weeks later at the end of November.
This is distinct from the Always Held Election-Runoff because the election is in con-
junction with the statewide general election rather than the statewide primary election. As
Mississippi’s elections do not often attract more than two candidates, this gives the general
electorate the final say in who gets elected a majority of the time. Only in the relatively
rare event that three or more challengers run for the seat does the final decision get left to
those voters who return to the polls at the end of November.
The second state, Michigan, is an outlier because candidates are not selected in primary
elections. Instead, candidates are chosen by the party elite at a convention. To the eyes of
the average voter, judges appear on the general ballot in a multimember district election.
In Michigan, it is not required that a candidate get more than 50% of the vote and there
are no runoff elections. Therefore, it is not uncommon for many candidates to run for office
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and for the winning candidates to have a vote share of less than 30% of the total vote.
These characteristics make it unique from other electoral systems in the states, but it shares
similarities to the system in place to elect the judges in New York’s appellate court.
Although the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is somewhat geographically distributed
across the states, as a whole, the other distinguishing characteristics are not. For example,
there are not large numbers of one system concentrated in the South while the Midwest
uses a different system. Instead, there seems to be a somewhat random distribution of each
system across the states, with the Pacific Northwest favoring nonpartisan elections and the
Midwest and South favoring partisan elections. Figure 4.13 shows the distribution of primary
systems across the country and Figure 4.14 shows the number of judicial primary elections
by each typology category in the dataset.
Summary Statistics
This section shows basic summary statistics for the dataset when looking at the different
types of primary races. Summary statistics on primary and general elections reveal that the
number of primary and general elections varies significantly by state and typology. States
that always hold primary elections have far more elections, while those that do not require
primary elections have fewer. Rates of contestation also vary between the primary and the
general election based on typology. Statistics also reveal differences between the entire pool
of primary elections and those that are contested. Incumbent vote share is very high when
looking at all elections, but is much lower when looking at challenged elections. In most
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Figure 4.13: Primary Systems in the States
In 2012, Arkansas switched from Challenger-based Partisan primaries to Election-Runoff.
In 2004, North Carolina changed from Challenger-based partisan to Challenger-based non-
partisan primaries.
In 2015, West Virginia changed from Always Held partisan to Election-Runoff.
In 2014, Washington changed from Always Held Nonpartisan primaries to Challenger-based
nonpartisan primaries.
cases the typology performs similarly to the broader categories of partisan and nonpartisan
elections. However, the typology variable is able to refine our understanding of primary
competitiveness between the categories.
Table 4.6 shows the number of primary and general elections by state for the entire
dataset (1990-2016). This shows the dramatic disparities in the number of elections for the
same time period. For example, Ohio and Texas have the most primary elections, 66 and
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Figure 4.14: Number of Primary Elections by Typology Category 1990-2016
84 respectively, while Kentucky and Mississippi have the fewest, one and five respectively.
There are also great disparities in the number of general elections, with Texas having 49
general elections and Idaho having only two.
Generally speaking, state supreme court races garner minimal attention from the average
person and, are often overlooked in political circles also. Many supreme court primary and
general elections are uncontested, and many primaries do not occur if there is no challenger.
Table 4.1 describes the number of primary and general elections for the 26-year period
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Table 4.6: Number of Primary and General Elections by State
State
Number of
Primary Elections
Number of
General Elections
Alabama 21 39
Arkansas 21 10
Georgia 25 8
Idaho 22 2
Illinois 24 13
Kentucky 1 32
Louisiana 10 13
Minnesota 7 27
Mississippi 5 35
Montana 28 30
Nevada 7 33
New Mexico 13 17
North Carolina 8 30
North Dakota 18 18
Ohio 66 35
Oregon 31 9
Pennsylvania 14 13
Texas 84 49
Washington 39 45
West Virginia 16 9
Wisconsin 7 19
between 1990 and 2016. As I will be analyzing rates of contestation in the different primary
types, I am also including the rate contested primary and general elections during the same
time period for each state in Table 4.7.
There are very different rates of contestation between the states in both general and
primary elections. In primary elections, the difference in contestation lies, in part, with the
difference between primary systems, where those states with Always Held Primaries having
lower rates of contestation and a greater number of elections. States with Challenger-Based
Primaries have fewer primaries and higher rates of contestation. However, these differences
do not explain all of the different rates of contestation seen in the states.
The following three tables show basic summary statistics for variables of interest in the
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Table 4.7: Rates of Contestation in Primary and General Elections by State
State
Percent Primary Elections
that are Contested
Percent of General Elections
that are Contested
Alabama 95.24% 74.36%
Arkansas 71.43% 60%
Georgia 28% 37.50%
Idaho 36.36% 100%
Illinois 50% 76.92%
Kentucky 100% 62.50%
Louisiana 90% 53.85%
Minnesota 100% 81.48%
Mississippi 40% 80%
Montana 53.57% 50%
Nevada 100% 42.42%
New Mexico 23.08% 47.06%
North Carolina 100% 93.33%
North Dakota 27.78% 27.78%
Ohio 10.60% 91.43%
Oregon 29.32% 44.44%
Pennsylvania 71.43% 53.85%
Texas 40.48% 95.92%
Washington 79.49% 46.67%
West Virginia 68.75% 88.89%
Wisconsin 100% 78.95%
dataset. While these numbers do not answer any questions themselves, there are interesting
differences to be gleaned between the three subsets of primary elections. Table 4.8 shows
descriptives for all primary elections. Here we see 55% of all primary elections feature
an incumbent. This is a fundamentally different measure than the percentage of general
elections featuring an incumbent (73.77%).15 Partisan states can have two primary elections,
both Republican and Democrat, and the incumbent is only able to run in one of those
elections. Additionally, the vote share for candidate one is very high at 75.70%, suggesting
most elections are a wash-out. However, with only 48.82% of the elections being challenged,
15According to t-tests, general elections are challenged more often than primary elections (p = 4.471e-11).
Additionally, t-tests reveal that there are more incumbents in general elections than primary elections. This
can be due to two factors. In partisan elections, the incumbent can only run in one primary, and in both
partisan and nonpartisan elections, it is possible for the incumbent to skip the primary and advance directly
to the general election.
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it is likely this number is just a reflection of the large number of uncontested races. It is
possible that contested primaries are relatively competitive.
Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics for All Primary Elections
Variable
Mean
(% Yes)
sd Min Max N
Candidate 1 Vote Share 75.70 26.59 12.47 100 465
Candidate 2 Vote Share 34.30 12.51 6.16 67.73 230
Incumbent $ Advantage (log) 11.50 2.53 0.00 15.09 119
Competitiveness1 20.16 14.63 0.07 61.07 230
Rank Difference -0.18 1.83 -4.00 4.00 122
Candidate 1 Rank 2.81 1.27 1.00 6.00 462
Candidate 2 Rank 2.95 1.35 1.00 8.00 218
Number of Candidates 1.89 1.26 1.00 8.00 467
Murder Rate (log) 1.61 0.57 -0.51 3.01 465
Lawyers in State (log) 9.69 1.18 7.17 11.36 354
Incumbent 55.89% - - - - - - - - - 467
Incumbent Woman 15.63% - - - - - - - - - 467
Challenger Woman 24.20% - - - - - - - - - 467
Open Seat 27.19% - - - - - - - - - 467
Challenger 48.82% - - - - - - - - - 467
High Quality Challenger 32.71% - - - - - - - - - 217
Partisan Election 55.89% - - - - - - - - - 467
Prior Primary Opponent 16.59% - - - - - - - - - 452
Prior General Opponent 23.62% - - - - - - - - - 453
Appointed 36.93% - - - - - - - - - 463
1 Competitiveness is measured as the absolute percentage difference be-
tween Candidate 1 and Candidate 2.
The most dramatic difference between Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 is the difference between
the first candidate’s vote share. The numerous uncontested primaries in the first table bring
up the average vote share for the first candidate by over 20 percentage points. As the first
candidate’s vote share is much lower when only looking at contested elections, it is likely
that, on the whole, judicial elections are not close contests due to the number of uncontested
races, but when narrowed down to just the races that draw a challenger, judicial elections
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can become very competitive. As further evidence of this, the minimum difference between
candidates 1 and 2 is only .07 of a percentage point, a very close electoral race.
Another difference obvious when just comparing challenged primary elections is the num-
ber of open seat elections, or those that do not have an incumbent in the race. Open seat
elections only make up 27.19% of all primary elections; however they make up over 42%
of all contested elections. This suggests that, in most cases, an open seat election draws
more than one competitor (open seats draw two or more candidates 75.59% of the time) and
challengers may strategically enter the electoral arena when there is no incumbent.
Finally, while most of the summary statistics are similar between the challenged primaries
and all primaries, such as the percentage of incumbent women, the presence of a high quality
challenger, and whether the election is partisan, there is a noteworthy difference in the
number of challenger women. The percentage of races with challenger women increases
when I only include challenged elections, compared to the percentage of challenger women in
all primaries, suggesting women run in primary elections and are often involved in contested
races. It is not clear from this table if women challenge incumbents or participate in a greater
percentage of open seat elections.
One thing to note when moving to Table 4.10 is the dramatic drop in n-sizes. While about
half of all primary races are challenged, only about a quarter of the total number of primary
races feature challenged incumbents, suggesting incumbents, by virtue of their prestige or
status, are often able to scare off a potential challenger before the filing date. Of those who
do face challengers in the primary election, 62% are appointed and 34% faced challengers in
a prior primary election. Incumbent vote shares are higher than challenged primary elections
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Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics for All Challenged Primary Elections
Variable
Mean
(% Yes)
sd Min Max N
Candidate 1 Vote Share 51.21 15.29 12.47 100 226
Candidate 2 Vote Share 34.22 12.56 6.16 67.73 224
Incumbent $ Advantage (log) 11.53 2.53 0.00 15.09 114
Competitiveness 20.17 14.62 0.07 61.07 224
Rank Difference -0.16 1.84 -4.00 4.00 211
Candidate 1 Rank 2.79 1.25 1.00 6.00 227
Candidate 2 Rank 2.93 1.37 1.00 8.00 212
Number of Candidates 2.79 1.27 1.00 8.00 228
Murder Rate (log) 1.66 0.60 -0.10 3.01 228
Lawyers in State (log) 9.51 1.06 7.18 11.37 169
Incumbent 48.25% - - - - - - - - - 228
Incumbent Woman 15.35% - - - - - - - - - 228
Challenger Woman 36.84% - - - - - - - - - 228
Open Seat 42.11% - - - - - - - - - 228
High Quality Challenger 32.23% - - - - - - - - - 211
Partisan Election 50.44% - - - - - - - - - 228
Prior Primary Opponent 19.46% - - - - - - - - - 221
Prior General Opponent 22.07% - - - - - - - - - 228
Appointed 32.74% - - - - - - - - - 228
in the aggregate, indicating open seat elections are closer affairs, on average, than elections
with an incumbent. However, that being said, the smallest vote difference involving an
incumbent is still .20%, a very close race by any standard.
Basic Differences and Similarities
For all the ways scholars and activists have decried the differences between partisan and
nonpartisan elections, they are similar in many commonly measured outcomes. Difference
of means tests (t-tests) show there is no significant difference in the average competitiveness
of primary races, as a whole or in just contested races.16 Partisan and nonpartisan states
also do not differ in the matching of candidates for state supreme court, or, in other words,
16On average, contested primary races in nonpartisan states were less competitive with an average of 21.27
percentage points between the winner and loser, compared with partisan races which averaged an 18.8 point
difference. However, this difference was not significant (p=0.2).
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Table 4.10: Descriptive Statistics for Challenged Incumbent Primary Elections
Variable
Mean
(% Yes)
sd Min Max N
Candidate 1 Vote Share 54.00 13.69 12.47 76.43 109
Candidate 2 Vote Share 34.90 12.33 6.16 67.73 109
Incumbent $ Advantage (log) 11.89 2.25 0.00 14.47 62
Competitiveness 23.57 14.43 0.20 57.58 109
Rank Difference -0.33 1.88 -4.00 4.00 105
Candidate 1 Rank 2.53 1.27 1.00 6.00 109
Candidate 2 Rank 2.85 1.42 1.00 8.00 106
Number of Candidates 2.56 0.91 1.00 6.00 110
Murder Rate (log) 1.54 0.61 -0.11 2.75 119
Lawyers in State (log) 9.58 1.08 7.18 11.37 118
Incumbent Woman 31.81% - - - - - - - - - 110
Challenger Woman 25.45% - - - - - - - - - 110
High Quality Challenger 35.23% - - - - - - - - - 105
Partisan Election 42.73% - - - - - - - - - 110
Prior Primary Opponent 34.61% - - - - - - - - - 104
Prior General Opponent 38.46% - - - - - - - - - 104
Appointed 62.03% - - - - - - - - - 108
the difference in rank between candidates does not differ significantly between partisan and
nonpartisan states. Both partisan and nonpartisan states have elections where the candidates
are roughly balanced in their quality, as measured by law school prestige. Related to this
measure, the mean number of elections with high quality challengers, or challengers who
went to higher ranked law school than the incumbent, is not significantly different between
partisan and nonpartisan states.
However, despite all of these similarities, there are differences aside from the obvious
labeling of partisan affiliation. Incumbents in partisan elections have a significant finan-
cial advantage over challengers in primary elections. On average, incumbents in challenged
partisan primary elections have a greater financial advantage over challengers than their
counterparts in nonpartisan primary elections—13.18 logged dollars vs. 10.64 logged dol-
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lars.17 This could be due to incumbents having a greater support network and ability to
access resources. Additionally, it is possible that if an incumbent senses that they will be
challenged, they are more likely to work harder to raise money in the primary election.
These findings are echoed when testing the typology. In most cases, the typology performs
similarly as the broad categories of partisan/nonpartisan when looking at competitiveness,
difference in quality, presence of high quality challenger, and financial advantage. However,
there are some instances where the typology is able to refine and further explain the insignif-
icant results of the t-test. For example, an ANOVA test on primary competitiveness using
the typology instead of just partisan/nonpartisan reveals more refined differences between
the categories.18
Table 4.11: Frequency Table Challenger and Typology
Challenger in Primary
Typology No Challenger Challenger Row Total
AHP 112 (67.88%) 53 (32.12%) 165 (35.33%)
CBP 27 (34.62%) 51 (65.59%) 78 (16.70%)
ER 68 (46.26%) 79 (53.74%) 147 (31.48%)
AHN 26 (56.52%) 20 (43.48%) 46 (9.85%)
CBN 0 (0%) 25 (100%) 25 (5.35%)
Column Total 233 228 461
1 Pearson’s χ2 = 585.66 p= 9.54e-11
When comparing the number of challenged primary races by each space in the typology,
Chi2 tests are significant in rejecting the null hypotheses that the type of primary and the
17This difference is significant at the .001 level.
18However, with a p-value of 0.057, these differences are not significant.
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rate of contestation are independent (see Table 4.11). This suggests there are different rates
of primary contestation based on the different system of primary election in the states.
Likewise, but not shown, significance tests reveal statistically significant differences in the
rates of challenger women by primary type and the number of appointed judges by primary
type. Challenger-based nonpartisan elections have a greater percentage of women running.
Finally, and also of interest, there is also a relationship between appointed judges drawing
a challenger in all primary elections, significant at the 0.05 level with Always Held partisan
elections having far fewer challenged incumbents.19
These chi-squared tests signify there are differences in when state supreme court in-
cumbents are challenged during the primary elections. As such, they are the first step in
investigating when state supreme court candidates are challenged and how the primary sys-
tem influences who draws a challenger and when incumbents can avoid one. This makes up
the backbone of Chapter 5, which investigates when challengers emerge at the primary level.
It also investigates more clearly the theory presented by Lazarus (2008b) that incumbents
who are challenged in the past will continue to be challenged in the future and vice versa.
Mixed with systems where primary elections can be avoided entirely, this has the potential
to create a self-reinforcing system where primary elections always occur in some states while
they may hardly ever occur in others.
Following the investigation of when challengers emerge in judicial primary elections in
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 investigates the path women traverse in judicial primary elections.
Prior research by Gill and Eugenis (2017) show challenger women have an electoral advan-
19For Typology and Any Challenger Women:Pearson’s χ2 = 26.01 and p = 8.88e-05. For Typology and
Appointed: Pearson’s χ2 = 48.85 and p = 2.38e-09. For Appointed and Challenger: Pearson’s χ2 = 4.06 p
= 0.04.
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tage possibly explained by strategic entry, but scholars do not investigate the potentially
confounding role of the primary election. Chapter 6 investigates how incumbent women and
challengers navigate the different primary systems and reveals any potential advantages, dis-
advantages, or strategies used to proceed to the general election. Each chapter includes its
own miniature review of especially relevant literature, as well as an overview an explanation
of the specific models used in that chapter before an analysis and discussion of the results
of those models.
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Chapter 5
Challenger Emergence in Judicial Primary
Elections
One of the best known truths in all elections is that incumbents generally win, regardless
of who runs against them. This is also true in state supreme court elections.1 Because the
incumbent generally wins during both the primary and general election levels, there is always
some surprise when an incumbent with no prior scandal loses an election, especially at the
primary election.
Regardless of office, party, or stage in the electoral process, the easiest way for a candidate
to ensure an electoral win is to deter challengers from emerging in the first place. Candidates
always win an uncontested election. This is particularly true at the primary level. If candi-
dates in partisan election can deter in-party challengers or any challengers (in nonpartisan
elections), then that candidate is assured an opportunity to move on to the general election.
1A prime example is Judge Roy Moore from Alabama. He won election to the chief justice seat in the
Alabama Supreme Court in 2000 despite a scandal involving a statue of the 10 Commandments he placed
in front of the courthouse. He was sued and the case appealed to the U.S. District Court who ruled against
Moore and the monument. In 2003 Moore announced his intention to disobey the court order and was
removed from his position as judge. He ran again for a seat on the Alabama Supreme Court in 2012 and was
elected. In 2015, after telling judges to disregard the U.S. Supreme Court ruling allowing same-sex marriage,
he was removed from his post as judge, this time permanently. As of the time of this writing, Moore has just
won the Republican nomination in a special election for Senate and, despite allegations of sexual misconduct
with minors, could still be elected to office. Incumbents, even when they repeatedly violate the laws of the
land, can still win.
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Due to the nature of primaries in Election-Runoff states, it is possible for candidates to win
at the first electoral stage if they deter all competition or win an absolute majority of the
vote. Should this happen, these candidates do not even need to submit their name for the
general election ballot because they already won office. Similarly, candidates in challenger-
based systems do not have to place their name on the primary ballot if no challengers file for
election. Instead, they go straight to the general election. States where election are always
held require unchallenged candidates place their name on the primary ballot, but they are
assured victory. This creates the unique situation where an unchallenged primary candidate
has the opportunity to enter the general election after winning the primary election by 95
percent or higher.
Because deterring a challenger is the easiest way to win an election, it is important to
understand under what circumstances candidates attract challengers and when they deter
challengers from emerging at the primary level. There is a lot of previous work on the topic
of when judicial candidates attract challengers during the general election (e.g Bonneau
and Hall 2009; Hall and Bonneau 2006; Streb and Frederick 2008). However, if we do not
know what happens during the primary stage, it is possible primary-level factors play a
more important role in determining when a challenger emerges in the election. If we are to
understand when challengers emerge in the general election it is important to first understand
when challengers emerge prior to the primary election.
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Challenger Emergence
Challengers must self-select to run for office. The types of people who run for office are
greatly influenced by the political climate, incumbent, and current institutions (Jacobsen
and Kernell 1981). Those willing to run for political office are thought of as cautious risk
takers: Cautious because they run in conditions favorable to their success, but risk takers
because election outcomes are uncertain (Jacobsen and Kernell 1981). In early studies of
legislative elections, challengers appear to be strategic because they only run for office when
the incumbent is weak enough for there to be a chance to win (Jacobsen and Kernell 1981;
Maestas et al. 2006).
The incumbent wins inmost elections. It is much easier for an individual to remain in
office than it is for them to gain office the first time. This is because incumbents are better
able to put their name in front of voters (Fenno 1978), take claim of the good things they
do in office (Stratmann 2013), and have networks of supporters who provide professional
support, experienced staff, and access to financial resources (Cover 1977). The incumbency
advantage is so strong as to deter many challengers from emerging. Those candidates who
are not deterred must be strategic in when they enter the race. Due to the difference in
access to resources and experienced advisors, challengers are at a natural disadvantage when
it comes to winning elections. They need access to money, television time, and outlets to
express their political stances in order to increase their name recognition.
Gaining this access is notoriously difficult for challengers as incumbents are able to attract
20-25% more money just by virtue of holding office (Fouirnaies and Hall 2014). This is
particularly apparent in legislative elections, where interest groups use campaign donations
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to vie for access and further their own agenda (Brunell 2005). States with relatively low
contribution limits increase the likelihood that a challenger emerges, possibly because the
lower limit on contributions works to decrease the incumbent advantage and places the
challenger on more equal footing (Hamm and Hogan 2008). Therefore, it is possible that state
elections will be more likely to draw challengers because of limits on contributions. The same
factors may also be at work in judicial elections as incumbents obtain more donations than
challengers. However, it is possible that judicial incumbents only solicit campaign donations
when they are vulnerable to competition. Therefore, high donations to the incumbent may
be a symptom of competition rather than an indicator of strength.
Regardless, many potential challengers, particularly those in low interest races, choose
to wait until the incumbent reaches their term limit, retires, or is forced out before running
for office. In municipal elections, the most qualified candidates choose to run in open seat
elections, and incumbents who won prior elections by large margins are far less likely to
attract a challenger than those who narrowly won (Krebs 1999). This suggests the most
qualified for office run in open seat elections or wait until the incumbent shows signs of
potential weakness before running. At the municipal level, where they are few candidates
and few voters, challengers closely evaluate the political environment and the strength of the
incumbent before making the decision when to run for office.
If the most highly qualified challengers wait until an open seat election, then this serves
to further reinforce the incumbency advantage. If the most strategic and highly qualified
challengers wait until an open seat, then incumbents tend to face lower quality challengers
in the election, thereby leading to a situation where they have a higher chance at winning
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just by virtue of being the most qualified individual on the ballot (Ban, Llaudet, and Snyder
2016). Additionally, while candidates are risk adverse, so too is the voting public. There is
evidence to suggest the general public would rather elect an incumbent than risk giving the
office to an outsider or an unknown (Eckles et al. 2014). Studies find citizens who are risk
adverse are more likely to support the incumbent, while those who are more risk accepting
will tend to vote for challengers (Eckles et al. 2014). This suggests that the incumbency
advantage has it roots, not only in candidate strategy and psychology, but also in voter
strategy and psychology.
In legislative elections, those likely to run as challengers are generally already holding a
lower office or have held office in the past, are wealthy, and are established in the community
(Maisel and Stone 1997). However, surveys of potential candidates indicate that personal
factors are less influential in their decision to run than professional and institutional charac-
teristics (Maisel and Stone 1997). This lends credence to claims that it is the attractiveness
of the seat and the weakness of the incumbent that play the largest roles in determining
when challengers decide to run for office (Maisel and Stone 1997).
Additionally, judicial elections may mirror Senate elections in that the number of other
highly qualified candidates may also be a factor (Adams and Squire 1997). As there are
few seats and long terms for judicial office, it may not be advantageous to wait until the
incumbent is weak. Challengers may run when the opportunity presents itself, either against
the other party, or when there are not many other challengers. This occurs even if it means
running against a strong incumbent (Adams and Squire 1997).
Those states that pay the best, have longer terms, or where the state supreme court is
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held in high esteem are going to lead to cases where the job is a relatively attractive and more
people will be willing to take the risk of losing in order to obtain a seat (Bonneau and Hall
2009). Additionally, the political context also plays a factor in determining the likelihood of
a challenger emerging. Political factors include the presence of a partisan election because
the ability to lean on partisan support, particularly in states where partisan allegiances are
shifting, may increase the ability for a candidate to be elected (Bonneau and Hall 2009).
Candidates may be influenced the presence of a strong party in the state (Ashworth
and Bueno de Mesquita 2008). The size of the candidate pool may also influence when
challengers emerge. In judicial elections, the candidate pool is the number of lawyers in
the state, because only lawyers are eligible to run for judge. States with more lawyers have
more potential challengers and supreme court races should reflect that increased competition
(Bonneau and Hall 2009). Finally, candidates who were appointed and are now facing election
for the first time may be perceived as weak and attract more challengers (Streb and Frederick
2007).
Challenger Emergence in Primary Elections
Some challenger emergence in general elections may be explained by looking at the pri-
mary election. There is still a lot that is not known about the effect of the primary, both
partisan and nonpartisan, on candidate emergence in judicial elections. There has been re-
search on both the effects of judicial elections on candidates and the judiciary as a whole
(e.g. Bonneau and Hall 2009; Hall 2014b; Sobel and Hall 2007; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright
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2007), but the effects of primaries on the electoral system and candidate emergence within
these systems is unknown. These ideas have not been combined to reveal the effects of pri-
maries on judicial elections and candidate emergence, even though there are 21 states with
judicial primaries. Here, there is an opportunity to merge the ideas and study the effects of
the primary election on patterns of candidate emergence. Without knowledge of the role of
the primary election in challenger emergence, it is possible scholars are attributing findings
to general elections when they are more accurately a result of the primary election.
Some evidence on congressional primaries suggests in partisan elections challengers are
more likely to emerge in locations with more intra-party factions—or where there is a desire
for the party to be more or less extreme (Ansolabehere et al. 2007). Breaux and Gierzynski
(1991) note primary elections in races beneath presidential and congressional are very low
information. This leads to lower voter turnout and greater vote roll-off for these elections.
While the general electorate may not know much about the candidates, those who are most
likely to vote in these elections have higher amounts of political knowledge. In this climate,
money plays the biggest role in determining who is best able to get their message to voters,
and who wins (Breaux and Gierzynski 1991; Bonneau and Hall 2009).
It is important to understand competitive primary elections do not cause competitive
general elections, but both stem from expectations of the general election. What occurs
in the primary is largely a function of what candidates and voters think will happen in
the general election, including incorrect assumptions and false signals. While some have
suggested that a close primary election leads to an even closer general election (e.g. Kenney
and Rice 1987; Southwell 1986), more recent research suggests that expectations of the
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general election shapes the primary contest (Lazarus 2005). In these cases, challengers who
expect the incumbent to be weaker will be more likely to file for election in greater numbers
than usual. When this occurs, there are more people in the election and vote shares for all
candidates are lower. This makes the election between the incumbent and the challenger
closer. Competitive primary elections are an indication that the general election will see the
challenger do slightly better than normal (Lazarus 2005).
While this may be the case in presidential elections and some highly competitive gu-
bernatorial elections in swing states, party support is entrenched in most states. In these
one-party states, research suggests that a competitive primary leads to a less competitive
general election (Hogan 2003b). In state legislative elections,2 primary challengers generally
emerge when there is an open seat, or if there is strong state/district support for a partic-
ular party (Hogan 2003a). In these cases, primary competition generally indicates a strong
party—one that is entrenched enough to have bred divisive factions (Breaux and Gierzynski
1991). The outcome of the general election is already assured in these cases due to the
leanings of citizens in the state (Klumpp 2011).
This goes hand in hand with Lazarus’ (2008b) finding that potential challengers consider
the incumbent’s vote share in the prior election when deciding to run for office. In congres-
sional and gubernatorial elections, there is a significant relationship between a competitive
election in the general election and increased likelihood of a challenger in the general elec-
tion because a close vote share signals there may be a partisan shift in the state or district
(Lazarus 2008b). In the same vein, a more competitive prior primary election indicates in-
2State legislative elections are generally partisan; Nebraska is the exception.
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cumbent weakness in regards to party standing, and more in-party challengers are likely to
emerge if the incumbent has lost the support of the party although the party has not lost
support in the state (Lazarus 2008b).
The institutional structures surrounding selection and retention have a role in the cal-
culation if an individual is going to run for office. As prior research shows, there are many
different factors that drive challenger emergence in judicial general elections (Bonneau and
Hall 2009). However, there is little research on when challengers emerge in judicial primary
elections. Instances where the primary election is the only election, and other situations
where the primary election is contested but the general election is not, are not adequately
researched to determine under what circumstances challengers emerge in judicial primaries.
Theory of Challenger Emergence in Judicial Primaries
All of this prior research builds on the rational model of challenger entry, or that chal-
lengers only enter when they think there is a viable strategy to win (Carson and Park 2005;
Banks and Kiewiet 1989; Jacobsen and Kernell 1981; Lazarus 2008a). Challengers are strate-
gic when choosing to run for office to maximize their chances of getting elected. In state
legislative elections, literature on challenger emergence in primaries suggests that in-party
challengers are more likely in states dominated by one party (Hogan 2003a). This is also
reflected in the vote shares of the incumbent’s prior election; incumbents who had a rel-
atively competitive prior primary election are more likely to attract challengers (Lazarus
2008b). In contrast, in states undergoing a partisan shift, incumbents will be more likely to
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attract challengers from other parties in the general election. These out-party challengers
must also emerge through a primary election and there may be more competition in the
out-party’s primary election. This is reflected in the incumbent’s prior general election vote
in that a more competitive prior general election will signal to potential challengers that the
incumbent is weak and there may be support for a partisan change.
Hypothesis 5-1: Parties with more entrenched partisan support will be more likely to
have challengers in partisan primary elections.
Partisan challengers take cues from the strength of the party and the weakness of the
incumbent. There is little point in running in a primary election against an incumbent if
state partisanship has shifted against the party. In nonpartisan elections, there is no party
identifier so gradual shifts and sways of partisan power do not have as much of an influence
in these elections. Here it is more likely that the incumbent will face more challengers, more
often, due to the low information present about the election. Therefore, it is also more likely
that, as prior general elections are more competitive, challengers are more likely to emerge
in subsequent elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009). This is because the partisan pressures
are not at work in nonpartisan elections. In partisan elections, potential challengers look to
the political climate to see if the incumbent is weak to in-party or out-party challengers. In
nonpartisan elections, potential challengers use the prior first election to see if the incumbent
is weak to any challenger. In states where it is possible for the victor to be declared in the
first election, those with election-runoff systems, it is likely potential challengers will look to
the prior primary election before deciding to run for office.
I suspect states that are Republican-dominated, as measured by vote share in the prior
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presidential election and party of the governor, are far more likely to produce challengers
than states leaning Democrat or states with split votes. This may be due to two things at
work. First, particularly in the 1990s, many states voted Republican in federal elections,
but still had Democrat judges on the bench from the 1980s, before the partisan realignment.
Alabama is a prime example of this. Between 1994 and 1998 four incumbent Democrat
judges lost re-election bids to Republican candidates. The only sitting judge who survived
the Democrat purge of the courts was Gormon Houston. Judge Huston won election in 1992
as a registered Democrat. In 1998 he won again as a registered Republican. He was the only
judge to see which was the wind was blowing and act in his own best interest. Additionally,
this could also reveal strong partisan entrenchment to the point where Republicans are
internally divided on the future of the party. This makes way for competition between two
candidates who are different ideologically, but share a partisan affiliation.
Hypothesis 5-2: Challengers will be more likely to emerge when the candidate was
contested or had a lower vote share in the prior primary election.
Hypothesis 5-3: Election-Runoff systems will be more likely to have competition in the
first election if there was competition in the incumbent’s prior first election.
There is no prior research separating primaries between those that are always-held with
unchallenged incumbents running uncontested in the primary, or challenger-based with only
challenged incumbents in the primary and all uncontested candidates skip the primary.
However, some research suggests that the act of holding an uncontested election is beneficial
to the candidate (Adams and Merrill 2008; Hogan 2003a). Older research suggests that
the damage inflicted on incumbents in the primary may benefit challengers in the general
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election (Squire 1989). However, if in-party challengers emerge when there is sufficient party
entrenchment as to make the outcome of the general election certain (Lazarus 2008a), then
a challenger in the primary election may be harmful for the incumbent, it is not harmful
to party’s chances for winning the primary. If holding a primary, even an uncontested one,
is beneficial to the candidate for name recognition, then running in an uncontested election
will have a greater deterrent effect on subsequent challengers than skipping the primary
altogether and only running in the general election.
Hypothesis 5-4: Candidates who run in uncontested primary elections will be better
able to deter future challengers than candidates who run only in the general election, all
other things being equal.
Data and Summary Statistics
As mentioned in Chapter 4, data come from all judicial primary and general elections
from 1990-2016. For the purposes of this inquiry, I am only using data on primary elections
with incumbents. The main dependent variable is the presence of the challenger. Challenger
is a dichotomous variable that indicates the presence of any challenger in the election. Inde-
pendent variables include newly appointed incumbent, or this election is the first election for
that particular incumbent. I also created a variable that indicates if the incumbent skipped
the prior primary election by being uncontested in a state that only lists elections on the
ballot when contested. This is coded as NA for newly appointed candidates and those run-
ning in systems where the primary is required. This variable is only applicable in challenger
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based states. Other independent variables include partisan entrenchment in the state.3 I
use prior election results for both primary and general elections to approximate incumbent
strength in current elections. Finally, there is a count variable for the number of winners
in the primary election. As primaries narrow down the available candidates, it is possible
for more than one candidate to win, or move on to the general election. This is the case
particularly in Election-Runoff states, and states with nonpartisan elections.
In addition, I also include several control variables found to be important in prior litera-
ture (Bonneau and Hall 2003; Frederick and Streb 2011; Hall and Bonneau 2006; Streb and
Frederick 2008). Prior research on judicial elections suggests that new appointees, partisan
elections, unified government, and the number of lawyers in the state are all positively as-
sociated with the emergence of a challenger in a general election (Bonneau and Hall 2003;
Frederick and Streb 2011; Hall and Bonneau 2006; Streb and Frederick 2008). Therefore, as
there are more challengers in primary elections than general, I would expect the same control
variables are also important to predict the presence of a challenger in the primary election. I
anticipate newly appointed incumbents will be targeted more often than established incum-
bents because they have had less time to establish themselves on the bench. Additionally,
incumbents in states with a greater number of lawyers may be challenged more often due
to greater availability of qualified challengers (Bonneau and Hall 2009). It is possible that
states with relatively long term limits will attract more challengers because the elections oc-
cur rarely and challengers must run when the opportunity presents itself and not necessarily
3In this case, more entrenched partisan support is measured using the vote in the prior presidential
election and the party of the current governor. This is then turned into a series of dichotomous and ordinal
variables. There are dichotomous variables for unified Republican, unified Democrat, unified in any party,
and an ordinal variable with Republican, Democrat, and split.
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at the most strategic time. All variables, save for the number of lawyers in the state4 and
the financial variables,5 encompass the entire time frame of 1990 through 2016.6
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Judicial Primaries with Incumbents
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Party of Governor 261 1.471 0.508 1 3
Number of Candidates 261 1.670 0.972 1 6
Number of Lawyers (log) 205 9.519 1.213 7.168 11.368
Murder Rate (log) 259 1.498 0.607 −0.511 2.754
Incumbent $ Advantage (log) 72 11.755 2.265 0 14.465
Competitive Election 112 23.225 14.562 0.200 57.580
Total Seats on Court 261 7.268 1.437 5 9
Term Length 261 6.920 1.649 6 12
Prior Vote General Election 247 36.117 37.335 0 100
Prior Vote Primary Election 246 47.078 43.093 0 100
Incumbent Vote Share 260 80.156 24.442 12.470 100
Republican Presidential Vote 261 49.876 8.863 31.850 68.380
Democrat Presidential Vote 261 43.573 6.830 26.180 61.830
Partisan Election 261 0.418 — 0 1
Incumbent is a Minority 261 0.092 — 0 1
Any Minority Challenger 261 0.034 — 0 1
Incumbent Woman 261 0.276 — 0 1
Any Challenger Women 261 0.107 — 0 1
Incumbent Win 261 0.954 — 0 1
Challenger 261 0.421 — 0 1
Off Cycle 261 0.011 — 0 1
Elect in Primary 261 0.268 — 0 1
Challenger Prior General 247 0.372 — 0 1
Challenger Prior Primary 247 0.275 — 0 1
Appointed Incumbent 257 0.599 — 0 1
Typology: Always Held Partisan 261 0.291 — 0 1
Typology: Challenger Partisan 261 0.100 — 0 1
Typology: Election Runoff 261 0.402 — 0 1
Typology: Always Held Nonpartisan 261 0.130 — 0 1
Typology: Challenger Nonpartisan 261 0.061 — 0 1
Typology: Odd 261 0.015 — 0 1
High Quality Challenger 108 0.352 — 0 1
Skipped Prior Primary 246 0.061 — 0 1
Newly Appointed 251 0.303 — 0 1
4I was unable to obtain information about the number of lawyers per state prior to 1995.
5In most states, archival data for state campaign finances is not available prior to 2000.
6Further information about the models are located in Appendix B and information about the coding of
the variables is in Appendix A.
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The dataset used for the analysis is a subset of the larger dataset. While the full dataset
includes all races in states where judges are elected to office, the data used for this chapter
only include primary elections with incumbents. Primary races make up roughly 47.9% of
all races and incumbents run in 55.89% of all primaries. General summary statistics for the
“incumbents in primaries” dataset are in Table 5.1. Of the 261 primary elections with an
incumbent, there is a challenger 42.1% of the time but the incumbent still wins in 95.4% of
races. Only 30.3% of primary races with incumbents include a newly-appointed incumbent.
Although it may seem likely that newly appointed incumbents would attract challengers at a
higher rate, chi-square tests reveal newly appointed incumbents are no more likely to attract
a challenger than experienced incumbents (as seen in Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Rates of Contestation for New Appointees in Judicial Primary Elections
Challenger
No Yes Total
Experienced Incumbent
105
61.40%
66
38.60%
171
69.23%
Newly Appointed Incumbent
39
51.32%
37
48.68%
76
30.77%
Total 144 103 247
Note: P earson χ2 = 2.202 p = 0.139
Results
In order to determine when challengers emerge in primary elections, I run logistic models
with the dependent variable being the presence of a challenger. Independent variables include
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new appointee, vote share in the prior primary election, vote share in the prior general
election, and partisan sway of the state. Models also include the control variables term
length, law school prestige, the number of lawyers in the state, the murder rate in the state,
and year.7 Models with random effects at either state or typology show no difference in
quality of fit across typology/state as explained in Chapter 4 and Appendix B.
The resulting model, seen in Table 5.3, shows few significant predictors for the emergence
of a challenger.8 Newly appointed judges are less likely to attract a challenger by 1.925
log odds, suggesting challengers do not strategically pinpoint newly-appointed incumbents.9
Challengers do take into consideration the prior primary election and how well the incumbent
before deciding to run for office. As vote share increases and ultimately ends up at 100%,
challengers are less likely to emerge. As vote share in the prior primary decreases the
likelihood of a challenger increases.10 Finally, it seems as though 2002 saw the rise of more
challengers than usual with incumbents being more than twice as likely to attract a challenger
in that election.
The results in Table 5.3 show that higher vote shares in the prior primary election de-
creases the likelihood that the incumbent will attract a primary challenger. Interestingly,
newly appointed challengers are less likely to attract a challenger. This is also seen in an
adjusted model that uses a dichotomous variable indicating if the prior primary election was
7Odd year elections are grouped with the subsequent even year. For example, 1992 represents both 1992
and 1991 elections.
8This is a logit regression including fixed effects for typology and year.
9I also tried creating an ordinal variable where 0 = no incumbent, 1 = newly appointed, and 2 =
established incumbent and ran the model using this. The model produces insignificant results for the newly
appointed candidates.
10Newly-appointed incumbents are listed as having a vote share of zero in the prior primary and general
elections. These results suggest that although the likelihood of a challenger increases as prior vote share
declines, this is not due to the newly-appointed incumbents as they are less likely to attract a challenger.
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Table 5.3: Emergence of a Challenger in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Challenger
New Appointee −1.925∗∗
(0.967)
Term Length 0.212
(0.175)
Vote Share Prior Primary −0.031∗∗∗
(0.009)
Vote Share Prior General −0.007
(0.009)
Incumbent Law School Prestige 0.080
(0.161)
Number of Winners 38.419
(2,924.278)
Number of Lawyers (log) 0.239
(0.334)
Murder Rate (log) 0.028
(0.577)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Year 2002 2.861∗∗
Typology Fixed Effects Included
Constant −61.333
(4,487.043)
Observations 199
Log Likelihood −78.424
Akaike Inf. Crit. 202.849
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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contested or not. Candidates who are contested in the prior primary election are significantly
more likely to attract a challenger in subsequent election. These results are in Table 5.4.11
Combined, these results suggest that candidates who run uncontested in previous elections
are less likely to attract challengers in subsequent primary elections, and, as the vote share in
the primary election increases, incumbents are better able to deter challengers in subsequent
elections. In this model, newly appointed incumbents are no longer better able to deter a
challenger although the results indicating increased challengers in 2002 remain stable.
Of the 106 partisan primary elections with an incumbent, approximately, 44% are chal-
lenged. Chi-squared tests do not indicate there is a relationship between challenged elections
and the incumbent being a new appointee (Table 5.2). A logit regression on partisan primary
races with an incumbent reveal there are different predictors for when a challenger emerges
in partisan elections when compared to the total dataset. Results of the logit model12 (seen
in Table 5.5) throws into question the argument that in-party competition emerges when
prior primary results are weak. Although the variable is significant when looking at all
candidates, it is not significant in partisan races, where it is hypothesized to have the most
influence as challengers capitalize on within-party weakness (Lazarus 2008a). Here, there
are no significant predictors for a challenger in a partisan primary election.13
Nonpartisan elections with a traditional primary-general election structure14 share some
11This is a logit regression with fixed effects for typology and year. The only difference between this model
and the one in Table 5.3 is that prior primary vote share is replaced with a dichotomous variable indicating
if there was competition in the prior primary election.
12This is a logit regression for the emergence of a challenger in elections with an incumbent in states with
partisan elections.
13The n-size is smaller than the 106 because of missing data concerning the number of lawyers in the state.
These data only go back to the mid-1990s.
14This comprises of states with either Always Held or Challenger Based Nonpartisan primaries, but not
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Table 5.4: Emergence of a Challenger – Dichotomous Prior Primary in Judicial Primary
Elections
Dependent variable:
Challenger
Newly Appointed 0.927
(0.644)
Term Length 0.171
(0.180)
Prior Primary Opposition 1.418∗∗∗
(0.511)
Vote Share Prior General −0.003
(0.008)
Incumbent Law School Prestige 0.001
(0.158)
Number of Winners 38.603
(3,007.766)
Number of Lawyers (log) 0.118
(0.341)
Murder Rate (log) 0.194
(0.572)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Year: 2002 2.943∗∗
(1.324)
Typology Fixed Effects Included
Constant −63.412
(4,613.505)
Observations 200
Log Likelihood −80.564
Akaike Inf. Crit. 207.129
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.5: Emergence of a Challenger in Partisan Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Challenger Odds Ratios
Newly Appointed −8.219∗ 0.000
(3.760)
Term Length 0.929 2.534
(0.617)
Vote Share Prior Primary −0.048 0.953
(0.028)
Vote Share Prior General −0.095 0.909
(0.054)
Incumbent Law School Prestige −0.29 0.748
(0.353)
Number of Lawyers (log) 0.289 1.336
(0.841)
Murder Rate (log) −4.702 0.009
(3.444)
State Partisanship: Republican 7.058 162.3
(2.35)
State Partisanship: Split −0.055 0.946
(2.004)
Typology: CBP 4.994∗ 147.6
(2.294)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 3.477 3.244e+01
(14.172)
Observations 86
AIC 97.871
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
State Partisanship: Democrat is the reference category for these findings.
Typology: Always Held Partisan is the reference category for these findings.
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characteristics with partisan primary elections. Chi-square tests reveal there is no difference
in when new appointees are challenged, but difference of means tests show there are more
challengers in states with more lawyers in them. Mirroring the findings from partisan states,
nonpartisan primaries also have more challengers in states with shorter term limits. In fact,
there are relatively few primary elections in nonpartisan states that do not have an Election-
Runoff system. There are only two states with Always Held primary elections, where two
candidates can run in a primary, both win, and then run again in the general, North Dakota
and Montana. Additionally, in Challenger-Based nonpartisan election systems there needs
to be three or more candidates in order to justify running a primary election, but most of the
time the elections do not attract that many challengers. This partially explains why n-sizes
are so small. There are only 41 primary races with incumbents in nonpartisan states—far
too few observations to draw any conclusions on when challengers emerge and when they do
not.
Given that Election-Runoff systems require all candidates to run in the first election,
there are many more primary, or first, elections in this group of states. It is also possible
for a candidate to win outright and not appear on the November ballot, thereby, making
this type of primary election more like a general election. Here, I expect the prior primary
results would be significant, because for this group of states it is possible to be elected to
office based on the results of the primary (Hypothesis 5-3).
Logit tests using first elections in states what have Election-Runoff systems show no
those states in an Election-Runoff system. This is because in Election-Runoff systems the primary or first
election occurring in the Spring is actually a pseudo general election. It is possible for someone to win office
in these elections. Any and all challengers who want to run for office must participate. This makes them
more akin to a general election than a primary election and I will analyze them separately.
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significant predictors for when a challenger emerges, seen in Table 5.6.15 This suggests
challengers in these systems use other cues to determine when it is most advantageous for
them to emerge. Additionally, it could be because the n-size is relatively small. More data
would present a clearer picture of when competition emerges in these elections. Missing data
on the number of lawyers per state contributes to the small n-size, resulting in 23 deleted
observations.
Table 5.6: Emergence of a Challenger Election-Runoff First Elections in Judicial Primary
Elections
Dependent variable:
Challenger
Newly Appointed −2.405
(1.306)
Term Length 0.502
(0.753)
Vote Share Prior Primary −0.016
(0.012)
Incumbent Law School Prestige 0.184
(0.260)
Number of Lawyers (log) 0.782
(0.780)
Murder Rate (log) −0.715
(1.424)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant −9.448
(9.121)
Random Effect
# of States 6
State Variance 0.745
State Standard Deviation 0.863
Observations 76
Log Likelihood −37.4
AIC 110.7
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
15This is a logit regression for emergence of a challenger in states that use the Election-Runoff type of
primary election. Because this model only has one typology represented, I use random effects for states to
control for any variation within the state.
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Hypothesis 5-3 posits that institutional differences in the primary system may account for
some of the differences in challenger emergence. Specifically, candidates who run in uncon-
tested primary elections will be better able to deter potential challengers when compared to
candidates who run only in the general elections due to lack of competition. Some states hold
primary elections even when the incumbent is uncontested, resulting in an election with one
name on the ballot and an assured win before moving to the general election. Other states
choose to remove uncontested candidates from the primary ballot and only place them in the
general election. This results in the candidates running in only one election, as the primary
does not exist. While the end result of both of these practices is the same—candidates are
guaranteed to advance to the general election—there is no research on if challengers are more
likely to emerge if the incumbent previously ran in an uncontested election, or if challengers
emerge when the incumbent skips the prior election entirely.
The following table (Table 5.7) shows the rates of contestation for the two types of can-
didates. This is a small subset of data comprising only incumbents who had the opportunity
to participate in the prior election. In order to isolate the effects of running uncontested vs.
skipping the primary, I took incumbents who ran unopposed in the prior primary election
and compared them to the incumbents who skipped the prior election to see which types of
candidates attracted challengers more often. To clarify, all candidates in this subset have
run in prior elections and were uncontested in the most recent primary election.
Table 5.7 makes it appear as though incumbents who skipped the prior primary are
challenged at much higher rates than those who ran uncontested in the previous primary
election. However, logit models with fixed effects at year and random effects at either state
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Table 5.7: Rates of Contestation based on Prior Primary Results in Judicial Primary Elec-
tions
Challenger
No Yes Total
Skipped Prior Primary
1
9.091%
10
99.909%
11
12.500%
Ran Uncontested
Prior Primary
55
71.429%
22
28.571%
77
87.500%
Total 56 32 88
or typology fail to find any significance for candidates who skipped the previous primary to
be more likely to draw a challenger, holding all other things constant.16 This suggests that
there are other factors at work either encouraging or discouraging challengers from emerging
aside from if the incumbent sat in the prior primary, seen in Table 5.8. However, it is possible
that this model is overfit to the data. Ideally, there should be 17 observations where the
incumbent skipped the prior primary, 10 greater than the number of predictors in the model
(Jaeger 2013). This is not the case for this time period. Additional data will shed more light
on the effect of skipping the prior primary election.
Discussion
These findings confirm, in part, the results of similar studies on candidate emergence
in congressional primaries (Table 5.9) (Lazarus 2008b). One of the most critical findings
concerning Hypothesis 5-2 is that, in the aggregate, challengers do take the previous primary
election results into consideration when deciding when to challenge the incumbent. Seen in
Tables 5.3 and 5.4, as prior primary vote share increases, the likelihood of a challenger
16Table 5.8 is a mixed model logit model with fixed effects at year and random effects at the state level.
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Table 5.8: Effect of Skipping the Prior Primary on Challenger Emergence in Primary Elec-
tions
Dependent variable:
Challenger
Term Length 0.267
(0.651)
Incumbent Law School Prestige −0.393
(0.314)
Number of Laywers (log) −0.007
(1.337)
Murder Rate (log) −3.410
(4.351)
Skipped Previous Primary −0.968
(2.175)
Number of Candidates Advancing 17.844
(836.104)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant −34.532
(1136.066)
State Random Effects
Observations 82
# of States 6
State Variance 8.548
State Standard Deviation 2.924
Log Likelihood −34.3
Akaike Inf. Crit. 104.6
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.9: Expectations About Challenger Emergence in Judicial Primary Elections
Hypothesis 5-1 States with more entrenched partisan support will
be more likely to have challengers in the primary
elections.
Not
Supported
Hypothesis 5-2 Challengers will be more likely to emerge when the
candidate was contested or had a lower vote share in
the prior primary election.
Partially
Supported
Hypothesis 5-3 Election-Runoff systems will be more likely to have
competition in the first election if there was compe-
tition in the incumbent’s prior first election.
Not
Supported
Hypothesis 5-4 Candidates who run in uncontested primary elections
will be better able to deter future challenger than
candidates who run only in the general election, all
other things being equal.
Not
Supported
emerging decreases. Related to this, candidates who were challenged in the primary in
the past are more likely to be challenged in subsequent primary elections. However this
hypothesis is only partially supported because, while the relationship exists in the aggregate,
the relationship does not hold when looking at only partisan or nonpartisan elections. Most
concerning, the relationship between prior primary vote share and subsequent challenger
emergence are not seen when looking at partisan primary elections, even though here they
should be the most evident Lazarus (2008a). In partisan states, prior primary results have
no significant effect on subsequent competition. Interestingly, the political entrenchment
does not predict which party’s primary elections have more competition.
Likewise, there is still much we do not know about nonpartisan elections, and much
I cannot determine due to small n-sizes. Realistically speaking, there are very few tradi-
tional elections in nonpartisan primary states, which makes it difficult to systematically test
138
hypotheses—particularly for states that require three or more challengers before a primary
election is held. Therefore, models of challenger emergence at the primary stage can only
measure the conditions necessary for at least two challengers to emerge. These conditions are
likely different compared to systems that need only one challenger before holding a primary
election.
In contrast to traditional nonpartisan primary elections, states with the Election-Runoff
system have a quasi-general election at the same time the rest of the state has a primary
election. While the first election in these states acts as a general election, only the primary
voters get a say. These elections always occur and a winner will be declared should one
candidate gain more than 50% of the vote. Challengers these Election-Runoff states are less
likely to run if the incumbent is newly appointed and the higher their vote shares are in the
previous election, but these variables are only significant at the 10% level. This leaves a lot
of room for doubt in regards to Hypothesis 5-3. Further research on the ways nonpartisan
candidates are recruited, or just the simple passage of time leading to more data, may reveal
new insights on how candidates in election-runoff systems emerge.
Interestingly, while the number of lawyers in the state influences challenger emergence
in general elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009), it does not appear to have the same influence
in primary elections. Murder rate, term length and the other control variables also do not
have a significant effect on when challengers emerge. While these are commonly accepted
control variables in the literature, it is possible there are different factors at work in partisan
elections that make these significant in the general election but obscure relationships at the
primary stage.
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In testing Hypothesis 5-4, I find that there is no difference in the likelihood of a challenger
emerging depending on whether the incumbent skipped the prior primary or ran uncontested.
Ultimately, this distinction leads to the same outcome: an incumbent not challenged at the
primary stage in the prior election. Procedurally, these are very different in that candidates
who run uncontested have the advantage of putting their name in front of the voters one
additional time. This debunks Hypothesis 5-3 and throws doubt over previous findings
in congressional studies on the advantage of running uncontested (Adams and Merrill 2008;
Hogan 2003b). Further research on the distinction between running uncontested and skipping
the primary and running uncontested in the primary.
Overall, incumbents are stronger when they run uncontested in primary elections, as
those elections are better able to deter future challengers.17 Additionally, newly appointed
judges are not especially targeted at the primary level by potential challengers, perhaps due
to the halo effect of good press following a gubernatorial appointment. However, there is still
much to learn about when challengers decide to run in judicial primary elections. Although
incumbents win the primary election most of the time, there are several instances where
a challenger defeats the incumbent in this early stage in the election. One such example
is Stephen Wayne Smith in Texas. He won election in an upset in 2004 and was free of
scandal during his tenure on the bench. Regardless, in 2004, he lost the primary election to
Rick Green, a fellow Republican. Smith ran in two subsequent Republican primary elections
(2006 and 2016) and lost both times.
17This is true regardless of if the candidate skips the primary due to lack of competition or sits in an
uncontested election.
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Chapter 6
Women in Judicial Primary Elections
In 2000 a challenger defeated a sitting justice in Idaho for the first time since 1944.
Incumbent Cathy Silak was appointed in 1993 and elected in 1994 after defeating a challenger.
Although she had no major scandals during her time on the bench, she lost to challenger
Dan Eismann six years later by a 17-point margin in the primary election. In New Mexico
two years earlier, in 1998, challenger Petra Maes defeated incumbent Dan McKinnon II in
the first defeat of an incumbent in the primary election in more than ten years. Although
McKinnon’s short time in office included no large scandals, Maes was able to defeat him by
18 percentage points to become the first Hispanic woman on the New Mexico state supreme
court. Although both of these examples are extreme, an incumbent woman losing reelection
and a woman defeating an incumbent, they also typify two different understandings of gender
and judicial elections. Silak typifies the conventional wisdom that women are more vulnerable
to defeat by a challenger, while Maes typifies the research showing women have a competitive
advantage.
The primary election has the potential to explain how women move through the electoral
cycle to eventually hold, and keep, office. Recent research suggests judicial candidates who
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are women have an advantage in judicial elections (Frederick and Streb 2008; Gill and Eugenis
2017). Although not mentioned, this advantage may have its origins in how women move
through the primary system and the differences in primary rules across the states. Evidence
suggests the incumbency advantage is part of what slows the ascension of women on state
supreme court benches, particularly since term limits are long for state supreme court office
and incumbents generally are successful even when challenged (Allen and Wall 1993; Bonneau
2007). It is possible other differences in primary elections also contributes to the slow rate
of women joining state supreme court benches in states with elective systems.
In this chapter I focus on how primary elections inpact women who run for judicial office.
In order to do this I use the dataset of state judicial primary elections introduced in Chapter
4.1 My research finds women have an advantage in that they win judicial primary elections
and they have a vote share advantage when they run as challengers or incumbents. Women
are challenged more often in nonpartisan primaries and this may lead to stronger candidates
advancing to the general election. Finally, evidence suggests women may strategically avoid
primary elections when possible so as to only run in one election per judicial cycle.
Electing Women
Women in Primary Elections
Scholars have speculated on the role of gender in the electoral process, particularly as it
relates to the emergence of women as candidates for political office (Dolan 2014; Lawless
1Additional details about the data and models are in Appendices A and B.
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and Pearson 2008; Sanbonmatsu 2002, 2006a; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003). Much of
the current research suggests women face no disadvantage when running against men in
legislative and executive elections (Hayes and Lawless 2016). Still, fewer women run in
general elections for office (Fox 2014). However, despite running in fewer numbers, recent
House and Senate results suggest incumbents women who are Democrats gain a higher vote
share than Democrat incumbent men and challenger women obtain a greater percentage of
the vote than challenger men (Dolan 2014).
Studies show voters perceive women to be more liberal and more attuned to social issues
than men (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Lawless and Pearson 2008).
Voters use these perceptions as a way of determining their vote in the election (Huddy and
Terkildsen 1993). Sanbonmatsu and Fox (2014) find the number of women elected to state
legislatures has increased in recent years. Specifically, the total number of Democrat women
elected has increased, while Republican women in state legislatures have leveled off in recent
years (Lawless and Pearson 2008). It is possible that women have an advantage in general
elections if they take advantage of their gender and run “as a woman” (Herrnson, Lay, and
Stokes 2003; Kahn 1994).
Despite many studies confirming women fare no worse than men in legislative elections,
there is still a scarcity of women participating as either incumbents or challengers in general
elections. Some have questioned if this is because women are more likely to be challenged
and defeated at the primary stage, or if the primary election institutions create additional
barriers that fall on the shoulders of women more harshly than men (Seltzer, Newman, and
Leighton 1997). Burrell (1994) notes it is possible fewer women run in primary elections and
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those who do run may face a disadvantage that prevents them from advancing to the general
election. This would result in a compounded disadvantage.
Electoral data from legislative and executive elections do not support this argument. Con-
sistently, scholars have shown that women do no worse than men in primary elections for
legislative office (Burrell 1994; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Sanbonmatsu 2006a).
In some cases, women do as well in the primary elections as other incumbents, open seat
candidates, and challengers in the U.S. House, Senate, Gubernatorial elections (Seltzer, New-
man, and Leighton 1997). Other researchers contend incumbent women do well, but women
running in open seat races are at a disadvantage in some states, but not all (Sanbonmatsu
2006a). Finally, the most recent research on women in elections suggests that being a woman
has no impact on the way voters vote or perceive a candidate, nor does it change the way
candidates run their campaigns or the way the media covers candidates (Hayes and Lawless
2016). Due to the polarized state of current politics, Hayes and Lawless (2016) claim voters
care more about and vote based on partisan affiliation more than gender.
These results would seem to suggest women have the same chance at making it through
the two-election process as men in legislative elections. However, what is true in general
elections may not hold in the primary election. Hayes and Lawless (2016) note that while
voters may care more about the partisan affiliation in the general election, a partisan primary
election features candidates from the same party, and women may face a greater advantage
or disadvantage in these elections. Some research shows women are challenged more often
than men at the primary level (Lawless and Pearson 2008). Although voters are electing
women to the U.S. House and Senate in greater numbers, there are fewer women emerging
144
as challengers in legislative primaries and, despite greater visibility of women in public office,
relatively few women run in open seat primaries (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Burrell 1992).
This has the potential to further decrease the number of women who run in general elections
to only the most qualified women and those who are willing to endure the two-election
system.
Therefore, the picture of women’s participation in legislative primaries is full of contra-
dictions: women suffer no negative electoral ramifications in primary elections compared to
men, but they are challenged at greater rates and face more challengers per election. Voters
care more about political party than gender, but women are election-adverse and often do
not run. A combination of these factors may lead to fewer women emerging as candidates and
running in primary elections. Additionally, there is conflicting research on women running
in open seat elections. While these elections do not feature an incumbent and, hypotheti-
cally, give challengers the best opportunity to win the seat, few women participate in these
elections despite evidence that they fare as well as men (Burrell 1992; Sanbonmatsu 2006a).
Women in Judicial Elections
Currently, women are underrepresented on state supreme courts. Women comprise less than
40% of the bench in more than half of the states. Washington state has the most women
on the bench with 6 women (66%) and Wisconsin has the highest percentage of women on
the bench (71%). Iowa still has all men on the bench. All told, women make up 36% of all
state supreme court seats. Although the first woman on a state high court was appointed in
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1923,2 a majority of states did not see the emergence of women on the highest court until
the 1970s and 1980s. After these early pioneers, it is not until the 1990s and 2000s that the
second generation of women run in judicial elections on a more regular basis.
Most research done on the topic of gender diversification on the bench focuses on the
differences among judicial selection systems as the explanation for the glacial pace women
join the judicial ranks. Gubernatorial appointment is more likely to add the first woman to
the court, but is not instrumental in appointing more than token representation (Bratton
and Spill 2002). Given this, it appears as though women have a greater chance at obtaining
state court seats if they go through the election process (Williams 2006; Brennan 1986).
However, other explanations for the lack of women as judges are institutional in nature.
Terms are long in the state high courts and sitting justices benefit from high retention rates
and a strong incumbency advantage (Allen and Wall 1993).
It is even possible that, due to strategic entry into elections, challenger women may
have an advantage over challenger men when running against an incumbent judge (Gill and
Eugenis 2017; Frederick and Streb 2008). Specifically, Gill and Eugenis (2017) find women
have an advantage in general elections when they have the ability to strategically pinpoint
a weaker incumbent. This advantage is confined to challenger women against incumbents;
women running as an incumbent or in open seat elections fare similarly to men. While not
always able to defeat the incumbent, challenger women are able to decrease the incumbent’s
vote share more so than challenger men.
This prior research suggests women face no disadvantage in judicial general elections, but
2Florence E. Allen in Ohio was the first woman on a state supreme court in the United States (Ohio
Supreme Court 2017).
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it raises questions about what occurs before this point in the election cycle. If incumbent
women are more likely to run against a challenger in the primary, more women could be
defeated at the primary stage—with the winning women being stronger candidates than
incumbent men who did not have strong competition in the primaries. Differences in the
quality of women compared to men may be hidden in general elections, but come to the
forefront of primary elections (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Reid 2010).
Reid (2010) finds women are more likely to face challengers in general elections and have
to work harder in order to raise campaign funds because political parties offer less financial
support to women. She also finds different factors predict women’s financial support than
men’s—indicating that there are substantial differences in the ways women are elected to
the bench and these differences are masked in traditional regression models (Reid 2010).
However, these findings are disputed by Hayes and Lawless (2016) who find no difference in
the amount of money raised or campaign strategy employed by women in legislative elections.
In some of the only research on judicial primary elections, Klumpp (2011, 823) asserts that
a competitive two-party contest in the general elections is rare because most elections are
by rights “decided” in the primary with the general election being a “foregone conclusion.”
While this study on the importance and role of judicial primaries is important, it is also
limited to only Cook County, Illinois. The author finds that being a woman and being Irish
are two of the strongest predictors of the outcome of the election (Klumpp 2011).3
3This is also born out in judicial perceptions of what it takes to win, with judges legally changing their
last names in order to sound more Irish (Klumpp 2011).
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Theories Regarding Women in Judicial Primary Elections
All of this leads to several theories and hypotheses in order to explain why women tend
to do better, under certain circumstances, once they get to the general election. Prior
research on this topic claims the advantage for women stems from the strategic behavior of
challenger women targeting weak opponents (Gill and Eugenis 2017), or primary elections
disadvantage women because only the most qualified move to the general election (Reid
2010). However, it is also possible women strategically avoid contested primaries and only
run in uncontested primaries, assuring themselves a spot in the general election. This theory
is, thus far, untested.
Theory 1: Women as Strategic Challengers
Women run for elected office in fewer numbers than men in elections at most levels of
government because of what is known as “the ambition gap,” (Costantini 1990) scholars claim
that women run less often despite having the same opportunities and the same qualifications
as men (Lawless and Fox 2005). Even with equal opportunity and qualifications, women
need to be encouraged to run for office (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2014). These women
running for office are not categorized as self-starters, meaning they do not envision serving
in public office on their own; rather, they tend to run because someone else suggested it as
a good course of action (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2014).
The fact that women are less likely to run for office without a nudge in that direction has
led some scholars to determine that women are more election adverse than men (Kanthak
and Woon 2014). They only run when the conditions in their favor drastically outweigh the
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risks of running an expensive campaign for office. This line of reasoning suggests women
would be more likely to run when the incumbent is particularly weak. This would lead to the
challenger woman gaining a higher vote share, not because she is more qualified or because
voters prefer women, but because the incumbent is electorally weak. In these instances, the
electoral advantage for women is a reflection of the weakness of the incumbent and not any
unusual over-qualification of the challenger (Gill and Eugenis 2017).
If this is the case, then I expect challenger women to run in primary elections only when
the incumbent exhibits signs of weakness. In these cases it is possible for challenger women
to gain an electoral advantage due to their strategic entry into races, but incumbent women
and women who run in open seat elections would have no such advantage. This is not to say
that incumbent women or women in open seat elections face an electoral disadvantage, but
that challenger women will gain an advantage when facing a weak incumbent.
Hypothesis 6-1: Because incumbent women are perceived to be weaker candidates, more
women will target, and run against, incumbent women.
Hypothesis 6-2: Because women are strategic in targeting incumbents, they will exhibit
an electoral advantage in primary elections contesting the incumbent.
Hypothesis 6-3: Because women only gain an advantage due to strategic entry into
primary races, then incumbents women and women in open seat races will not have the same
advantage.
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Theory 2: Primary Elections Disadvantage Women
Another explanation for why women do well in judicial general elections is that they are
disproportionately targeted in primary elections. Following Fox (2014), it is possible women
are more likely than men to be challenged at the primary stage because they are perceived
as weaker candidates. Facing more challengers at the primary level makes it less likely that
women will advance beyond the primary to the general. Those women who pass the primary
may be more qualified or electorally viable candidates, making them more competitive in
general elections (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Burrell 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2006a).
Women generally attract more challengers in legislative primaries (Sanbonmatsu 2006a),
so it is possible the same is occurring in judicial primaries. Here, women may run in the
primaries in greater numbers, but increased competition limits the number of women who
advance to the general elections to only those who are the most electorally viable. If this is
true, then women advancing beyond the primaries are the most fit for office. This leads to
women in general elections being the most competitive. Therefore, these electorally strong
women are likely to get a boost in votes in the general election. Should this be the case,
women will run in primaries in greater numbers and lose primary elections more frequently
with only the most electorally viable women advancing to the general election. This would
lead to a high percentage of women in the primary and a low percentage in the general.
Hypothesis 6-4: Because incumbent women are perceived as weaker candidates, they
will be challenged in primary elections at higher rates.
Hypothesis 6-5: Because primary elections are disadvantageous to women, women will
run in primaries at higher rates than general elections and will lose primary elections at
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higher rates.
Theory 3: Women Strategically Avoid Primaries
Finally, it is possible that a combination of both theories is also true. Although yet untested,
women may strategically avoid primary elections by picking races where they will run un-
contested or where they can avoid running in two elections. This follows in line with prior
theories of women being, if not risk adverse, then election adverse (Kanthak and Woon 2014).
In many states, uncontested judges do not even need to appear on the ballot because they
advance directly to the general election. A select number of other states require uncontested
primary races to go on the ballot, but since these elections are uncontested, the candidates
are assured a victory. Due to the structure of judicial primary elections, it is possible for
candidates to avoid a competitive primary.
In nonpartisan states, they can run as one of two candidates in a state where the top two
move on to the general election, ensuring everybody wins the first stage. In states where
primaries are only held in the event there are more than three candidates, candidates can
similarly avoid a second election by only running when there are fewer than three candidates
in the race.4 In states with a system of election and runoff,5 a winner can be chosen in the
first, or primary, election so candidates do not need to go through an additional contest.
Although these elections advance to runoff elections should no candidate obtain an absolute
majority, most of the time these seats are won in the first election.
It is also possible for candidates to avoid primary elections in partisan states, as there are
4These states are Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
5These states are Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Oregon, and Washington.
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four states where primaries are only held if there are two or more candidates running for one
party spot.6 It is possible one challenger will go uncontested in the primary and avoid that
part of the electoral cycle. Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia (until 2015) run uncontested
primaries on the ballot; therefore, while the general election may be competitive, most
candidates run in uncontested primaries.
If women strategically avoid primaries, it is more likely there will be few contested pri-
maries with women—regardless the proportion of general elections featuring women. Here,
the contested primaries are likely comprised of men, as women attempt to implement strate-
gies to increase the chances that they run unopposed. Therefore, the gender advantage in
general elections may be a result of women strategically choosing not to run a separate
race before the deciding elections, while men end up running in two separate back-to-back
elections.
Data and Summary Statistics
These theories are tested using a variety of methods from the main dataset as described
in Appendix B.7 The dataset includes all judicial primary races, contested and noncontested,
from 1990 through 2016. The main independent variables of interest for this chapter are a
dichotomous variable indicating if the candidate was a woman, if there was a challenger or
incumbent woman, the number of women running in the race, and a dichotomous measure of
winner. Additionally, the models use measures of the type of primary election, the financial
6These states are Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania.
7Additional information about the data, variables, and models used in this chapter are found in Appen-
dices A and B.
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advantage of the incumbent, law school rank, and the murder rate in the state, as well
as the number of practicing lawyers in the state. In contrast to the models in previous
chapters, which use the election centered dataset, many of the models in this chapter use
the candidate-centered dataset.
The main dependent variables are candidate vote share, winner, and presence of a chal-
lenger woman. Vote share is a continuous variable indicating the percent of the vote the
candidate received in the primary election. Winner is a dichotomous variable indicating if
the candidate moved on from the primary to the general election. It is possible for multiple
candidates per race to move on so this variable is used on the candidate-centered dataset.
Presence of a challenger woman is a dichotomous variable that indicates if there is a chal-
lenger woman participating in the race. Independent variables of interest include incumbent
woman, a dichotomous variable indicating if the incumbent is a woman, and challenger
woman, a dichotomous variable indicating if the challenger is a woman. I also include con-
trol variables as explained in the previous chapter on on challenger emergence. Most of the
models are logistical models as explained in Appendix B.
The candidate-centered dataset is comprised of all the same variables, with the same
limitations, as the election centered dataset. Summary statistics for the candidate centered
dataset at the primary level are in Table 6.1.8 All candidates in the same primary race
are linked together with an identification variable in order to account for non-independence
in variables such as vote share. As shown in Table 6.1, there are 883 candidates who run
in primary elections. 51.40% of all candidates run in partisan elections and 29.60% of
8Further detail about any of the variables and the coding structure used can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 6.1: Summary Statistics: Candidate-Centered Dataset for Judicial Primary Elections
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Candidate Party 464 1.511 0.584 1 8
Law School Prestige 859 2.888 1.293 1 8
Number of Winners 883 1.361 0.559 1 4
Vote Share 879 52.666 32.530 2.720 100.000
Number of Lawyers (log) 662 9.620 1.092 7.168 11.368
Murder Rate (log) 881 1.615 0.571 -0.511 3.011
Incumbent $ Advantage (log) 457 9.344 5.067 0.000 15.092
Difference in Ranks 613 -0.225 1.746 -5 4
Total Number Candidates 883 2.726 1.727 1 8
Total Candidates-Women 883 0.653 0.816 0 4
Total Challengers-Women 883 0.330 0.640 0 3
Partisan 883 0.514 — 0 1
Incumbent 883 0.296 — 0 1
Challenger 883 0.371 — 0 1
Candidate-Woman 878 0.241 — 0 1
Incumbent Woman 883 0.154 — 0 1
Any Challenger Women 883 0.365 — 0 1
Open Seat Race 883 0.387 — 0 1
Race Challenged 883 0.732 — 0 1
Off-Cycle 883 0.032 — 0 1
Appointed 879 0.195 — 0 1
High Quality Challenger 613 0.297 — 0 1
Winner 877 0.609 — 0 1
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all candidates running in primary elections are incumbents. Only 24.1% of all candidates
are women, 15.4% are incumbent women and 36.5% of candidates run in races with any
challenger women. Most candidates run in challenged races, 73.2%, and 38.7% of candidates
run in open seat races.
Results
To establish the role of gender in state supreme court elections, it is important to know
how often women run for this office. Although the first woman was appointed to the state
supreme court in 1927 (Ohio Supreme Court 2017), women did not start running for high
judicial office in greater numbers until the late 1980s through the 1990s and 2000s. A
majority of states elected or appointed their first woman on the state supreme court in the
1980s, thereby opening the door for more women to run for office. Even now, women are just
beginning to be regular contenders for judicial office. Some evidence suggests women are more
likely to be challenged and women will challenge other women because they perceive them
to be weaker candidates than men or in an effort to avoid challenging a man (Sanbonmatsu
2006a). Additionally, once the first woman has established herself on the court, it is possible
her seat will become the token woman’s seat and will attract more challenger women that
way.
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When Women Run for Office
In order to determine when women emerge and run for state supreme court, I run two
separate models. The first is a logistic regression where the dependent variable is presence
of a challenger woman in order to determine if women emerge more often in the presence of
one or more other variables. Specifically, I test if women run more when there is a challenger
woman, as stated in Hypothesis 6-1. The logistic regression captures the binary nature of
when women run for office and includes fixed effects for the primary type.9 This is in order
to account for systematic variations due to the type of race. The results of this model in
Table 6.2 does not reveal many defining characteristics about when women decide to run
in judicial elections.10 However, the logistic model tests just the presence of a challenger
woman. This model reveals a few different patterns. This model suggests elections with
incumbent women are nearly twice as likely to draw challenger women and women are more
likely to run in open seat elections in an effort to avoid running against an incumbent. These
results lend credence to Hypothesis 6-1, or women run against incumbent women at higher
rates.
The next model (Table 6.3) is negative binomial model where the dependent variable
is the total number of challenger women.11 While the first model tests the presence of a
9This model is a logit regression run on the election centered dataset. It has fixed effects at both year
and primary type.
10Part of this is due to the relatively low n-size in the model. These tests are limited to the 163 primary
elections with a challenger. The model also removes a few primary elections occurring in the early 1990s due
to missing data on the number of lawyers in each state. When this variable is removed, the n-size increases
to 209, but the model with the increased observations is not as good a fit as the ones presented here. This
means that open seat elections do not draw more women, and elections with incumbent women do not draw
a larger number of challenger women.
11This is a negative binomial count model with fixed effects at typology. This is run on the election
centered dataset.
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Table 6.2: Emergence of Challenger Women in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Presence of a Challenger Woman
Incumbent −0.944
(0.710)
Incumbent Woman 1.886∗∗∗
(0.415)
Vote Prior General Election 0.001
(0.008)
Incumbent Law School Prestige 0.200
(0.202)
Incumbent Appointed 0.382
(0.596)
Open Seat Election 1.261∗∗
(0.614)
Difference in Law School Ranks −0.150
(0.138)
Murder Rate (log) −0.448
(0.407)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Year: 2006 2.148∗
(1.301)
Year: 2012 2.375∗
(1.313)
Typology Fixed Effects Included
Constant −2.587∗
(1.488)
Observations 209
Log Likelihood −99.707
AIC 253.414
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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challenger woman, this one tests the total count of challenger women per election. Particu-
larly in nonpartisan races, there are as many as seven challengers in each primary race. The
negative binomial model is used due to the fact that the total number of challenger women
is a count variable with a large amount of overdispersion, as there are many races without
women (Hedeker and Gibbons 2006).
Table 6.3 reveals the beginnings of a complicated picture about when women choose to
run for office. The independent variables are all factors known to a challenger on or before the
filing deadline: Namely, if there is an open seat election, if there is an incumbent, and if that
incumbent is a woman. The second group of variables captures the nature of the primary
system, or the potential number of elections the challenger will have to participate in before
she reaches the general election. Finally, control variables account for other factors known
to impact candidate emergence and outcomes in judicial election. None of the independent
variables of interest have significant effects on the number of challenger women who run in
primary races. Although challenger women tend to run against incumbent women, this model
suggests that incumbent women are not more likely to attract several challenger women at
a time. However, the murder rate in the state may be a contributing factor in that there are
more challenger women as the murder rate in the state decreases. Additionally, an increase
in the candidate pool, or being located in a state/time with more lawyers positively increases
the number of women who run in any given election.
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Table 6.3: Number of Challenger Women in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Total # Challenger Women
Incumbent −0.267
(0.277)
Incumbent Woman 0.059
(0.142)
Vote Prior General Election 0.002
(0.003)
Incumbent Appointed −0.203
(0.207)
Incumbent Law School Prestige −0.082
(0.075)
Open Seat Election −0.151
(0.243)
Difference in Law School Ranks 0.024
(0.049)
Murder Rate (log) −0.584∗∗∗
(0.146)
Number of Lawyers (log) 0.245∗∗∗
(0.081)
Typology: AHP 0.336
(0.348)
Typology: CBN 0.247
(0.323)
Typology: CBP −0.689∗
(0.352)
Typology: ERO −0.196
(0.286)
Constant 9.227∗∗∗
(0.756)
Observations 163
Log Likelihood -1,809.649
AIC 3,649.297
Alpha 0.686
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Reference category for typology variable is Always Held Nonpartisan Elections.
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How Women Fare Electorally
The next piece of the puzzle concerning women in judicial primary elections is how they do
in terms of vote share as incumbents, challengers, and candidates in open seat elections. Of
course, once a candidate files for election, their ultimate goal is to win office by gaining the
highest vote share. It is notoriously difficult to predict in advance when, and under what
circumstances, a particular candidate can win an election. However, it may be possible to
identify patterns in how voters respond to women running for high court.
To portray the election accurately, I use candidate-centered data with fixed effects at
typology for all candidates running for office (Finch, Bolin, and Kelley 2014; Hedeker and
Gibbons 2006). The election typology is assigned by the election race. This means that the
typology will vary within a state if that state changed their election procedures for judicial
elections. States sometimes made drastic changes, like from partisan to nonpartisan systems,
in the span of a year. To account for nonindependence in elections results by context, I set
all the models to have year and typology fixed effects and random effects by race.
Challengers running against an incumbent face different hurdles due to the uneven nature
of the race. Incumbents generally win, regardless of past scandal or the quality of the
challenger. However, open seat races may be more competitive, as all candidates have an
equal opportunity to make an impression on voters. It is possible challenger women have an
advantage running against incumbent due to strategic entry into the race. This advantage
in vote share would be seen only when women run as challengers as explained in Hypothesis
6-3.
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Table 6.4 shows the results of three models of vote share with candidate-centered data.12
This is a continuous measure of vote share in the current primary. I choose vote share
as the first measure in order to determine if women have an advantage or disadvantage in
primary elections. This advantage would be reflected in the percentage of votes women get
in primary elections. The first model looks at the effect of either being a woman or facing
challenger women on all candidates for all primary races—incumbents, challengers, and open
seat candidates. The second model only looks at challengers facing an incumbent, while the
third model focuses on candidates in open seat elections. Due to the ways partisan primaries
are set up, it is possible for the incumbent to be Republican, and for a Democrat challenger
to run in a different primary. I count these as separate elections. A Democrat emerging in the
primary against a Republican incumbent does not directly face that Republican incumbent
until the general election. I make this distinction to isolate the path to the general election
for incumbents.
These three models are very similar, suggesting the factors that predict vote share do not
differ much depending on when someone runs for office and who they run against. In the
model of all candidates, the biggest significant predictors of vote share is incumbency status,
with incumbents gaining 21 points over the competition. Interestingly, I find candidates
with greater financial advantage generally end up with lower vote shares. This may suggest
candidates in safe districts do not raise as much money and an increase in fund-raising is
actually indicative of strong competition. As the number of candidates in the race increases,
12This model predicts candidate vote share in the primary election. I use the candidate-centered data in
this model in order to separate the different types of candidates, all candidates, just challengers, and open
seat candidates. In order to account for nonindependence of vote share, as vote shares for all candidates in
the same race must approximate 100%, I nest observations under an election identifier. This ties candidates
running in the same race to each other.
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the vote share goes down by over 6 percentage points. Finally, candidates in the CBN
primary type have lower vote shares. This is likely a result of the multiple challengers often
present in this type of primary election. Finally, the incumbent’s prior vote share in the
general election is also a significant predictor of primary election outcomes. Incumbents
who have higher previous general vote shares also show lower current primary scores. It
is possible that incumbents who sat in previous elections have more of a target painted on
them, while freshly-appointed judges are not targeted as frequently.
When analyzing only the vote share of challengers, a very similar picture emerges. The
financial advantage the incumbent has over a challenger decreases the challenger’s eventual
vote share. The total number of candidates has the effect of spreading out the vote and
decreases all challengers’ chances of winning by lowering vote share by over six percentage
points. Evidence suggests challenger women receive seven additional percentage points over
challenger men. Overall, Table 6.4 suggests, in the aggregate, women may have a gender
advantage when they run as challengers.13
The determinants of vote share in open seat elections are far less clear. This is likely
due to having more electorally close races where candidates win with much narrower vote
shares. The only significant predictors for vote share in an open seat election is the number
of candidates, which always draws the individual vote share down. In this case all candidates
lose over seven percentage points in vote share with each additional candidate. Additionally,
candidates in states with more lawyers receive an additional three percentage points. Based
on these three models of vote share including all candidates, just challengers, and candidates
13Likelihood Ratio tests indicate the models with random effects set at typology add significant bias when
compared to models with fixed effects at typology. While the coefficients change between the two models,
the significance does not.
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Table 6.4: Models of Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Candidate Vote Share
(All Candidates) (Challengers) (Open Seat)
Incumbent 21.089∗∗∗ — —
(1.867)
Financial Advantage (log) −0.472∗∗∗ −0.670∗∗∗ −0.289
(0.139) (0.223) (0.190)
Total # Candidates −6.683∗∗∗ −6.307∗∗∗ −7.321∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.950) (0.707)
Incumbent Vote Prior Election −0.050∗∗ −0.045 —
(0.020) (0.032)
Candidate: Woman 1.976 7.263∗∗ 2.851
(3.189) (3.385) (10.812)
Any Challenger Women −1.842 −4.950 −1.229
(1.607) (3.386) (2.177)
Difference in Law School Rank 0.519 0.817 0.943∗
(0.342) (0.506) (0.514)
Murder Rate (log) 0.919 1.817 1.893
(1.359) (2.307) (2.164)
# of Lawyers (log) 1.120 −1.608 3.100∗∗
(0.769) (1.204) (1.330)
Candidate-Woman * Any Challenger Women 1.198 — −0.814
(3.647) (11.048)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Typology: AHP −3.680 5.841 −6.307
(3.431) (5.764) (4.798)
Typology: CBN −9.622∗∗∗ −6.687 −5.160
(3.156) (5.136) (4.606)
Typology: CBP −5.245 −0.424 −7.435
(3.456) (6.086) (5.029)
Typology: ERO −5.474∗ −0.560 −5.620
(2.969) (5.181) (3.857)
Constant 61.411∗∗∗ 66.914∗∗∗ 38.694∗∗∗
(7.668) (12.098) (12.116)
Random Effects
Election Race Variance 0 0 0
Election Race Std. Dev. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 345 115 171
Log Likelihood -1,256.354 -369.980 -588.900
AIC 2,568.707 789.960 1,227.801
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,676.326 858.583 1,306.342
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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in open seat elections, gender only plays a role in the outcome of the election for challengers.
Being a woman only gives challengers a vote share advantage. This is not seen when looking
at models of all candidates, nor open seat candidates.
The model of incumbent vote share is similar to those of challenger and open seat can-
didate vote share (Table 6.5). Being a woman increases the incumbent’s vote share by over
seven percentage points. Interestingly, running against a challenger women does not decrease
an incumbent woman’s final vote share. Variables about the financial advantage and the to-
tal number of candidates perform similarly in the model of incumbent vote share as they do
in other models with an increase in financial advantage and an increase in the number of
candidates leading to a decrease in the incumbent’s vote share.
The n-sizes of this model are small because over the past 26 years there are not many
primary elections involving challenged incumbents. Most incumbents run unopposed, if they
run at all in the primary. The model also suffers from a large amount of missing data as we go
further back in time. Going forward, there are more cases of women challenging incumbents
and it may be possible to discern a relationship at the primary level. Alternatively, should
historical data on financial contributions at the primary and general levels come available,
it may be possible to see a significant influence of the presence of a challenger woman on the
vote share of the incumbent. Results are in Table 6.5.14
However, it is not enough for a candidate to just increase their vote share; it is also
important to win and move on to the next phase of the election cycle. In the primary
14This is a regression with a dependent variable of vote share. This model has fixed effects at both year and
typology because Likelihood Ratio tests indicate the model with random effects at typology added significant
amount of bias. This model does not have random effects at the race level because incumbents do not run
against each other and there is only one per race.
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Table 6.5: Model of Incumbent Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Vote Share
Financial Advantage (log) −0.670∗∗∗
(0.223)
Total # Candidates −6.307∗∗∗
(0.950)
Incumbent Vote Prior Election −0.045
(0.032)
Candidate-Woman 7.263∗∗
(3.385)
Any Challenger Women −4.950
(3.386)
Difference in Law School Rank 0.817
(0.506)
Murder Rate (log) 1.817
(2.307)
# of Lawyers (log) −1.608
(1.204)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Typology Fixed Effects Included
Constant 66.914∗∗∗
(12.098)
Observations 115
R2 0.670
Adjusted R2 0.591
Residual Std. Error 8.984 (df = 92)
F Statistic 8.476∗∗∗ (df = 22; 92)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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election, specifically in nonpartisan primaries, it is not always necessary to win a majority of
the votes in order to move on to the next election. In many cases, the top two vote getters
will move on, even if they both obtained less than 30% of the vote, or if there is a large
disparity in the final vote count (65% and 35%). Keeping this in mind, it is important to
gauge whether candidates did well enough to move on to the next phase of the election,
regardless of final vote share.
To measure the effects of gender on the odds a candidate moves past the primary to the
next stage of the election, I code a dichotomous variable for all winning candidates and run
logistic regressions with winning being the dependent variable. The gender of the candidate
along with gender of challenger are the independent variables of interest. I ran this on the
dataset of all candidates as a whole, as well as on incumbents, challengers, and candidates
in open seat elections separately. Results are in Table 6.6.15
This table shows the odds ratio of a candidate winning given any of these characteristics
based on the type of candidate (all, incumbents, challengers, or open seat candidates). Here,
we see that in the model with all candidates, being an incumbent makes someone nearly three
times as likely to win. However, the number of candidates does not statistically influence
the likelihood someone will win. This is in contrast to the prior models (shown in Tables 6.4
and 6.5) where increasing the number of candidates dramatically decreases each candidate’s
vote share. As their vote share decreases, their odds of winning only decreases slightly.
Additionally, women have a greater chance of winning the primary election, despite the fact
15These are logit regression models on the candidate-centered dataset with the only difference being the
subset of data going into the models. The first includes all primary candidates, while the second through
fourth models have just incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates respectively. These models do
not have random effects or fixed effects at the typology level. ANOVA Tests indicate the model with the
typology variable does not perform better.
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Table 6.6: Logistic Regression for Winning in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Winning
(All) (Incumbents) (Challengers) (Open Seat)
Incumbent 2.993∗∗∗ — — —
(0.486)
Financial Advantage (log) −0.022 — — 0.046
(0.026) (0.035)
Number of Candidates −0.091 −1.540 0.207 −0.281∗∗
(0.098) (0.963) (0.196) (0.140)
Prior Vote Share Gen −0.004 0.138∗∗ 0.006 —
(0.004) (0.061) (0.007)
Candidate-Woman 0.919∗∗∗ 4.405∗∗ 2.619∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗
(0.329) (2.071) (0.936) (0.412)
Any Challenger Women 0.167 −4.797 −0.777 0.009
(0.322) (3.162) (0.932) (0.421)
Difference in Rank −0.002 −0.772 −0.050 0.011
(0.074) (0.731) (0.151) (0.103)
Murder Rate (log) −0.344 −1.484 −0.596 −0.473
(0.269) (1.644) (0.589) (0.380)
Number of Lawyers (log) −0.205 1.179 −0.563∗∗ −0.080
(0.133) (0.793) (0.269) (0.190)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 2.201 −2.162 3.965 1.401
(1.472) (7.984) (2.578) (1.838)
Observations 359 87 139 182
Log Likelihood −199.826 −12.778 −60.300 −114.179
AIC 439.652 61.556 156.600 264.359
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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that being a woman does not give candidates any particular advantage or disadvantage in
vote share. Although, in prior models, women may not have an advantage in vote share, it
is possible for more than one candidate to win the primary election. It appears as though
being a woman makes it easier for women to move on to the next stage of the election cycle.
While women do not experience significant advantages or disadvantages when calculating
vote share in the primary elections, women do experience an advantage in their odds of
winning or moving on to the next election. This relationship is not always perfectly correlated
with high vote shares due to the different structures of primary elections and the number of
candidates who can move on at any given point in the electoral cycle. Particularly in states
where the top two candidates move on from the primary to the general election, candidates
do not need a majority of votes to win. It is possible to win a primary election with as low
as 18% of the vote. Therefore, while women are not more likely to have high vote shares,
they are more likely to move on from the primary election. These results add nuance to our
understanding of Hypotheses 6-2 and Hypothesis 6-3. Challenger women do not have any
vote share advantage linked to who they are running against. However, women are better
able to move on to the general election as incumbents, challengers, and open seat elections.
Incumbent Women and Uncontested Elections
Overall, incumbent women are not more likely to be challenged than men. When separated
into general and primary elections and tested separately, the same still holds true. Women
are not more likely to be challenged than men in either stage. That being said, women face
a challenger half the time (50.69%) while men only face a challenger 39.89% of the time in
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primary elections. This difference, however, is not significant. Therefore, this sheds doubt
on the idea that women are perceived as weaker candidates and will be challenged more
often, as explained in Hypothesis 6-4. This is likely because of the 261 primary races with
incumbents, only 112 are challenged. Of those, 73 involve an incumbent woman, and 37 of
those are a challenged incumbent woman.
This story changes when looking at the differences between partisan and nonpartisan
races. Incumbent women in partisan primary races are no more likely to be challenged than
men, seen in Table 6.7. In contrast, incumbent women in nonpartisan primaries are far more
likely to be challenged, shown in Table 6.8. This is significant at the .05 level. This partially
confirms Hypothesis 6-4 that incumbent women in nonpartisan systems are far more likely
to be challenged than men. In contrast, women in partisan systems are no more likely to be
challenged.
Table 6.7: Rates of Contestataion in Partisan Elections by Gender of Incumbent in Judicial
Primary Elections
Challenger
No Yes Total
Incumbent Man
43
55.128%
35
44.872%
78
71.560%
Incumbent Woman
19
61.290%
12
38.710%
31
28.440%
Total 62 47 109
Note: χ2 = 0.3434 p = 0.558
Finally, it is important to decipher the relationship between candidates in the different
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Table 6.8: Rates of Contestataion in Nonpartisan Elections by Gender of Incumbent in
Judicial Primary Elections
Challenger
No Yes Total
Incumbent Man
71
64.545%
39
35.455%
110
72.368%
Incumbent Woman
18
42.857%
24
57.143%
42
27.632%
Total 89 63 152
Note: χ2 = 5.3837 p = 0.020
election systems. In Always Held primaries, it is possible for the incumbent to run uncon-
tested in the primary. Should more incumbent women run uncontested in primary elections,
it might signify that incumbent women are particularly adept at deterring challengers at the
first stage of the election, giving them an advantage in the general election (Hypothesis 6-5).
Breaking it down by type of primary election, incumbent women in Always Held Primary
Elections are not challenged at greater rates than incumbent men in those same elections.
Likewise, Election-Runoff systems do not see incumbent women attract challengers at greater
rates than incumbent men, although these systems have more challengers per elections.
Finally, women in Always Held Nonpartisan elections do not get challenged more or less
often than incumbent men. Due to the fact that there are only two states employing Always
Held Nonpartisan elections, there are relatively few incumbent women in this subset. These
results may need further confirmation as more candidates run for election in these states.
The percentage of contested races for candidates of each gender by their type of primary is
found in Figure 6.1.
It is relatively straightforward to determine which types of candidates are challenged more
often in elections where there is the possibility for uncontested elections. The same is not true
170
Figure 6.1: Percent of Contested Judicial Primaries by Typology and Gender
for Challenger-Based systems. While women in Always Held and Election Runoff systems are
not challenged more often than men, uncontested challengers in Challenger-Based systems
do not sit in the primary and do not appear in the dataset until the general election. This
makes it difficult to track their progress through the election cycle. In effect, tests on the
rate of contestation pick up the fact that, in some states, only challenged candidates appear
in the dataset at the primary level and there is no record of the uncontested candidates
who go straight to the general election without needing to sit in the primary. Statistically
speaking, these results are because all of the 1s are in the dataset while the 0s are not.
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One way to account for this is to look at the rate at which women run in the Challenger-
based primary and general elections. A large percentage of women at any one stage of
the election cycle would suggest that women either skip or are weeded out at the other
stage. For example, more women in the primary stage who do not move on to the general
election would suggest that the primary election acts as a barrier fo women. Likewise, more
women in the general election than the primary election suggests that women are able to
move through or skip the primary election with ease. There are distinct differences between
what percentage of primary and general elections have incumbent women and challengers as
shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. If women faced a systematic disadvantage in primary elections,
there would be a higher percentage of women running in primaries and a lower percentage
of women running in the general election. In this scenario, women would be defeated in
primary elections. Likewise, if women were able to strategically skip the primary election by
deterring challengers, then there would be a large percentage of incumbent women running
in the general election but not in the primary election.
However, as seen in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, neither of these are the case. In fact, there
are no significant differences between the percentage of incumbent women in primary and
general elections. This suggests incumbent women pass through the primary to the general
election at the same rate as men. Therefore, primaries neither advantage nor disadvantage
women who are incumbent judges. There is also no difference in the percentage of races with
challenger women between the primary and general elections in all save one category.
The only significant difference in the percentage of primary and general races with women
occurs in Challenger-Based Nonpartisan primaries. Challenger-Based primaries tell a slightly
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Figure 6.2: Percentage of Judicial Races with an Incumbent Woman
different story. In partisan primaries, there is no statistically significant difference in the
number of women running in the primary compared to the general election. Challenger-Based
Nonpartisan primaries are a little different. Most of the seats in these systems only attract
two candidates and primaries only occur when three or more candidates are in competition
for the same seat. Here, there is a disproportionately large number of incumbent women and
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of Judicial Races with a Challenger Woman
challenger women.16 The significant disparity in percentage of races with challenger women
at the primary as compared to the general may indicate challenger women are more likely
to challenge incumbent women in this system, but the numbers are too small to indicate
if there is a statistically significant relationship. The fact that 60% of primary races have
16This is in part because Washington follows this system and Washington has a large number of women
on the bench and competing for seats on the bench.
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at least one challenger woman while only 21.09% of general races have a challenger woman
indicates that, in this system, challenger women are more likely to be disqualified in primary
elections.
Discussion
As a whole, this paints a nuanced picture of when women run, and win, state judicial
office. First, women are running for office at ever increasing numbers. This suggests a
natural progression of women to the courts. However, when it comes to the number of
women running, none of the predictors are significant save for the negative effect of Election-
Runoff systems. If the system is less likely to attract any women, then it makes sense that
it is less likely to have multiple women running. Overall findings as concerns the hypotheses
in this analysis are in Table 6.9.
While there may be other factors which cause women to self-select out of the electoral
process, data indicate women may perceive incumbent women as weaker candidates and
target them more often (Hypothesis 6-1). This is seen in Table 6.2 as incumbent women are
more likely to attract a challenger woman. However, as seen in Table 6.3, incumbent women
are not more likely to attract multiple challenger women.
Hypothesis 6-2 suggests challenger women gain an advantage in vote share when running
against an incumbent because they strategically choose weak incumbents to challenge. This
trend is seen judicial general elections (Gill and Eugenis 2017), and in judicial primary
elections. The models of vote share in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show women have an advantage
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Table 6.9: Expectations About Gender in Judicial Primary Elections
Hypothesis 6-1 Because incumbent women are perceived to be
weaker candidates, more challenger women will tar-
get, and run against, incumbent women.
Supported
Hypothesis 6-2 Because women are strategic in targeting incum-
bents, they will exhibit an electoral advantage in pri-
mary elections contesting the incumbent.
Supported
Hypothesis 6-3 Because women only gain an advantage due to strate-
gic entry into primary races, then incumbent women
and women in open seat races will not have the same
advantage.
Partially
Supported
Hypothesis 6-4 Because incumbent women are perceived as weaker
candidates, they will be challenged in primary elec-
tions at higher rates.
Partially
Supported
Hypothesis 6-5 Because primary elections are disadvantageous to
women, they will run in primaries at higher rates
than general elections and will lose primary elections
at higher rates.
Partially
Supported
when they run as challengers or as incumbents, but not as open seat candidates. Women who
run as challengers or incumbents get a seven percentage point advantage over men. Women
may have an advantage when running as challengers due to a more calculated and strategic
entry into primary elections. Because women do not have an advantage when running as
candidates in open seat elections, the advantage experienced by incumbents and challengers
may be directly linked to either strategic entry against weak incumbents, or a compounding
effect that being a woman has on being an incumbent.
Hypothesis 6-3 suggests that if challenger women have an advantage when running against
an incumbent, they will not have an advantage when running as an incumbent or as an open
seat candidate. This is not necessarily the case. Women have a vote share advantage when
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running as an incumbent or challenger, but not as an open seat candidate. Additionally,
models predicting the winner overwhelmingly suggest that women have an advantage when
it comes to winning primary elections (Table 6.6). This is possibly due to two factors: The
nature of the primary system and the often close electoral outcomes. Differences in electoral
rules in the primary means that, in many cases, the top two candidates move on to the final
election. This is true regardless of the final vote share of the candidates. Some elections are
very close, with the top two being within a few percentage points of each other. In others,
there may be as many as 30 percentage points separating the candidates, but the second
place candidate is still a winner for the purposes of this analysis. Therefore, while women
do not have a clear advantage or disadvantage in vote share, they do have a clear advantage
in their ability to move past the first stage of the electoral cycle.
When evaluating Hypothesis 6-4, or if incumbent women are challenged more often than
incumbent men, I find women have a disadvantage in some systems but not others. Evidence
suggests incumbent women are not challenged more often than men in states with partisan
elections (Table 6.7). This may confirm prior findings by Hayes and Lawless (2016) who find
partisan affiliation is far more important than gender in legislative races. However, women
are challenged more often in nonpartisan judicial elections (Table 6.8). This may suggest
that in the absence of a partisan cue, potential candidates view women to be vulnerable to
electoral defeat.
Knowledge of the nature of primary elections in the states calls into question some of
these findings. While those running in Always Held primary systems always appear in the
dataset regardless of if they are challenged, those in Challenger-Based systems only appear
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in the dataset when they are challenged, but not when they are unopposed. This makes it
appear as though women may have a disadvantage because they are challenged more often.
That analysis does not take into account the number of women who run in the general
election without being challenged in the primary election. General rates of women running
in elections do not reveal any trends in the rates of women appearing in each election largely
due to the small n-size, but suggest challenger women may be disadvantaged in Challenger-
Based Nonpartisan systems, due to the large numbers of women running in the primary but
not the general election (shown in Figure 6.3). This lends partial credence to Hypothesis
6-5 which suggests women are blocked from passing through to the general elections due to
the events of the primary. This may be particularly true in systems with Challenger-Based
nonpartisan elections.
As a whole, the results confirm reigning hypothesis that women have an advantage in
elections because they strategically target candidates who are weaker and ripe for removal
(Gill and Eugenis 2017). As women are able to win, regardless of who they run against and
show an advantage against incumbents, it seems less likely women are able to win the general
election because they strategically chose who to run against in the primary election. This
may be typified in the case of Petra Maes, who defeated sitting incumbent Dan McKinnon
in a 1998 New Mexico primary election. Although she was not obviously more qualified than
McKinnon and he had no large scandals in his background, Maes still won. It is possible that
unmeasured factors, such as the popular desire for a Hispanic judge, played in the strategic
decision to run at that particular time.
Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest primary elections systematically disadvantage
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women by requiring them to be twice as good, or even slightly more qualified than men.
Incumbent and challenger women have no significant differences in qualification compared
to incumbent and challenger men, nor do challenger women wait to run against those who
are obviously less qualified—just as incumbent women are not particularly targeted by par-
ticularly high quality challenger men. There is no evidence for Hypothesis 6-5. Neither is
there convincing evidence that women run in primary elections at much higher rates than
in general elections, which would indicate women get voted out at the primary level and are
therefore unable to sit in the general election. Only in Challenger-Based Nonpartisan election
systems is there a large percentage of women who run in the primary but fail to run in the
general election. It is possible that this result is due to the small n-size of Challenger-Based
Nonpartisan elections. More data are needed in order to fully evaluate this hypothesis. Thus
far, the evidence does not suggest women have a systematic disadvantage or that they are
weeded out at the primary level. All of this together suggests the defeat of Idaho incumbent
Cathy Silak may not be directly attributed to gender bias, but perhaps due to other factors.
Finally, the third theory, that women avoid running in primary elections, cannot be
substantiated right now. The greater percentage of women running in some types of general
elections, particularly in systems where primaries only occur when there is a challenger, seems
to indicate that women are able to avoid the primary election by positioning themselves in
a way so as to not be challenged. Additionally, there are high numbers of women who run
in systems where primaries always occur and who run unchallenged, although incumbent
women are not statistically more likely to run unchallenged than incumbent men. This
suggests incumbent women are able to deter challengers to some extent, but does not provide
179
conclusive evidence for or against theories about when women do and do not run in a primary
election. Evidence overwhelmingly suggests that when women run in primaries, they win,
and this fact alone might deter some challengers from emerging at the primary level.
Overall, challenger women may have an advantage in winning judicial primary elections
even if they do not have a systematic advantage in getting a higher percentage of the vote
share. However, these findings alone do not describe when women run and when they
are prevented from continuing to the general elections. Studying the primary elections
shines light on when and how women move through the electoral cycle. Knowledge about
the primary elections shows that women, incumbents and challengers alike, may have an
advantage in moving through the primary elections, if not in percentage of vote shares, but
in their ability to move from the primary election to the general election.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Elections are not singular events. As is shown in the Dynamic Election Phase Model
(introduced in Figure 4.2) there are several critical junctions in the path to office. The
first of these is the decision to run for office. This can be a blind process as all potential
challengers must submit their paperwork prior to the filing date. Potential challengers do
not have the ability to wait and see who else will be in the election before filing their
own paperwork. Once all candidates have decided to run for election and completed all of
the necessary filing paperwork, they must still navigate their state’s rules surrounding the
primary election. At this point it is possible for any candidate to lose the election, or have
deterred all primary challengers and thereby guarantee their position in the general elections.
Only those candidates who are able to win the primary election, or avoid it, are able to go
on to the general election.
Conceptualizing elections this way reveals the ways in which the general election is not
an isolated event in time. Rather, the events of the general election brew over many months
before they come to a head. As the general election is the direct result of the primary
election, it is important to study the differences in primary elections to understand how
181
candidates get elected. In the case of judicial elections, much is made of the fact that there
are many different selections systems and those systems influence which candidates win. Up
until this point there has been no study of the ways judicial primary systems differ and what
influence that has on which candidates get to the general election.
The distinctions are not always obvious. Ohio and Michigan are often singled out as
having systems that are unique among the states. They are lumped together because on the
surface they appear to be the same, as both systems have partisan primaries and nonpartisan
general elections. However, Ohio has traditional partisan elections where all candidates must
run regardless if they are challenged. On the other hand, Michigan has a convention system
where party elite select the candidates who go to the general election and the average citizen
has no part in those decisions. These distinctions make Ohio’s primary elections look more
like Texas’s while Michigan’s system is unique.
To account for the differences in primary elections, aside from the mere partisan/nonpartisan
divide, I create a typology of primary elections. This typology differentiates on partisan-
ship, ability to win office in the primary election, and the presence of uncontested primary
elections. This leads to five categories: Always Held Partisan Primaries,1 Challenger Based
Partisan Primaries, 2 Election-Runoff,3 Always Held Nonpartisan Primaries,4 and Challenger
Based Nonpartisan Primaries.5. All but two states with competitive judicial elections fit into
1The election is partisan, candidates can run uncontested, but candidates cannot win office in the primary.
2The election is partisan, candidates cannot run uncontested, and candidates cannot win office in the
primary.
3Here, candidates can run uncontested, and the candidate can win office in the first election.
4The elections are nonpartisan, candidates must always run in the primary, and in the event of two
candidates, they both win and go on to the general election.
5Elections are nonpartisan, and if there are fewer than three candidates there is no primary
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only one of these five categories. The two states that do not fit into one of these categories,
Michigan and Mississippi, do not have primary elections because candidates are either chosen
by the party elite or only run in the general election with a possible runoff election occurring
in late November.
Differentiating primary elections this way is an efficient way to group states into like
groups when testing hypotheses. ANOVA tests show these models do no worse than models
that are clustered by state. This method has the advantage of accounting for changes
in each state’s judicial selection method as time goes on. As states change their election
rules, this typology may become useful in accounting for within state differences. Aside
from the theoretical advantage of accounting for changes within the states, there are two
more advantages of using the typology to differentiate the different primary rules. The first
advantage occurs within multilevel models. Due to rules surrounding when primaries occur
and a lack of interest in the state supreme court, some states have very few primary elections
during the 26 years covered in this study. Kentucky, for example, has only had one primary
election during this time period. Using the typology allows Kentucky to be grouped with
other states that have the same context and allows us to make generalizations about what
would otherwise be too small to statistically test.
Secondly, and not done in this paper, using the typology to differentiate different time
periods within a state’s history and would allow researchers to test differences in election
outcomes within a state across different time periods. North Carolina moved from partisan
to nonpartisan elections in 2002. Testing hypotheses using the typology would establish the
ways elections in North Carolina have changed, or may not have changed despite popular
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expectations.
Keeping the theory and typology in mind, conclusions from this study can be grouped
into three different categories: When challengers emerge; women in primary elections; and
divergent results based on typology.
When Challengers Emerge
There are slightly different predictors for when challengers emerge depending on if the elec-
tion is partisan or nonpartisan. This is expected because partisan and nonpartisan primaries
have different functions. Partisan primaries are a communication device from the rank and
file members of the party to the elite. Primary elections are a chance for all those subscribing
to the same political party to choose the candidate that best represents them and the future
of the party. In contrast, nonpartisan elections do not have that partisan cue. Therefore,
nonpartisan elections are used to merely whittle down a large group of candidates to only
the two with the most support, irrespective of political party.
In partisan primary elections, newly appointed judges, or those who were appointed but
have not yet sat in a public election, are less likely to attract a challenger. This may be due
to the positive press that accompanies an appointment to the court. Additionally, candidates
having a higher vote share in either the previous primary or general election are more likely
to deter a challenger in the primary elections. Election-Runoff states have similar findings
for when challengers emerge. Here the data suggest newly appointed judges are less likely to
receive a challenger than those who are on their second or third term. Again, this may be due
to the positive press that accompanies such a direct gubernatorial endorsement. Secondly,
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the effect of the prior primary vote share still holds. Candidates who had a higher vote share
in the previous election are less likely to attract a challenger.
Women in Primary Elections
There are two significant finding about when challenger women emerge. First, challenger
women tend to emerge in open seat elections and when the incumbent is a woman. Addition-
ally, there appears to be more challenger women when there are a high number of lawyers in
the state and when the murder rate is relatively low. However, when it comes to vote share,
there are few significant findings concerning women.
Incumbents get an automatic 21 percentage point increase in their vote share just by
virtue of being an incumbent. This does not change if there are challenger women in the
race. When testing predictors of vote share on all candidates, the financial advantage of
the incumbent and the total number of candidates influence the eventual vote share. These
results hold when just testing the predictors of vote share on only challengers (excluding
incumbents from the dataset). Interestingly, women get a six to seven percentage point
advantage when they run as either challengers or incumbents, but not open seat candidates.
These findings suggests challenger women have a vote share advantage over men. This may
be due to strategic entry against weaker incumbents.
That being said, it is sometimes possible for multiple people to win a primary election
and move on to the general election. In general elections, only the person with the highest
vote share wins, but in some nonpartisan primary elections the top two go on, regardless if
the election was close or not. In all cases, women have an advantage in winning primary
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elections. Even if women do not have an obvious advantage in gaining the highest vote share
of the election, in the aggregate they are better able to move on to the general election.
Typology Specific Results
There are interesting findings about the presence of women in the different races. In most
systems, there is a slightly higher percentage of general election races with a incumbent
woman than there are primary elections. This suggests women have no problem moving
through the primary election to sit in the general election. However, a greater percentage of
first election have challenger women than second elections in the Challenger-Based nonpar-
tisan system. This, combined with findings that incumbent women are challenged at greater
rates in nonpartisan systems, may suggest that this system is disadvantageous to women
because fewer move from the primary to the general election.
Implications
Perhaps the most obvious implication of this study regards women’s access to the state
supreme courts. This study suggests there are few, if any, electoral reasons why women
should not be able to attain the bench. In the aggregate, the systematic discrimination
everyone predicted is not present in primary elections. Currently, the advantage women
have when winning elections is obscured by the ever-present incumbency advantage. Even if
challenger women win primary elections, they are unable to combat the incumbency advan-
tage in the general election. However, as incumbents move into retirement, this study posits
186
women should be able to take their places at an increasing rate.
In fact, we are already starting to see this influx of women onto state supreme court
benches. At the onset of this project in 2015, only seven states had women as a majority on
the bench and women made up less than 40% of the state supreme court in a vast majority of
states. The state with the highest percentage of women was Washington (at 66% women) and
there were two states, Iowa and Indiana, that had no women on the bench. As of August
2017, women make up the majority of state supreme courts in 12 states with Wisconsin
having the highest percentage of the bench being women (71.42%). Only one state, Iowa,
has all men on the court and 27 states have fewer than 40% representation of women on the
court. This is a tremendous improvement in the number of women on state supreme courts.
Given the number of women elected and appointed within this short, two-year time span, we
should see even more women gain access to the highest court as current incumbents reach
retirement. If future studies confirm these findings, it is possible potential women will run
in elections in even greater numbers without fearing systematic gender discrimination at the
polls.
Related to this, given incumbent women generally draw more challengers in nonpartisan
states, it is possible that, as more women gain access to the bench, there will be an influx
of primary challengers. This would lead to more competitive races, particularly in Election-
Runoff states. Changes in laws around judicial races and an influx of campaign money have
already begun raising judicial elections out of obscurity in the minds of voters. An increase
in competition, and especially competitive races, may continue to raise the profile of judicial
elections. This may have the effect of increasing voter knowledge, turnout, and ultimately,
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increasing the quality of judge as they must gain active support from a majority of the
population.
In a similar vein, trends in judicial election competitiveness based on primary typology
type may mirror those present in state legislative elections. In many respects, state legislative
elections are similar to judicial elections in that there is a high percentage of uncontested
incumbents and voter knowledge is generally low. Even when there is an abundance of
information about the candidate, their partisan views, and their background, state legislative
elections are often unstudied by voters who suffer ballot fatigue once they make decisions in
the big elections on the ballot.
Further Research and Next Steps
Of course this is just the tip of the iceberg concerning the effects of judicial primary
elections. In the grand scheme of the electoral cycle, candidate emergence and the primary
election are just the first two critical junctures in what is ultimately a longer journey. Here,
I investigate the decision to run for election, the first critical juncture, and when how women
do in the primary election. This is just the first brush at a largely unknown topic. Further
research on this topic can, and should, include exploring the connection between the primary
election and the general election.
There are many untested hypotheses concerning the role of campaign finance and the
critical junctures. Although there is current research about the role of money in judicial
general elections, there lacks an investigation of when that money is raised and if it is more
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beneficial to raise money before or after the primary election. It is possible that a bulk of the
money for a judicial election is raised relatively early, or that candidates raise only what they
think they need to win the primary election and then do the largest fund-raising after the
primary election. Knowing when candidates raise money and how that impacts their chances
of winning the primary election and, ultimately, the general election, will change how scholars
study judicial and primary elections. An investigation of who donates to judicial primary
campaigns could also reveal some of the many intricacies of the election process (Baum and
Klein 2007). It is possible that high profile donors start contributing to campaigns before
the filing date and this may have a deterrent effect on challengers.
Overall, there is a lot that is still unknown and there are many potential next steps
using these data on primary elections. Taking any of these avenues would greatly advance
knowledge about judicial elections and may unravel some of the mysteries concerning why
the incumbent advantage is so strong, or what is at work when an incumbent loses election.
The next step to continue this specific investigation to wait for more time to pass. Despite
using data for 26 years, missing observations of certain variables like the money raised and
the number of lawyers in each state, limits the overall n-size in all of the models. The next
steps to improve the chapters as written would be to compile archival data within campaign
finance records or find other ways to increase the number of observations, such as gathering
data further back in time to account for the 1980s. Going backwards presents problem in
that there were few women on the courts prior to the 1990s, mostly due to institutional
bias. In the 1980s, women were just beginning to be appointed to the state supreme court
in most states. Therefore, any attempt to continue study on the route women take to sit on
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the state supreme court must either study different questions and parts of the electoral cycle
or simply wait until more time has passed, more elections have been held, and more women
are in the system. A re-evaluation of the same hypotheses held 10 years in the future may
reveal more significant relationships.
Moving away from judicial elections, two of the typology types, Always Held Partisan
Elections and Challenger Based Partisan Elections, also occur in state and national legislative
elections. There are relatively few primary election observations when only looking at the
judicial branch, but expanding questions on challenger emergence to the legislative arena
and opening the study to all 50 state legislatures, would provide more evidence for some of
the hypotheses tested in this work.
My interests, however, lie in the role of the news media at each stage of the electoral
cycle. Right now, lack of accessible and digitized news archives prevent me from compiling a
dataset containing positive, neutral, and negative mentions of each candidate prior to each
critical juncture in the election cycle. It is likely that good or bad press can serve as either
an invitation or a deterrent to potential challengers prior to the filing date. Additionally, the
presence, or lack, of news coverage could be instrumental in explaining why some candidates
win and others lose (Coate 2004). When looking at media, news coverage can be an example
of unplanned coverage because the candidate his/herself is unable to control exactly when
or what will be covered.
The influence of unplanned media, or traditional news journalism, combined with planned
media, or advertising, can also paint a picture of the environment surrounding each juncture
of a judicial election cycle. To follow in the footsteps of Hall (2014b) and Ansolabehere, Behr,
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and Iyengar (1991), there are likely answers hidden in the amount and type of advertising
employed at the primary and general elections. There are likely differences in the number
and tone of advertisements at the different junctures. These variations are likely visible
and differentiate partisan and nonpartisan elections due to the different audiences they must
mobilize. The timing of this planned media will influence the perceptions of voters and may
change the outcome of the election (Stone et al. 2013; Wei and Lo 2007).
For me, this initial study about the types of primary elections, challenger emergence, and
the ways women move through the primary election process is the first step to eventually
adding the role of the media, both planned and unplanned, to the scholarly understanding
of the judicial election cycle.
Final Thoughts
Generally speaking, scholars study either primary elections or general elections. There
are few works that merge the two elections together to describe a complete cycle. Although
this work does not describe the entire election cycle, it does lay the groundwork and provides
a theory for how the elections differ and influence one another. Ultimately, knowledge of
the forces at work in the primary election sheds light on the context of the general elections.
As researchers continue to study the primary election, not just as an isolated event but
one sprint in a greater marathon, knowledge about the general election will increase. It is
possible many of the less understood scientific results about general elections have their roots
in the primary elections.
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Although many of the hypotheses presented here are specific to judicial elections and their
workings, the Dynamic Election Phase Model (Figure 4.2) is relevant to all elections in the
United States, and in other countries with a two-election system. Additionally, the typology
of differences in primary elections describes many primary systems in state legislative elec-
tions or municipal elections. The theory and typology can be applied to any other statewide
election in order to understand forces at work. There are many questions left to answer
concerning how candidates emerge in the primary and general election for other statewide
and municipal offices. Research about the earlier critical junctures, as well as a knowledge
of the different types of primary elections will shed light on previously understudied parts
of statewide and municipal elections. This study lays the groundwork in combining the two
studies of primary elections and judicial elections. It is my hope that scholars continue to
build and improve upon this foundation as they study the effects of not only judicial primary
elections, but also other statewide and municipal elections.
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Appendix A: Data Codebook
Table A1: Data Codebook
Variable Title Description
Election Year Year of the election observation.
State Name of the state.
Seat The number of the seat as listed on the ballot. Note- Not
all states assign numbers to each seat. In these cases, I
added numbers to distinguish elections occurring at the
same time in the same state/year.
Primary Dichotomous Variable that reflects if this election was a
primary or general election. 1= primary 0= general
Partisan Dichotomous variable that reflects if the election had
partisan labels on the ballot. 1= partisan 0= nonparti-
san. Some states have a partisan primary and nonpar-
tisan general elections.
Partisan Party In states with partisan primaries, this is a categorical
variable that reflects which party’s election this is. 1
= Republican, 2= Democrat, 9= Both Parties Repre-
sented, . = N/A
Name of Candidate (1-8) The first and last name of the candidate in the elec-
tion. In elections with an incumbent, the incumbent is
always listed first, in open seat elections, the first listed
on the ballot is first. .= No candidate of that number
in the election. Most elections have no more than two
candidates, but some go as high as 8. Information on
all candidates comes from publicly available sources on
the internet.
Candidate 1 Incumbency Dichotomous variable indicating if candidate 1 is an in-
cumbent. 1= Incumbent, 0= Not Incumbent
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Title Description
Candidate political party Categorical variable reflecting the party of the candi-
date. 1= Republican, 2= Democrat, 3= Libertarian,
4= Green, 8= Other, .=Not applicable
Candidate Gender Dichotomous variable indicating if candidate is female.
1= female, 0= male
Candidate Race Categorical variable indicating the race/ethnicity of can-
didate. 1= White, 2= Black, 3= Hispanic, 4= Asian,
5= Native American, .= Unknown
Law School of Candidate (1-8) String variable. The name of the law school attended
by the candidate.
Law School Ranking (1-8) Categorical ranking of law schools based on ranking
listed in the US News and World Report Law School
Rankings 2016. 1= 1-15, 2= 16-50, 3= 51-100, 4= 101-
150, 5= 150+, 6= Unranked, 7= No Law School, .=
Unknown
Female Incumbent Dichotomous variable indicating if the incumbent is a
woman. 1= yes, 0= no
Female Challenger Dichotomous variable indicating if there are any female
challengers. 1= yes, 0= no
Open Seat Election Dichotomous variable indicating if the election was for
an open seat. 1= yes, 0= no
Incumbent Won Dichotomous variable indicating if the incumbent won
the election. 1= incumbent won, 0= incumbent lost, or
no incumbent.
Challenger Present Dichotomous variable conveying the presence of a chal-
lenger. 1= Challenger present, 0= Uncontested election.
Number of Winning Candi-
dates
Variable indicating the number of candidates who “win”
or advance to the next election. Note - in some cases
(Pennsylvania and Michigan), two candidates can win
the final election because the election is for two seats.
Candidate Vote Share (1-8) Electoral vote share of the candidate. Written as a per-
centage (54.51% = 54.51).
Continued on next page
194
Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Title Description
Filing Date Filing date to be on the electoral ballot. This is written
in MMDDYYYY format.
Election Type Categorical variable summarizing the previous 7 vari-
ables. 1= May General Election with Runoff, 2= May
General Election without Runoff, 3= Runoff, 4= Gen-
eral Election without a Primary, 5= Primary Election
followed by General Election, 6= General Election fol-
lowing a Primary Election, and 7= Post-November Elec-
tion Runoff.
Number of Candidates Variable describing the total number of candidates in
the election.
Date of Election Date of the election in MMDDYYYY format.
Off-Year Elections Dichotomous variable that indicates if it was an off-year
election (odd-year elections). 1= off-year election, 0=
Standard election.
Off-Cycle Election Dichotomous variable that indicates if it was an elec-
tion at a non-standard time (elections held in Spring
with primaries in Winter, for example). 1= off-cycle
elections, 0= Standard cycle election
Candidate Elected in Primary Candidate elected in the primary (meaning there is no
general election for that seat). Dichotomous variable.
1= Candidate elected in primary, 0= Candidate elected
in general election.
Prior General Election Vote
Share
Candidate 1’s vote share in the previous election. Can-
didate 1 is always the incumbent, so it is the only candi-
date with a possibility for a prior election result. Vari-
able is written as a percentage, and open seat elections,
or primaries without an incumbent are coded as 0.
Prior Opposition in General
Election
Dichotomous variable indicating if candidate 1 had op-
position in their previous general election. Variable is 0
if the incumbent has been appointed since the previous
election, and in open seat elections. 1= Prior opposition
present, 0= No prior opposition.
Continued on next page
195
Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Title Description
Prior Primary Vote Share Candidate 1’s vote share in prior primary elections. As
candidate 1 is always the incumbent, they are the only
ones with prior vote share. Variable is coded as a per-
centage, and is 0 if the candidate did not have to sit in
a primary or if they were appointed since the last elec-
tion. Candidates who were not challenged, and therefore
did not have to sit in an election are coded as 0, while
uncontested challengers who did sit in an election are
coded as 100.
Prior Past Opposition in Gen-
eral Election
Dichotomous variable indicating if candidate 1 had op-
position in the prior primary election. 1= Candidate
had prior opposition, 0= Candidate did not have oppo-
sition in the previous primary.
Appointed Dichotomous variable indicating if candidate 1 was ever
appointed (regardless of when). 1= Appointed, 0= Not
appointed
Term Length Length of judicial term (in years).
Elected in District Dichotomous variable indicating if the judge is elected
at the district level (as opposed to the statewide level).
1= District election, 0= Statewide election.
Only Open Seat Elections Pennsylvania only has open seat elections. Dichotomous
variable indicating that there are no incumbents in that
state’s data. 1= Only open seat elections, 0= Incum-
bents elected.
Candidate Financial Contri-
butions
Donations made to that particular candidate (1-8) in
that election (only). Data reported in raw dollar
amounts.
Total Cycle Contributions by
Candidate
Donations made to candidate during the entire electoral
cycle (both primary and general elections). Data re-
ported in raw dollar amounts.
Total Cycle Contributions Total contributions to all candidates for the entire elec-
toral cycle. Data is reported in raw dollar amounts.
Total Election Contributions Total contributions to all candidates for the single elec-
tion. Data is reported in raw dollar amounts.
Continued on next page
196
Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Title Description
Lawyers Lagged Number of lawyers in the state the previous year. Data
only goes back to 1996.
Murder Rate Lagged Murder rate for the previous year in that state. Re-
ported as a rate per 100,000 residents of the state.
Violent Crime Rate Lagged Violent crime rate for the previous year in that state.
Reported a rate per 100,000 residents of the state.
Primary Openness Categorical variable describing the openness of the pri-
mary. Closed means voters must be a registered member
of the party to vote; partially closed means voters must
be registered voters, but parties may choose each elec-
tion whether to allow unaffiliated voters or not; partially
open is when voters have the option to choose which pri-
mary but must do so publicly or their vote is regarded
as a form of registration to the party; open to unaffili-
ated voters means unaffiliated voters may choose which
primary to vote in, but affiliated voters cannot cross
over; open means all voters can chose to vote in either
primary. 1= Closed, 2= Partially Closed, 3= Partially
Open, 4= Open to Unaffiliated, 5= Open, 6= Top Two.
Total Number of Seats Count of the number of state supreme court seats.
Typology: Always-Held Parti-
san
Primary typology variable. Dichotomous variable indi-
cating if this state uses the Always-Held Partisan Pri-
mary. 1= Always Held Partisan Primary, 0= Other type
of primary.
Typology: Challenger-Based
Partisan
Primary typology variable. Dichotomous variable indi-
cating if this state uses the Challenger-Based Partisan
Primary. 1= Challenger-Based Partisan Primary, 0=
Other type of primary.
Typology: Election-Runoff Primary typology variable. Dichotomous variable indi-
cating if this state uses the Election-Runoff Primary. 1=
Election-Runoff, 0= Other type of primary.
Typology: Always-Held Non-
partisan Primary
Primary typology variable. Dichotomous variable in-
dicating if this state uses the Always-Held Nonparti-
san Primary. 1= Always-Held Nonpartisan Primary, 0=
Other type of primary.
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Title Description
Typology: Challenger-Based
Nonpartisan Primary
Primary typology variable. Dichotomous variable indi-
cating if this state uses the Challenger-Based Nonpar-
tisan Primary. 1= Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Pri-
mary, 0= Other type of primary.
Typology: Odd Primary typology variable. Dichotomous variable indi-
cating if this state has an unusual primary system. 1=
Odd, 0= Other type of primary.
Typology Categorical variable combining all of the different
primary types. 1= Always-Held Partisan Primary,
2= Challenger-Based Partisan Primary, 3= Election-
Runoff, 4= Always-Held Nonpartisan Primary, 5=
Challenger-Based Nonpartisan Primary, 6= Odd.
Party of Governor Categorical variable describing the party allegiance of
the sitting governor. 1= Republican, 2= Democrat, 3=
Other.
Presidential Vote Democrat Percentage of that state’s vote for the Democrat candi-
date in the prior presidential election.
Presidential Vote Republican Percentage of the state’s vote for the Republican candi-
date in the prior presidential election.
Democrat Dominated State State has a Democrat Governor and more than 50% of
citizens voted for the Democrat candidate in the prior
presidential election.
Republican Dominated State State has a Republican Governor and more than 50% of
citizens voted for the Republican candidate in the prior
presidential election.
Split State The state’s governor is of a different party than the one
the citizens voted for in the prior presidential election.
Newly Appointed The incumbent was appointed since the previous elec-
tion. 1= Newly appointed incumbent, 0= Experienced
incumbent, NA= Not an incumbent.
Skipped Prior Primary Candidate did not have a challenger in the prior primary
election and the state did not hold a primary election.
1= Candidate skipped the prior primary election, 0=
Candidate did not skip prior primary, NA = Candidate
was not eligible for the prior primary.
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Title Description
Competitive Election Vote Share percentage difference between the winning
and losing candidate.
High Quality Challenger Dichotomous variable indicating if the challenger went
to a higher ranked law school than the incumbent. 1=
Challenger went to a higher ranked law school, 0= In-
cumbent went to a higher ranked law school.
I collected most of the data in Table A1: Data Codebook by going to each state’s
Secretary of State or Election Commission website and searching for archival data. Many
states had complete records of primary elections going back to 1990 and earlier. For the
states that did not have the complete record online, I called the office of the Secretary of
State. In many instances the Elections Division could email me copies of the data or could
direct me to the office or department that would have the data. I got much of the missing
data in this fashion. I also used a Twitter account to “tweet” at the state’s Secretary of
State office. This was often successful when I could not get through on the phones or email.
In cases where the Elections Division did not have the data on-hand, I used interlibrary
loan to request Legislative “Blue Books” or legislative manuals. These are biannual books
published by each state’s legislature that act as a state-level government almanac. Although
many states no longer publish these books, I was often able to find archival copies online or
in university libraries. In these cases, I requested the books through interlibrary loan and
copied the relevant pages. Using these tactics, I was able to get official electoral data for
all but three primary elections. To get these last three elections, I personally visited the
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Alabama State Archives to obtain official election results.
Campaign finance variables were provided by the National Institute for Money in State
politics. I downloaded all campaign finance records for all state supreme court candidates
with competitive elections. This produced datasets where every contribution was listed
individually. To get total primary election contribution I added up all contributions from
the first until the date of the primary election. Likewise, I added up all contributions from
the day after the primary election through the end of the year to get the total contributions
for the general election. I included the dates after the general election through the end of
the year because all candidates, winners and losers, still solicit contributions as they balance
their campaign books. I was unable to obtain dates of contributions for Montana, just
amounts. Therefore, candidates in Montana do not have financial data associated with their
campaigns.
I obtained candidate demographic data by searching the web for official campaign web-
sites, alumni association references, business websites, state and national bar association
listings, and obituaries. In so doing I was able to identify gender, race, and law school for
all but a few of the candidates in my dataset. The remainder of the variables either describe
the electoral system present in the state, or are from publicly available sources online.
All data manipulation and analysis was done using R (2017) in RStudio (2015). In order
to accomplish the data cleaning, shaping, and analysis I used many packages written for
statistical analysis and data transformation in R. These are: dplyr (Wickham et al. 2017);
psych (Revelle 2017); gmodels (Warnes et al. N.d.); ggplot2 (Wickham 2009); stargazer
(Hlavac 2015); MASS (Venables and Ripley 2002); lme4 (Bates et al. 2015); lmtest (Zeileis
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and Hothorn 2002); sampleSelection (Toomet and Henningsen 2008); plm (Croissant and
Millo 2008); nlme (Pinheiro et al. 2017); reshape2 (Wickham 2007).
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Appendix B: Explanation of Models
I utilize many different methods to establish relationships about when challengers emerge,
when they win, and how women pass through, or are stymied by, the primary system. While
I will explain the models as I present the results, here is an overview of the different statistical
tests used most often and why those tests are appropriate for the format of the data and the
hypotheses tested.
First, I often use the Chi-Square test of independence in order to determine if there is a
relationship between categorical or dichotomous variables. Many of these contingency tables
in the dissertation are not significant, but are still important as they debunk commonly
assumed hypotheses. Second, I also use multivariate regression to establish causal relation-
ships between dependent and independent variables. Due to the long time frame and the
differences between the states in the rules and institutions shaping the primary election, I
often use multilevel models. These multilevel models account for the longitudinal time scope
of the data as well as the differences between primary institutions in the states. To do this,
I generally set the year as a fixed effect, which is in line with methodological research done
by Hedeker and Gibbons (2006) and prior research on judicial elections (Bonneau and Hall
2009; Streb and Frederick 2008).
I also use mixed models and multilevel logistic regressions in order to account for the
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effects of year, state, and race on the the emergence of candidates and vote share. Generally,
the models have fixed effects for year and typology category. In chapter five, some models
are tested using a candidate-centered dataset, which is derived from the original dataset.
It is reorganized such that each candidate, incumbents and challengers alike, represent an
observation. In contrast, the election-centered dataset is organized around the race. When
testing hypotheses using the candidate-centered dataset, I add random effects by indicator
representing the individual election race order to account for the nonindependence of election
vote share within each race.6 Within each election, candidate vote shares can only add up
to 100%. If one candidate gets 55%, then all other candidates can cumulatively attain no
more than 45% of the vote share. Accounting for election race variable accounts for this
systematic nonindependence by linking all of the candidates in one race together despite
being entered in the dataset as separate observations.
The sample sizes present in these models may present a problem when it comes to ob-
taining biased coefficients. The theory and math behind multilevel modeling was built using
large-n, or big data studies to ensure accuracy. An example of these big data may be a
medical study with thousands of patients, or an education study with tens of thousands
of students (Bryk and Raudenbush 1987). Even when grouped into regions, hospitals, or
schools, each group contains many observations. Scholarly and statistical understanding of
these models have increased in recent years, but small-n studies may still result in biased
estimates (Raudenbush and Bryk 2001; Theall et al. 2011). Although every effort has been
made to gather the most complete data possible, the analyses in this work are limited by the
6Random effects by race are not significant in any model.
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small number of primary election observations in each state from 1990-2016. This is further
confounded by the small number of open seat primary elections, primary elections with an
incumbent, or primary elections with a female candidate. Models run on only these subsets
of data are unavoidably small and may experience more bias in the estimates.
Multilevel models are complex in many ways. One such way has to do with how obser-
vations are organized into groups and the effect of omitted variables on the results of the
model. Random effects in the models control for variations by allowing the intercept and/or
slope vary per group (Finch, Bolin, and Kelley 2014; Steenbergen, Jones, and Steenbergen
2000). While fixed effect models do not make any assumptions about the relationship of any
variables unaccounted for (Williams 2017), random effect models assume that any unmea-
sured variables are completely independent from observed variables (Williams 2017). This
adds additional bias to the coefficients that is not necessarily present in fixed effect models.
However, despite this bias, random effects models are better capable to measure the effects
of variables that do not change over time. Even with the additional bias, random effects may
be preferable in some cases where data are complex, and when including a covariate with no
within-unit variation (Clark and Linzer 2015). One example of this could be the electoral
system types (Clark and Linzer 2015).
One way to determine if the random effects model introduces too much bias into the
coefficients is to run a Hausman test (Hausman 1978). This test detects violation of the
assumptions random effects models make. A significant finding after comparing the two
models reveals that there is significant difference between the fixed effect and the random
effect models. In these cases the fixed effect model is preferred. Scholars can also use the
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likelihood ratio test, which accomplishes the same thing (Kim, Anderson, and Keller 2013;
Klein 2008).7
Random effects in the models control for variations at the typology level (Finch, Bolin,
and Kelley 2014; Steenbergen, Jones, and Steenbergen 2000). Most research on the subject
of elections and judicial elections sets random effects at the state level. I use the typology for
several reasons. First, states occasionally change their election systems for judicial elections.
It is not uncommon for states to switch from partisan to nonpartisan elections nor is it
uncommon for states to change the rules about primary elections, as Washington and West
Virginia have done. Both states remained either nonpartisan or partisan, respectively, but
changed primary systems to require more challengers before having a primary election. This
led to the immediate reduction in the number of primary elections in those states. Random
effects at the state level cannot distinguish the effects of typology differences and elections
may change when the institutional rules surrounding them are altered.
Because typology type is highly correlated to state, the models produced are very similar.
Admittedly, the typology models perform only marginally better than the state models—
when the two types of models do not produce the exact same results. ANOVA tests on the
models reveal few, if any, differences in using random effects by state or typology (as seen
in Table B1 and Table B2). Therefore, it makes theoretical sense to set random effects at
the typology in order to account for states that change their system of judicial elections.
In the future, as more states change their electoral systems, it may be more critical to
account for the typology rather than the state itself. Tables B1 and B2 show the ANOVA
7I use the likelihood ratio test in order to determine the best model. This is because the R package that
I used to generate my models Bates et al. (2015), does not allow for a Hausman (Hausman 1978) test (Kim,
Anderson, and Keller 2013).
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test for incumbent vote share and open seat vote share (Zuur et al. 2011). Other models
differentiated at the typology or state level perform similarly with any differences leaning
one way or the other being insignificant.
Table B1: ANOVA on Incumbent Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
AIC BIC Log Likelihood
Typology 1 21 377.9822 412.917 -167.9911
State 2 21 377.9822 412.917 -167.9911
Table B2: ANOVA on Open Seat Candidate Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
AIC BIC Log Likelihood
Typology 1 22 1240.411 1306.937 -598.2058
State 2 22 1240.411 1306.937 -598.2058
While models with fixed effects estimate a separate coefficient for each variable, or group,
random effects use data from other cases to create estimates. Random effect models do not
reveal differences between the different groups, but they do account for differences in the
intercept of the model by group. By using random effects by typology, I do not test the
effect of the differing typologies in many of the hypotheses. Instead, I use the typology as
a substitute for state-level variance. By grouping race types into the typology, I account
for differences between the election systems without testing hypotheses about the effects of
those systems. As seen in Tables B1 and B2, models with random effects at the typology
206
perform equivalently against models with random effects at the state level.
However it is possible that these variables are measuring different things. One way to test
that is to combine random effects by state with fixed effects of typology type. This gives the
typology a coefficient while also determining different intercepts for each state to account for
this variation. Table B3 shows the output, including the random effects, of placing random
effects at state with fixed effects of typology. Here we see that the state accounts for no
variation once typology effects are added into the model.
To further strengthen this analysis, models that include fixed effects for the typology
perform better than models with random effects for state. This suggests that controlling for
the typology is sufficient for understanding state level effects. Table B4 shows an example of
one model run with random effects at the state level or including fixed effects at the typology
level.
ANOVA tests reveal that including fixed effects for typology without and random effects
is a slightly better model than including random effects for state. This suggests that the
typology is a slightly better way to understand and account for differences in judicial primary
elections better than state identification. This is shown in Table B5. Once the fixed effects
of the typology are accounted for, including the state does not improve the model estimates.
Finally, a likelihood ratio test shows that the random effects models add a significant amount
of bias to the estimates. In this particular case, the fixed effect model with typology is the
best. All of these models reveal that controlling for the election institutions is a good
substitute for understanding differences between the states. Continued use of the typology
to test hypotheses about the effects of the different primary election mechanism has the
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Table B3: Challenger Emergence Model with Random Effects at State and Fixed Effects for
Typology in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Challenger
New Appointee −13.612∗∗∗
(5.148)
Term Length 1.867∗∗
(0.727)
Prior Primary Vote Share −0.065∗∗∗
(0.025)
Prior General Vote Share −0.174∗∗
(0.071)
Incumbent Law School Ranking −0.514
(0.430)
Number of Lawyers (log) 1.678
(1.141)
Murder Rate (log) −2.324
(2.724)
Partisan Control: Republican 10.966∗∗
(4.503)
Partisan Control: Split 2.400
(2.780)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Typology: CBP 4.301∗
(2.407)
Typology: ERO 6.237
(4.066)
Constant −16.907
(14.575)
Random Effect
# of States 8
State Standard Deviation 0
Observations 86
Log Likelihood −25.794
Akaike Inf. Crit. 97.589
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 154.039
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
208
Table B4: Comparison of Challenger Emergence Models in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Challenger
(Random Effects State) (Fixed Effects Typology)
New Appointee −9.497∗∗∗ −13.612∗∗∗
(3.517) (5.148)
Term Length 1.309∗∗∗ 1.867∗∗
(0.457) (0.727)
Prior Primary Vote Share −0.054∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.025)
Prior General Vote Share −0.114∗∗ −0.174∗∗
(0.047) (0.071)
Incumbent Law School Prestige −0.306 −0.514
(0.348) (0.430)
Number of Lawyers (log) 0.010 1.678
(0.537) (1.141)
Murder Rate (log) 2.090 −2.324
(1.499) (2.724)
Partisan Control: Republican 6.464∗∗ 10.966∗∗
(2.838) (4.503)
Partisan Control: Split 0.084 2.400
(2.065) (2.780)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Typology: CBP 4.301∗
(2.407)
Typology: ERO 6.237
(4.066)
Constant −7.079 −16.907
(8.161) (14.575)
Random Effect
# of States 8
State Standard Deviation .0003
Observations 86 86
Log Likelihood −27.957 −25.794
Akaike Inf. Crit. 97.913 97.589
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 149.455 154.039
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B5: ANOVA on Challenger Emergence Models in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
AIC BIC
Log
Likelihood
Chi-
Squared
Pr
State:
Random
1 21 97.913 149.46 -27.957
Typology:
Fixed
2 22 95.589 149.58 -25.794 4.3247 0.038∗
ability to greatly increase our understanding of the role of the primary election as a step on
the path to winning office.
One way to determine if the random effects model introduces too much bias into the
coefficients is to run a Hausman test (Hausman 1978). This tests detects violation of the
assumptions random effects models make. A significant finding after comparing the two
models reveals that there is significant difference between the fixed effect and the random
effect models. In these cases the fixed effect model is preferred. Scholars can also use the
likelihood ratio test, which accomplishes the same thing (Kim, Anderson, and Keller 2013;
Klein 2008). I use the likelihood ratio test in order to determine the best model. This is
because the R package that I used to generate my models lme4 (Bates et al. 2015), does
not allow for a Hausman (1978) test (Kim, Anderson, and Keller 2013). Likelihood ratio
tests work the same way in that it detects which model has less bias in the coefficients.
After running likelihood ratio tests, I found that running models with fixed effects at year
and typology produced the best estimates. However, both the models with fixed effects at
typology and random effects are remarkably similar and there are not any large changes in
which variables are significant. This stability suggests the models are all very close.
Table B6 shows the side by side models with fixed and random effects at typology for
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Table B6: Emergence of a Challenger in Partisan Judicial Primaries
Dependent variable:
Challenger
Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2)
Newly Appointed −9.227∗∗∗ −9.497∗∗∗
(3.569) (3.517)
Term Length 1.353∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.457)
Prior Primary Vote Share −0.037 −0.037
(0.025) (0.024)
Prior General Vote Share −0.118∗∗ −0.114∗∗
(0.052) (0.047)
Incumbent Law School Prestige −0.317 −0.306
(0.345) (0.348)
# Lawyers (log) 0.508 0.010
(0.978) (0.537)
Murder Rate (log) 0.464 2.090
(2.432) (1.499)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Partisan Control: Republican 7.541∗ 6.464∗∗
(3.991) (2.839)
Partisan Control: Split 1.274 0.084
(2.623) (2.065)
Typology: CBP 3.177
(2.169)
Typology: ERO 2.064
(3.554)
Constant −10.992 −7.079
(13.837) (8.162)
Random Effects
# Typology Groups 3
Typology Variance 0
Observations 86 86
Log Likelihood −29.333 −27.957
AIC 102.667 97.913
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B7: Likelihood Ratio Test: Emergence of Challenger in Partisan Judicial Primaries
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Log
Likelihood
Chi-
Squared
Pr
Typology:
Fixed
1 21 -29.333
Typology:
Random
2 22 -30.689 2.7111 0.099
partisan incumbents attracting a challenger. Table B7 shows the results of the likelihood
ratio test. Here, typology random effects do not introduce significant bias. As they had no
effect, I used the typology fixed effects for this model.
Table B8 shows the side by side models with random effects at state and no random
effects when Election-Runoff systems attract a challenger. Table B9 shows the results of the
likelihood ratio test. Here, state random effects do not introduce significant bias. I used the
model with state random effects.
Table B10 shows models of candidate vote share for all candidates in the candidate
centered dataset. One model has random effects at race nested under typology. The other
has random effects at just election race. Table B11 shows the likelihood ratio test showing
the model with random effects at typology introduces significant bias.
Table B12 shows models of candidate vote share for open seat candidates in the candidate
centered dataset. One model has random effects at race nested under typology. The other
has random effects at just election race. Table B13 shows the likelihood ratio test showing
the model with random effects at typology introduces significant bias. Neither model nests
election because incumbents do not face each other.
Table B14 shows models of candidate vote share for incumbents in the candidate centered
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Table B8: Emergence of a Challenger in the First Election: Judicial Primaries in Election-
Runoff Systems
Dependent variable:
Challenger
Random Effect State No Random Effects
(1) (2)
Newly Appointed −2.405∗ −2.421∗
(1.306) (1.239)
Term Length 0.502 0.344
(0.753) (0.535)
Vote Share Prior Primary −0.016 −0.019∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Incumbent Law School Prestige 0.184 0.245
(0.260) (0.248)
# Lawyers (log) 0.782 0.752
(0.780) (0.508)
Murder Rate (log) −0.715 −0.780
(1.424) (0.939)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant −9.448 −7.540
(9.121) (6.505)
Random Effects
# of States 6
State Variance 0.745
State Std. Dev. 0.863
Observations 76 76
Log Likelihood −37.363 −38.419
Akaike Inf. Crit. 110.727 110.837
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B9: Likelihood Ratio Test: Emergence of Challenger in Judicial ERO Primaries
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Log
Likelihood
Chi-
Squared
Pr
State:
Random
1 17 -38.419
Fixed 2 18 -37.363 2.113 0.146
dataset. One model has random effects at race nested under typology. The other has random
effects at just election race. Table B15 shows the likelihood ratio test showing the model
with random effects at typology introduces significant bias. Neither model nests election
because incumbents do not face each other.
Table B16 shows models of candidate winning for all candidates in the candidate centered
dataset. One model does not include typology. The other has fixed effects at typology.
Table B17 shows the ANOVA test showing the model with fixed effects at typology is not
significantly different.
Table B18 shows models of candidate winning for challengers in the candidate centered
dataset. One model does not include typology while other has fixed effects at typology.
Table B19 shows the ANOVA test showing the model with fixed effects at typology is not
significantly different from the one without typology.
Table B20 shows models of candidate winning for open seat candidates in the candidate
centered dataset. One model does not include typology while other has fixed effects at
typology. Table B21 shows the ANOVA test showing the model with fixed effects at typology
is not significantly different from the one without typology.
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Table B10: Model of All Candidate Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
voteshare
linear linear
mixed effects mixed-effects
(1) (2)
Incumbent 21.107∗∗∗ 21.089∗∗∗
(1.865) (1.867)
Financial Advantage (log) −0.500∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.139)
Total # Candidates −6.829∗∗∗ −6.683∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.487)
Vote Share Prior Election −0.047∗∗ −0.050∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Female Candidate 1.815 1.976
(3.187) (3.189)
Any Female Challenger −1.665 −1.842
(1.591) (1.607)
Difference in Law School Rank 0.527 0.519
(0.340) (0.342)
Murder Rate (log) 0.631 0.919
(1.320) (1.359)
# of Lawyers (log) 0.927 1.120
(0.697) (0.769)
Typology: AHP −3.680
(3.431)
Typology: CBN −9.622∗∗∗
(3.156)
Typology: CBP −5.245
(3.456)
Typology: ERO −5.474∗
(2.969)
Female Candidate * Female Challenger 1.153 1.198
(3.643) (3.647)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 59.028∗∗∗ 61.411∗∗∗
(7.791) (7.668)
Random Effects
# Typology Groups 6
Typology Std.Dev. 2.498
# Elections 150 150
Election Std.Dev. 0.001 0.0
Observations 345 345
Log Likelihood −1,270.517 −1,256.354
AIC 2,589.034 2,568.707
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B11: Likelihood Ratio Test: All Candidate Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Log
Likelihood
Chi-
Squared
Pr
Typology:
Random
1 24 -1270.5
Typology:
Fixed
2 28 -1256.3 28.327 0.000
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Table B12: Model of Open Seat Candidate Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Vote Share
Random Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
Financial Advantage (log) −0.299 −0.289
(0.180) (0.190)
Total # Candidates −7.413∗∗∗ −7.321∗∗∗
(0.650) (0.707)
Female Candidate 1.074 2.851
(10.387) (10.812)
Female Challenger −0.992 −1.229
(2.083) (2.177)
Difference in Law School Prestige 0.809 0.943∗
(0.498) (0.514)
Murder Rate (log) 0.635 1.893
(1.895) (2.164)
# Lawyers (log) 1.910∗∗ 3.100∗∗
(0.949) (1.330)
Typology: AHP −6.307
(4.798)
Typology: CBN −5.160
(4.606)
Typology: CBP −7.435
(5.029)
Typology: ERO −5.620
(3.857)
Female Candidate * Female Challenger 1.089 −0.814
(10.592) (11.048)
Year Fixed Effect Included
Constant 47.436∗∗∗ 38.694∗∗∗
(9.019) (12.116)
Random Effects
# Typology Categories 5
Typology Std.Dev. 0.0004
# Elections 66 66
Election Std.Dev. 0.001 0.0
Observations 171 171
Log Likelihood −598.206 −588.900
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,240.412 1,227.801
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B13: Likelihood Ratio Test: Open Seat Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Log
Likelihood
Chi-
Squared
Pr
Typology:
Random
1 22 -598.21
Typology:
Fixed
2 25 -588.90 18.611 0.000
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Table B14: Model of Incumbent Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Vote Share
Random Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
Financial Advantage (log) −0.016 0.544
(1.131) (1.114)
Total # Candidates −10.981∗∗∗ −10.241∗∗∗
(1.792) (1.752)
Vote Prior General Election 0.128∗∗ 0.078
(0.053) (0.053)
Female Candidate 2.927 2.508
(3.120) (2.991)
Any Female Challenger −6.831 −7.395∗
(4.339) (4.246)
Difference in Law School Prestige −1.247 −0.942
(0.839) (0.855)
Murder Rate (log) −4.314 −4.086
(3.069) (3.157)
# Lawyers (log) 1.676 4.695∗∗
(1.496) (1.811)
Typology: AHP −28.603∗∗∗
(9.914)
Typology: CBN −19.618∗∗
(9.173)
Typology: CBP −21.856∗∗
(9.243)
Typology: ERO −19.862∗∗
(8.333)
Female Candidate * Female Challenger 4.116 2.424
(7.465) (7.740)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 68.339∗∗∗ 54.343∗∗∗
(16.775) (18.388)
Random Effects
# Typology Groups 5
Typology Std.Dev. 0.001
Observations 57 57
R2 0.734
Adjusted R2 0.574
Log Likelihood −167.991
AIC 375.982
Residual Std. Error 8.871 (df = 35)
F Statistic 4.589∗∗∗ (df = 21; 35)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
219
Table B15: Likelihood Ratio Test: Incumbent Vote Share in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Log
Likelihood
Chi-
Squared
Pr
Typology:
Random
1 20 -167.99
Typology:
Fixed
2 23 -191.40 46.812 0.000
Table B16: Logit When Any Candidate Wins in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Winning
(1) (2)
Incumbent 3.019∗∗∗ 3.092∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.490)
Financial Advantage (log) −0.031 −0.029
(0.028) (0.030)
Total # Candidates −0.103 −0.075
(0.100) (0.107)
Vote Share Prior Election −0.004 −0.006
(0.004) (0.005)
Female Candidate 0.881∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗
(0.335) (0.344)
Female Challenger 0.236 0.069
(0.332) (0.350)
Difference in Law School Prestige −0.018 0.011
(0.075) (0.076)
Murder Rate (log) −0.341 −0.232
(0.280) (0.310)
# Lawyers (log) −0.164 0.083
(0.136) (0.181)
Typology: AHP −2.022∗∗
(0.804)
Typology: CBN −1.221∗
(0.716)
Typology: CBP −1.632∗∗
(0.795)
Typology: ERO −1.728∗∗
(0.676)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 1.934 0.821
(1.513) (1.770)
Observations 344 344
Log Likelihood −191.070 −186.594
AIC 422.140 423.189
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B17: ANOVA Test: Winning - All Candidates in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Resid.
Deviance
Deviance Pr
No
Typology
1 324 382.14
Typology:
Fixed
2 319 373.19 8.952 0.111
Table B18: Logit When Challengers Win in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Winning
(1) (2)
# Candidates 0.207 0.393∗
(0.196) (0.233)
Incumbent Vote Prior Election 0.006 −0.005
(0.007) (0.009)
Difference in Law School Rank −0.050 0.016
(0.151) (0.172)
Female Candidate 2.619∗∗∗ 2.372∗∗
(0.936) (0.942)
Female Challenger −0.777 −0.710
(0.932) (0.979)
Murder Rate (log) −0.596 −0.507
(0.589) (0.733)
# Lawyers (log) −0.563∗∗ −0.253
(0.269) (0.379)
Typology: AHP −4.022∗∗
(1.841)
Typology: CBN −1.753
(1.581)
Typology: CBP −2.330
(1.922)
Typology: ERO −2.557
(1.619)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 3.965 4.169
(2.578) (3.138)
Observations 139 139
Log Likelihood −60.300 −56.213
AIC 156.600 158.425
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B19: ANOVA Test: Winning - Challenger in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Resid.
Deviance
Deviance Pr
No
Typology
1 121 120.6
Typology:
Fixed
2 116 112.42 8.174 0.147
Table B20: Logit When Open Seat Candidates Win in Judicial Primary Elections
Dependent variable:
Winning
(1) (2)
Financial Advantage (log) 0.044 0.049
(0.039) (0.042)
# Candidates −0.307∗∗ −0.288∗
(0.143) (0.153)
Female Candidate 0.837∗∗ 0.784∗
(0.418) (0.427)
Female Challenger 0.034 −0.143
(0.435) (0.465)
Difference in Law School Prestige −0.022 −0.0004
(0.105) (0.108)
Murder Rate (log) −0.581 −0.454
(0.399) (0.459)
# Lawyers (log) −0.013 0.169
(0.197) (0.274)
Typology: AHP −1.418
(1.003)
Typology: CBN −0.915
(0.982)
Typology: CBP −1.196
(1.068)
Typology: ERO −1.297
(0.821)
Year Fixed Effects Included
Constant 1.074 0.153
(1.921) (2.559)
Observations 171 171
Log Likelihood −107.910 −106.387
AIC 251.820 256.773
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B21: ANOVA Test: Winning - Open Seat Candidates in Judicial Primary Elections
Model
Degrees of
Freedom
Resid.
Deviance
Deviance Pr
No
Typology
1 153 215.82
Typology:
Fixed
2 149 212.77 3.046 0.551
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and the press: Newspaper coverage and criminal sentencing across electoral systems.”
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(4): 103–135.
Lindquist, Stefanie A. 2017. “Judicial Activism in State Supreme Courts: Insitutional Design
and Judicial Behavior.” Stanford Law and Policy Review 28(1985): 61–108.
Lovrich Jr, Nicholas P., and Charles H. Sheldon. 1983. “Voters in Contested, Nonpartisan
Judicial Elections: Responsible Electorate or Problematic Public?” The Western Political
Quarterly 36(2): 241–256.
Maestas, Cherie D., Sarah Fulton, L. Sandy Maisel, and Walter J. Stone. 2006. “When to
Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for U.S. House.” American
Political Science Review 100(2): 195–208.
Maisel, L. Sandy, and Walter J. Stone. 1997. “Determinants of Candidate Emergence in U.S.
House Elections: An Exploratory Study.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(1): 79–96.
Martindale-Hubble. 2017. “Martindale-Hubbel Lawyer Searchl.” http://www.martindale.
com [Acccessed: 03 November 2017].
Matson, Marsha, and Terri Susan Fine. 2006. “Ballot Cues in Low-Information Elections.”
State Politics and Policy Quarterly 6(1): 49–72.
McCloskey, Robert G. 2010. The American Supreme Court. 5th ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
McDonald, Michael. 2015. “Voter Turnout: National Turnout Rates, 1787-2012.” http:
//www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data [Acccessed: 05 February
2016].
Mcghee, Eric. 2014. Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections. Technical Report May 2014
Public Policy Institute of California San Francisco, CA: .
Mcghee, Eric, Seth Masket, Boris Shor, Steven Rogers, and Nolan Mccarty. 2013. “A Primary
Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology.” American Journal
of Political Science 58(2): 337–351.
234
McKenzie, Mark Jonathan, Cynthia R. Rugeley, and Michael A. Unger. 2015. “Testing Voter
Responses to New Style Judicial Campaign Appeals : What Works Policy Promotion or
Experience?” Politics and Policy 43(4): 562–585.
Melton, James, and Tom Ginsburg. 2014. “Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really
Matter?” Journal of Law and Courts 2(2): 187–217.
Michelson, Ethan. 2012. “Women in the legal profession, 1970-2010: A study of the global
supply of lawyers.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20(2): 1–46.
Miller, Gene. 2017. “A Few Arguments Against Partisan Judicial Elections.” http:
//standardspeaker.com/opinion/a-few-arguments-against-partisan-judicial-elections-1.
2240756 [Acccessed: 16 September 2017].
National Center for State Courts. 2017. “National Center for State Courts: Methods of Judi-
cial Selection.” http://judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/selection of judges.
cfm?state= [Acccessed: 18 November 2017].
National Conference of State Legislatures. 2016. “State Primary Election Types.” http:
//www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx [Acccessed: 19
September 2016].
National Institute of Money in State Politics. 2017. “Follow the Money.” http://www.
followthemoney.org [Acccessed: 03 November 2017].
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 2012. Vol. 132 Supreme Court.
Nelson, Michael J., Rachel Paine Caufield, and Andrew D. Martin. 2013. “OH, MI: A Note
on Empirical Examinations of Judicial Elections.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 13(4):
495–511.
Nicholson, Stephen P., and Thomas G. Hansford. 2014. “Partisans in robes: Party cues
and public acceptance of supreme court decisions.” American Journal of Political Science
58(3): 620–636.
Nielson, Lindsay, and Neil Visalvanich. 2015. “Primaries and Candidates: Examining the
Influence of Primary Electorates on Candidate Ideology.” Political Science Research and
Methods FirstView: 1–12.
Norrander, Barbara. 1986. “Selective Participation: Presidential Primary Voters as a Subset
of General Election Voters.” American Politics Quarterly 14(1-2): 35–53.
Obergefell v. Hodges. 2015. Vol. 135 Supreme Court.
Ohio Supreme Court. 2017. “Former Justices: Bios: Florence Ellinwood Allen.” https:
//www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/allen.asp [Acccessed: 10 March
2017].
235
Owens, Ryan J., Alexander Tahk, Patrick C. Wohlfarth, and Amanda C. Bryan. 2015.
“Nominating Commissions, Judicial Retention, and Forward-Looking Behavior on State
Supreme Courts: An Empirical Examination of Selection and Retention Methods.” State
Politics & Policy Quarterly 15(2): 211–238.
Palmer, Barbara. 2001. “”To do justly”: The integration of women into the American
Judiciary.” PS - Political Science and Politics 34(2): 235–239.
Pinello, Daniel R. 1995. The Impact of Judicial -Selection Method on State-Supreme-Court
Policy: Innovation, Reaction, and Atrophy. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Pinheiro, Jose, Douglas Bates, Saikat DebRoy, Deepayan Sarkar, and R Core Team. 2017.
nlme: Linear and Nonlinear Mixed Effects Models.
Pomper, Gerald. 1966. “Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections.” The
Public Opinion Quarterly 30(1): 79–97.
Posner, Richard A. 1996. The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform. 2 ed. Cambridga,
MA: Harvard University Press.
R Core Team. 2017. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. Vienna,
Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Ranney, Austin. 1972. “Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections.”
American Political Science Review 66(1): 21–37.
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2001. Hierarchical Linear Models: Ap-
plications and Data Analysis Methods (Advanced Quantitiative Techniques in the Social
Sciences). 2nd ed. New York: Sage Publications.
Reddick, Malia. 2001. “Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature.” Dick-
enson Law Review 106(4): 729–746.
Reid, Traciel V. 2010. “Women Candidates and Judicial Elections: Telling an Untold Story.”
Politics & Gender 6(3): 465–474.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. 2002. Vol. 122 Supreme Court.
Revelle, William. 2017. psych: Procedures for Psychological, Psychometric, and Personality
Research. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University.
Rogowski, Jon C., and Stephanie Langella. 2015. “Primary Systems and Candidate Ideology:
Evidence From Federal and State Legislative Elections.” American Politics Research 43(5):
846–871.
Romans, Neil T. 1974. “The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Es-
cobedo, Miranda and the Use of Judicial Impact Analysis.” The Western Political Quar-
terly pp. 38–59.
236
Roux, Theunis. 2016. “Constitutional Courts as Democratic Consolidators: Insights from
South Africa after 20 Years.” Journal of Southern African Studies 42(1): 5–18.
RStudio Team. 2015. RStudio: Integrated Development Environment for R. Boston, MA:
RStudio, Inc.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. “Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice.” American Journal of
Political Science 46(1): 20–34.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006a. “Do Parties Know That Women Win? Party Leader Beliefs
about Women’s Electoral Chances.” Politics & Gender 2(4): 431–450.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006b. Where Women Run: Gender and Party in the American States.
1 ed. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira, and Richard L. Fox. 2014. “Congressional Elections: Women’s Candi-
dacies and the Road to Gender Parity.” In Gender and Elections, ed. Susan J. Carroll,
and Richard L. Fox. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 265–287.
Savchak, Elisha Carol. 2015. “From Bench to Bench: Is Prior Judicial Experience Favored
by Certain Judicial Selection Methods?” Justice System Journal 36(4): 378–394.
Schaffner, B. F., M. J. Streb, and G. C. Wright. 2007. “A New Look at the Republican
Advantage in Nonpartisan Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 60(2): 240–249.
Schaffner, Brian F., and Jennifer Segal Diascro. 2007. “Judicial Elections in the News.” In
Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections2,
ed. Matthew J. Streb. New York: New York University Press chapter 7, pp. 115–139.
Schaffner, Brian F, and Matthew J Streb. 2002. “The Partisan Heuristic in Low-Information
Elections.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 66(4): 559–581.
Schaffner, Brian F, Matthew Streb, and Gerald Wright. 2001. “Teams Without Uniforms:
The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 54(1):
7–30.
Schotland, Roy A. 1985. “Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes
the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy.” Journal of Law and Politics 2(1): 57–168.
Schotland, Roy A. 2007. “Judges’ Pay: A Chasm Far Worse than Realized, and Worsening.”
Indiana Law Journal 82: 1273–1283.
Schwartz, John. 2009. “Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges.” http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/12/24/us/24judges.html?mcubz=0 [Acccessed: 16 September 2017].
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2004. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited. 2 ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
237
Seltzer, Richard A., Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. 1997. Sex as a Political
Variable. 1 ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Shah, Paru. 2014. “It Takes a Black Candidate: A Supply-Side Theory of Minority Repre-
sentation.” Political Research Quarterly 67: 266–279.
Shepard, R T. 2009. “The Changing Nature of Judicial Leadership.” Indiana Law Review
42: 767–772.
Shepherd, Joanna M. 2009. “Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?” Duke Law Journal
58(2): 1589–1626.
Shugerman, Jed Handelsman. 2010. “Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review.” Harvard Law Review 123(5): 1061–1150.
Sobel, Russell S., and Joshua C. Hall. 2007. “The Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on
Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics.” Cato Journal 27(1): 69–82.
Southwell, Priscilla L. 1986. “The Politics of Disgruntlement : Nonvoting and Defection
among Supporters of Nomination Losers , 1968-1984.” Political Behavior 8(1): 81–95.
Squire, Peverill. 1989. “Challengers in US Senate Elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
pp. 531–547.
Squire, Peverill, and Eric R.A.N. Smith. 1988. “The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters
in Nonpartisan Elections.” The Journal of Politics 50(01): 168.
Steenbergen, Marco R, Bradford S Jones, and Marco R Steenbergen. 2000. “Modeling Mul-
tilevel Data Structures.” American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 218–237.
Stone, George W., Jeffrey G. Blodgett, Japhet Nkonge, and Kathryn T. Cort. 2013. “The
Moderating Influence of Political Involvement on Voters’ Attitudes toward Attack Ads.”
The Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice 21(1): 91–102.
Stratmann, Thomas. 2013. “The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection.” European
Journal of Political Economy 32: 341–355.
Stratmann, Thomas, and Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo. 2006. “Competition Policy for
Elections: Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?” Public Choice 127: 177–206.
Streb, M. J., and B. Frederick. 2008. “Conditions for Competition in Low-Information Ju-
dicial Elections: The Case of Intermediate Appellate Court Elections.” Political Research
Quarterly 62(3): 523–537.
Streb, Matthew J. 2007. “The Study of Judicial Elections.” In Running for Judge: The
Rising Political, Financial and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections, ed. Matthew J. Streb.
New York: New York University Press chapter 1, pp. 1–14.
238
Streb, Matthew J., and Brian Frederick. 2007. “Judicial Reform and the Future of Judicial
Elections.” In Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial and Legal Stakes of
Judicial Elections, ed. Matthew J. Streb. New York: New York University Press chapter 11,
pp. 204–218.
Tarr, G. Alan. 2007. “Politicizing the Process: The New Politics of State Judicial Elections.”
In Bench Press: THe Collision of Courts, Politics, and the Media, ed. Keith J. Bybee.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press chapter 2, pp. 52–74.
Tarr, G. Alan. 2012. Without Fear or Favor. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Tarr, G. Alan, and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter. 1988. State Supreme Courts in State and
Nation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Theall, Katherine P., Richard Scribner, Stephanie Broyles, Qingzhao Yu, Jigar Chotalia,
Neal Simonsen, Matthias Schonlau, and Bradley P. Carlin. 2011. “Impact of Small Group
Size on Neighborhood Influences in Multilevel Models.” J Epidemiol Community Health
65(8): 668–695.
Toomet, Ott, and Arne Henningsen. 2008. “Sample Selection Models in R: Package sample-
Selection.” Journal of Statistical Software 27(7).
Tyler, Tom R., and Kenneth Rasinski. 1991. “Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy,
and the Acceptance of unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson.”
Law & Society Review 25(3): 621–630.
U.S. Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2017. “Uniform Crime Report-
ing Statistics.” https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/ [Acccessed: 07 November 2017].
Valdini, Melody E., and Christopher Shortell. 2016. “Women’s Representation in the Highest
Court.” Political Research Quarterly 69(4): 865–876.
Venables, W. N., and B. D. Ripley. 2002. Modern Applied Statistics with S. Fourth ed. New
York: Springer.
Vining Jr, Richard L., and Phil Marcin. 2014. “Explaining Intermedia Coverage of Supreme
Court Decisions.” In Covering the United States Supreme Court in the Digital Age, ed.
Richard Davis. New York: Cambridge University Press chapter 5, pp. 89–108.
Vining, Richard L., and Teena Wilhelm. 2010. “Explaining high-profile coverage of state
supreme court decisions.” Social Science Quarterly 91(3): 704–723.
Wanat, John. 1974. “Political Broadcast Advertising and Primary Election Voting.” Journal
of Broadcasting 18(4): 413–422.
Warnes, Gregory R., Ben Bolker, Thomas Lumley, and Randall C Johnson. N.d. gmodels:
Various R Programming Tools for Model Fitting.
239
Webster, Peter D. 1995. “Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?”
Florida State University Law Review 23(1).
Wei, Ran, and Ven-Hwei Lo. 2007. “The Third-Person Effects of Political Attack Ads in the
2004 U.S. Presidential Election.” Media Psychology 9(February): 367–388.
Wickham, Hadley. 2007. “Reshaping Data with the reshape Package.” Journal of Statistical
Software 21(12): 1–20.
Wickham, Hadley. 2009. ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis. Springer-Verlag New
York.
Wickham, Hadley, Romain Francois, Lionel Henry, and Kirill Mller. 2017. dplyr: A Grammar
of Data Manipulation.
Williams, Margaret S. 2006. “In a Different Path: The Process of Becoming a Judge for
Women and Men.” Judicature 90(3): 104–113.
Williams, Richard. 2017. “Panel Data 4: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Models.” https:
//www3.nd.edu/∼rwilliam/stats3/Panel04-FixedVsRandom.pdf [Acccessed: 22 October
2017].
Zeileis, Achim, and Torsten Hothorn. 2002. “Diagnostic Checking in Regression Relation-
ships.” R News 2(3): 7–10.
Zuur, Alain F., Elena N. Leno, Neil J. Walker, Anatoly A. Saveliev, and Graham M. Smith.
2011. Mixed effects models and extensions in ecology with R. Vol. 36 New York: Springer.
240
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Email- keugenis@gmail.com 
 
Education: 
 
2013-2017 Doctorate of Philosophy: University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
  Political Science 
Dissertation: Effects of Judicial Primary Election Systems on Challenger 
Emergence and Candidate Success 
 
2011-2013 Master of Arts: University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
  Political Science: International Relations; Comparative Politics 
  Thesis: Who Will Tell the Story?: Terrorism’s Relationship with the International  
  Mass Media   
 
2007-2011 Bachelor of Science: Northern Arizona University. 
  Political Science; minors in Sociology and International Relations 
  Summa Cum Laude   
 
2007-2011 Bachelor of Science in Journalism: Northern Arizona University. 
  Journalism; emphasis in News Editorial 
  Summa Cum Laude   
 
Research Interests: 
 
Judicial Politics Law and Courts  Agenda-Setting  Framing 
 
Media   State Supreme Courts  Communications  State Politics  
 
Current Projects: 
 
2017 Gill, Rebecca D. and Kate Eugenis. “Electoral Advantage or the Rewards of Caution? 
 Gender and State Supreme Court Elections.” Revise and Resubmit. 
 
Publications: 
 
2015  “`Covering the Supreme Court in the Digital Age’ Richard Davis ed.” Book  
 Review. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 92(3): 758-760. 
 
Presentations: 
 
2017 “Women in Judicial Primary Elections.” Midwest Political Science Association 
 Conference. April 6-9. Chicago, Illinois. 
2017 (with Dr. Rebecca D. Gill) “Competitive Advantage: Electing Women as Judges.” 
 Southern Political Science Association. January 12-14. New Orleans, Louisiana. 
2016 (with Dr. Rebecca D. Gill) “All Press is Good Press: The News Media and the Incumbent 
 Advantage in Judicial Elections.” Midwest Political Science Association Conference. 
 April 7-10. Chicago, Illinois.  
 
241
 
 
2015 “Framing and its Impact on Public Opinion: The United Nations and Libya 2011.” 
 International Studies Association Conference. February 18-21. New Orleans, Louisiana. 
2015 (with Jonathan Doc Bradley) “A Candidate by Any Other Name: Investigating the Use of 
 Informal Names as Heuristics.” International Studies Association Conference. February 
 18-21. New Orleans, Louisiana. 
2014 “Who Will Tell the Story?: Terrorism’s Relationship with the International News Media.” 
 Graduate and Professional Student Research Forum. March 29. Las Vegas, Nevada. 
2013 “What the West Thinks: How the Foreign Media can Influence the Course of a 
 Revolution.”  Pacific Northwest Political Science Association Conference. October 17 
 19. Vancouver, British Colombia, Canada. 
2013    “A Machine Fueled by the Past: Terrorism’s Relationship with the Global Media” 
            Western Political Science Association Conference. March 27-30. Hollywood, California. 
2011    “Miracles Don't Happen Here: Israel, the Security Wall, and the Gaza Strip” Intellectual 
            Intersections: A Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Flagstaff, Arizona. 
 
Teaching Experience: 
 
Teaching 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas: 
 PSC 231: Introduction to International Relations (Fall 2015) 
 PSC 101: Introduction to American Politics (Fall 2013 - Spring 2015)  
 
Teaching Assistant 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas: 
 PSC 304: The Legislative Process (with Dr. Daniel Lee) 
 PSC 401Z: Polarized Politics in the U.S. (with Dr. Daniel Lee) 
 PSC 411D: The Constitutional Rights of Women (with Dr. Rebecca Gill) 
 PSC 330: Constitutional Law: Governmental Powers (with Dr. Rebecca Gill) 
 PSC 411E: Constitutional Rights of the Criminally Accused (with Dr. Rebecca Gill) 
 PSC 407A: Political Systems of Western Europe (with Dr. Christian Jensen) 
 PSC 101: Introduction to American Politics (with Dr. Cathy Hanks) 
 PSC 100: Nevada Constitution (with Dr. Cathy Hanks) 
PSC 211: Introduction to Comparative Politics (with Dr. Michele Kuenzi; Dr. Christian 
Jensen) 
Northern Arizona University: 
 JLS 104: Introduction to Journalism (with Dr. Peter Friederici) 
 HON 190: Seminar in Critical Reading/Writing (with Robyn Slayton-Martin) 
 
Certifications: 
 
2017 UNLV Graduate Teaching Certificate  
2016 Stanford Online Statistical Learning Course 
2015 UNLV Graduate Research Certificate 
2013 College Reading and Learning Association -- International Tutor Program   
 Certification -- Level 1 Tutor 
 
 
 
 
242
 
 
Honors & Awards: 
 
2016  UNLV GPSA Annual Research Forum Outstanding Presentation. 2nd Place.  
2015  Rebel Grad Slam 3 Minute Thesis Semifinalist 
2015  COLA Ph.D. Student Summer Faculty Research Stipend Recipient (with Dr. 
Rebecca Gill) 
2011-2014 Graduate Access Award x 3 
2013  Graduate Matriculation Scholarship 
2011  Summa Cum Laude, Northern Arizona University 
2011  Charles W. Barnes Excellence in Honors Award 
2011  Ina Langstaff Award for Outstanding Student in International Affairs 
2007-2011 Northern Arizona University Dean’s List x 8 
2010  Phi Kappa Phi 
 
University Service: 
 
2015-2017 Graduate Rebel Ambassadors, Graduate Ambassador, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas; Las Vegas, Nevada. 
2014  General Education Assessment Summit, Participant, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas; Las Vegas, Nevada. 
2008-2010 GURUS (Guides to University Retention and Undergraduate Success) Steering 
Committee Member, Peer Mentor, Honors Program, Northern Arizona University; 
Flagstaff, Arizona 
 
Other Experience: 
 
2017 – Present Data Research Analyst, Clark County School District, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
2016- 2017 Research Assistant, “Policy Diffusion and the Puzzle of Juvenile Justice 
Reform.” University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Las Vegas, Nevada 
2013- 2017 English Instructor, Upward Bound, Center for Academic Enrichment and 
Outreach, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Las Vegas, Nevada 
2016 Research Assistant, National Science Foundation, Law & Social Sciences 
Program. “Objective Measures and Implicit Bias in Evaluating Public 
Officials.” [SES1354544]. University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Las Vegas, 
Nevada 
2011- 2015 Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science; University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas; Las Vegas, Nevada 
2015  Advanced Placement Exam Grader- American Government, Educational 
Testing Service, Salt Lake City, Utah 
2013  Writing Assistant, College of Southern Nevada; Las Vegas, Nevada 
2013, 2012 Summer Intern, The Neeley Law Firm; Chandler, Arizona 
2013 Latin America and World Government Research Assistant, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas; Las Vegas, Nevada 
2011 Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Communications, 
Northern Arizona University; Flagstaff, Arizona 
2008-2011 Peer Writing Tutor, Honors Program, Northern Arizona University; 
Flagstaff, Arizona 
243

